The Moderation Government in the Name of the Imprisoned, Benefits the Imprisoners

Statements by Ali Shamkhani, Secretary of the National Security Council, denying the house arrest of Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mehdi Karroubi, and Zahra Rahnavard have once again brought the issue of the symbolic leaders of the Green Movement into the spotlight of public opinion. The denial of Shamkhani's claim that "the imprisoned have no restrictions on meeting individuals" by the families of Mousavi and Karroubi, as well as widespread negative reactions, led to limited openings regarding meetings between Mousavi and Rahnavard with their families. Mehdi Karroubi, according to his children's statements after surgery, had previously gained the opportunity for unlimited visits with his wife, children, and grandchildren due to a hunger strike. This slight and relative improvement in the atmosphere of house arrest is uncertain whether it reflects a temporary tactic or a gradual process of lifting the house arrest. Some reformists and critical conservatives, such as Ali Motahari, have expressed optimism that these limited openings could mark the beginning of a gradual lifting of the house arrest. However, this optimism and the reasoning behind it only consider the physical lifting of the house arrest. In clearer terms, they pursue a resolution of the house arrest based on mutual agreement to find a mutually acceptable way between the regime and Mousavi, Rahnavard, and Karroubi, so that no party claims victory, ultimately closing the case of the 2009 election protests with the end of the house arrest. The result of this perspective is the negation of the distinct political approach of Mousavi and Karroubi after 2009, who had clearly called for extensive political changes based on a community-centered reform strategy. It also effectively closes the case for seeking justice for the crimes committed in 2009. The success of this approach requires the symbolic leaders of the Green Movement to return to their pre-2009 election positions and adopt similar retreats as the reformists, particularly Seyyed Mohammad Khatami. Mousavi, Rahnavard, and Karroubi have so far resisted and have not accepted such a demand. They have not claimed that if freed, they would pursue their past methods and activities unchanged. In the current conditions of the country, a realistic approach clarifies that there is no space for protest activities similar to those of 2009. However, defending the positions of the Green Movement, refusing any formal or implicit agreement with the regime, and the comprehensive failure of the repentance project place the symbolic leaders of the Green Movement in an alternative position to potentially organize a political movement and reconstruct the Green Movement in future critical moments. Concerns about this issue, despite differences of opinion regarding the overall issue of house arrest, are a point of commonality between moderates and some reformists with the institution of the Supreme Leader and authoritarian forces. In other words, lifting the house arrest in a neutral framework has created temporary interests for all factions of conservatives, moderates, and the majority of reformists. Explaining this political phenomenon requires a brief review of the historical trajectory of the house arrest of the symbolic leaders of the Green Movement. Hassan Rouhani and his close circle have specific reasons for wanting to reduce the lifting of the house arrest to physical freedom and the retreat of the imprisoned from their 2009 positions. However, the most significant factor is the stark differences in discourse and politics between Rouhani and Mousavi and Karroubi, and Rouhani's close circle evaluates the return of Mousavi, Rahnavard, and Karroubi to politics as a threat to their political and social position. They are also not in favor of the strengthening of reformists, and the main reason for Rouhani's refusal to actively pursue solutions to Seyyed Mohammad Khatami's political issues stems from this matter. Mr. Khamenei, at the beginning of the post-election street protests, tried to encourage Mousavi and Karroubi to silence and withdraw from protests through political strategies and sermons. The negative response from Karroubi and Mousavi led to the next stage of bloody suppression of protests with minimal casualties alongside the arrest of their associates and political forces, character assassination, and limiting their political action space. This was aimed at exhausting the Green Movement over time through security and judicial confrontations alongside manipulating the regime's social base. The emergence of the Arab Spring and the alignment of Mousavi, Karroubi, and Rahnavard with this regional wave caused concern among the power bloc, and in this atmosphere, the high and uncontrollable risk of the leaders' communication channels with the Green Movement led the regime to impose house arrest on the symbolic leaders of the Green Movement. It is not incorrect to say that the house arrest was somewhat imposed on the regime and was not the preferred choice of the ruling power. The institution of the Supreme Leader and aligned forces did not want Mousavi and Karroubi to be in an alternative position and lead the opposing political movement. Their main goal was to neutralize and weaken Mousavi and Karroubi by obstructing the Green Movement. Contrary to official claims, the lack of judicial action against Mousavi and Karroubi was the result of the regime's expediency and prioritizing its costs over perceived benefits. Therefore, from the beginning of the house arrest, secret negotiations and public stances around the demand for repentance and expression of remorse flowed. The strictness was also intensified with the aim of physically and psychologically exhausting Mousavi, Rahnavard, and Karroubi so that they would reconsider their positions. However, the refusal of the imprisoned and their firm resistance, alongside the unstable political conditions, prolonged the house arrest. Examining the events raises serious doubts that the regime intended for the permanent house arrest of Mousavi, Rahnavard, and Karroubi from the outset. Rather, it seems that the process of house arrest was somewhat laid out to first lead to repentance and, if that did not materialize, to weaken the political position of the imprisoned and render them forgotten in the political arena. Now, nearly eight years after the house arrest and with the aging and illnesses of the imprisoned, particularly Mehdi Karroubi, the discussion of ending the house arrest has become more serious for the regime. However, this issue has requirements from the regime's perspective that have not yet been realized, and their freedom is currently considered a calculated risk for the power bloc. Such a situation has made the regime in need of mediation, and the Moderation Government is a suitable option for playing this mediating role so that the house arrest can be lifted in a framework that does not create problems for the regime. Hassan Rouhani and his close circle also have specific reasons for wanting to reduce the lifting of the house arrest to physical freedom and the retreat of the imprisoned from their 2009 positions. Hassan Rouhani has opposed the Green Movement since December 30, 2009, when the regime ended the initial wave of street protests, responding positively to the call for "political insight" from the leadership. Therefore, he personally holds a contrary view to the later positions of Mousavi and Karroubi. On the other hand, pursuing the lifting of the house arrest and respecting their citizenship rights would place Rouhani in practical opposition to the institution of the Supreme Leader, which he has refrained from for various reasons. However, the most significant factor is the stark differences in discourse and politics between Rouhani and Mousavi and Karroubi, and his close circle evaluates the return of Mousavi, Rahnavard, and Karroubi to politics as a threat to their political and social position. They are also not in favor of the strengthening of reformists, and the main reason for Rouhani's refusal to actively pursue solutions to Seyyed Mohammad Khatami's political issues stems from this matter. These factors, alongside Rouhani's superficial and surface-level approach and his desire to find a middle ground in resolving issues, have led him to welcome the lifting of the house arrest in a way that the imprisoned come out of the house arrest while interacting with the regime. He is under pressure to find a solution that satisfies both parties to counter accusations of "populist and opportunistic handling of the house arrest" due to political exploitation of the house arrest in the 2013 and 2017 elections. Moderate reformists led by Seyyed Mohammad Khatami have also taken a different path from the symbolic leaders of the Green Movement since the 2016 parliamentary elections, choosing a different path of interaction with the leadership. Over the past six years, they have pursued a strategy of compromise and therefore prefer that Mousavi and Karroubi also move past the 2009 elections and begin a new chapter in political engagement that does not create a crisis in their relations with the regime and continues to build trust with Mr. Khamenei. Some prominent reformist figures have repeatedly stated since 2013 that they are willing to have the case of the 2009 election protests closed if the political space opens up relatively. In this context, the National Security Council, under Hassan Rouhani's leadership, has taken measures to test the possibility of interaction between the imprisoned and the regime as a condition for their freedom. Therefore, Ali Shamkhani's statements denying the house arrest are not an isolated and unsupported comment but rather a conscious decision by the Moderation Government to gradually reduce constraints while aligning with the regime and respecting the sensitivities of security institutions, and on the other hand, Mousavi, Karroubi, and Rahnavard should also declare their adherence to the principles of the regime and accept the existing political power balance. The selection of Ismail Doosti, a traditional figure trusted by the regime, who published an independent list in the recent Tehran city council elections contrary to the opinion of the Supreme Policy Council of Reformists, carries a specific meaning and message. He has only mentioned his adherence to the regime and belief in the theory of the Supreme Leader from discussions he has had with Karroubi in recent meetings. Decoding this brief report and his inappropriate interactions with journalists reveals the coordinated efforts of moderates and conservatives to persuade the imprisoned to overlook the Green Movement and interact with the regime as a gateway to the gradual lifting of the house arrest. The clock is ticking against the imprisoners. The continuation of the house arrest of the beloved Prime Minister of Ayatollah Khomeini and the former Speaker of Parliament, a close friend of most of the regime's officials, has become more problematic than ever due to the associated risks regarding their health. On the other hand, considering the political stagnation prevailing in society, the continuation of the house arrest does not tip the balance of benefits heavier than the costs. Additionally, the new international conditions and the recent regional alignments against the Islamic Republic have also introduced a new variable into the house arrest equation. Calls for unity and national reconciliation from both factions in the face of external threats, which the regime views as a tactical and temporary approach, encourage the lifting of the house arrest. However, the institution of the Supreme Leader and authoritarian forces insist that lifting the house arrest does not create a significant change in the current political situation and that reformists remain on the margins of power while Mousavi and Karroubi should somehow enter political retirement. Therefore, alongside the murmurs for limited openings in the house arrest situation, strictness against Seyyed Mohammad Khatami has increased. Thus, the lifting of the house arrest in a gradual and phased manner, which has also been accompanied by Rouhani's practical acceptance, requires a positive response from Mousavi, Karroubi, and Rahnavard to the interactive approach with the regime and the overlooking of past positions and demands after their release. They have so far rejected this approach and preferred to bear the costs of enduring house arrest while maintaining their positions to achieve freedom. However, they have not specifically and separately demanded the lifting of the house arrest, but have also described it as a lawlessness alongside numerous previous violations. Mehdi Karroubi has repeatedly stated that he demands a public trial and the clarification of the truth of the matter. The significant gap between the positions of both sides, which does not seem to be bridged in the short term, has put the lifting of the house arrest in a deadlock and has only made limited openings in the living conditions under house arrest possible. However, at the same time, the possibility of lifting the house arrest is not ruled out if the imprisoned continue to resist. The experience of Ayatollah Montazeri's house arrest and how it ended highlights a state where despair from a positive response to interaction with the regime, the challenging environment for effective political action by the imprisoned, and increasing risks of continued house arrest may change the conditions such that, despite the personal and characteristic confrontations of Mr. Khamenei and the objections of authoritarian forces, the house arrest of Mousavi, Karroubi, and Rahnavard may end in a phased process. The likelihood of this happening is low, but it may occur after 2018. Lifting the house arrest in a framework where Mousavi, Karroubi, and Rahnavard can exercise their citizenship rights and maintain their adherence to the Green Movement also has a potential path that results from the activation of the protest movement, but observing the current political conditions makes the likelihood of this event seem weak.