The Moral Legacy of Khomeini: The Spread of Hatred and Violence

Typically, when a political leader passes away, media outlets and political and social organizations, as well as historians, evaluate the actions and behaviors of the deceased leader and assess their presence in the political arena, examining their so-called 'legacy.' This evaluation is not easy, especially in countries like Iran, where many events remain shrouded in ambiguity for long periods, sometimes indefinitely. For instance, it took eighty years to understand that Reza Shah Pahlavi was not merely a servant of England and other foreign powers but, in fact, a man whose efforts significantly contributed to Iran's independent and unified existence in the last century; the concept of modern Iran is also unthinkable without the foundations laid during Reza Shah's twenty-year rule. The discussion surrounding Khomeini's legacy also navigates such complexities. Ten years have passed since Khomeini's death, yet many events leading to his rise as the absolute ruler of the clergy remain unclear. For example, it is still not precisely known who took the American embassy staff (and indeed all the people of Iran) hostage and, by creating a suffocating atmosphere, illegally and unconstitutionally ratified the constitution of the clergy's guardianship; it is still unclear what Khomeini's role was in inciting various political figures and factions against each other for political maneuvering in the country; it is still not known what the letters exchanged between Ayatollah Khomeini and some security officials contained (during his last year in Najaf); it is still not exactly known what transpired during two meetings (totaling four hours) between Khomeini and Mr. Richard Cottam in Paris (in the fall of 1978) and what agreements were made (although parts of it have been published in Sahifeh Noor); it may take forty years for Richard Cottam's report to the CIA to be declassified and published, as both parties to the conversation have passed away, and Dr. Ibrahim Yazdi, who was his translator in that conversation, is unwilling to discuss the matters raised in that meeting, believing he is still 'politically active.' (Dr. Yazdi made this statement in the summer of 1998 at a gathering in Washington in response to my question.) It is still not precisely clear how Mr. Bazargan facilitated the agreement between the embassies of England, America, and the Soviet Union in Tehran to declare the Islamic Republic; the complete text of the minutes of the Revolutionary Council has not been published, and there is much speculation about the members of this council – and possibly a council formed alongside it with the same name. Thus, we see that once again, many unclear and unspoken points remain for the evaluation of the so-called political legacy of one of the most prominent political figures in contemporary Iran – namely, Mr. Khomeini – which renders such an assessment incomplete and perhaps impossible. However, it can be said that Ayatollah Khomeini led a rebellion and revolution that resulted in the abolition of the monarchy in Iran, and thus his name will undoubtedly remain in the history of Iran, just as the names of figures like Mohammad Ali Foroughi, Reza Shah Pahlavi, Dr. Mossadegh, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, and Qavam al-Saltaneh will remain due to their influence on Iranian history. Apart from the political and historical issues regarding Khomeini's legacy, which has not yet reached the time for a fair assessment, one can examine the moral and behavioral legacy of Mr. Khomeini, the sources of which – namely his sayings and writings – are available; although the Islamic Republic is gradually collecting and prohibiting the mention of some of these sayings and writings and attempting to erase them from people's memories. A defining characteristic of Khomeini's behavior and actions was the hatred he harbored for the people of Iran. The roots of this hatred may be traced back to the treatment that the people and freedom-seekers of Iran meted out to clerics like Sheikh Fazlollah during the Constitutional Revolution, including hanging him as a 'corrupt on earth.' This hatred of Khomeini for the people increased during the reign of Reza Shah, who could not tolerate clerical interference in state affairs, and whose modernization program was detested by the clergy. The clergy opposed the establishment of courts, primary and secondary schools, and the administration of endowments, as well as the replacement of traditional baths with modern showers, the entry of women into society, and the construction of roads, hospitals, railways, and universities, all of which they presented as opposition to the Shia religion and faith. The reflection of Khomeini's hatred for the Iranian people can be seen in the preface of the book 'Kashf al-Asrar,' published in the early years after Reza Shah's ousting. There, he writes: 'He (Reza Shah) spent time with the late Modarres and had private contact with him and realized that he could not be convinced by anything, neither by bribery, nor by threats, nor by the power of logic. He assessed the situation of other scholars and understood his duty to execute the plans of his masters. Despite all the pressures, tortures, and humiliations that particularly the clerics faced during those days of oppression in Iran, they rose and revolted several times to eliminate the corruptions that they privately knew about from reliable sources, from Isfahan, Tabriz, and Mashhad, but the weakness of the people, who are the executive force of the scholars' plans, rendered their actions fruitless. The clerics recognized from the very first days of Reza Khan's rule that it was against the interests of the country, and as much as they could, publicly and when that was not possible, secretly and privately, they alerted the people to his destructive corruptions. However, the propaganda of that faction through the newspapers of that day, which were the disgrace of Iran, and some of which are still active today, discredited them [the religious scholars] in the eyes of the people to the extent that they were not allowed to ride in cars, and any defect in the car was attributed to the clerics' presence. I myself saw that on the way, when the gasoline ran out, the driver said it was due to the clerics' curse; I, as a Sayyid, was not objected to.' Khomeini is incorrect; according to documents recently published (the memoirs of Soleiman Behboudi.... 1999), Modarres visited Reza Shah repeatedly and stayed with him for long periods, consulting with him on various state matters. However, what is interesting in Khomeini's quotation regarding Modarres' thoughts is that he boasts that Modarres, being a cleric, would not even submit to the truth 'by the power of logic!' This is also an incorrect claim. Although Modarres clashed with Reza Shah over power – and also supported Sheikh Khaz'al, the British puppet, and his support for the separation of Khuzestan from Iran – he was the one who, through various arrangements, prevented the republicanism of Iran from being realized by Reza Khan, the Commander of the Army. In reality, what caused Khomeini's hatred for the Iranian people at that time was precisely what he summarized in the phrase 'the weakness of the people, who are the executive force of the scholars' plans,' that same 'weakness' that rendered the clergy's plans for gaining power through 'the brilliant record of the clergy' in anti-Iranian and anti-people sentiments ineffective. Khomeini at that time was also unable to understand the sentiments of the Iranian people, why they attributed every negative outcome to 'the clerics' presence' and 'the clerics' curse,' and why – as he himself said – even the coachmen refused to carry two groups, 'the clerics' and 'the whores.' Was it not the case that the Iran-Russia wars, which led to the humiliating treaties of Golestan and Turkmenchay, occurred by the fatwa of the clergy? Was it not the case that the people rightly attributed the disintegration of Iran, the defeat in the war with Russia, and the corruption of the Qajars to the interference of the clergy in governmental affairs? Was it not the case that many clerics – including Sheikh Ali Kani in Tehran and the Friday Imam of Tabriz – hoarded grains during the famine while people were dying of hunger? Was it not the case that the clergy, who controlled the courts, would marry women to others at their will, receiving gifts and money, and would create documents for people's properties in the names of others? Was it not the case that some clerics were large landowners and the oppression they inflicted on the peasants caused a negative reaction from the people towards them, just as Khomeini's father, who was a cruel landowner, was killed by his peasants, and Khomeini grew up in the homes of relatives without the care and affection of a father or mother? (Refer to the memoirs of Ayatollah Pasandide, Khomeini's brother.) This is just a sample of the 'brilliant plans' of the clergy in Iran over the last two hundred years. Khomeini knew these and worse, and for these reasons, he gradually developed a hatred for the Iranian people, using them merely as cannon fodder and 'the executive force of his plans,' as in his view, religion, faith, Islam, Shia, honesty, dignity, and truthfulness were only worth mentioning when they could benefit him and his far-fetched ideas. Khomeini had no fear of the people being killed; in fact, he welcomed it and wherever he could, he incited people and youth to become 'martyrs' so that he could politically exploit the 'blood of the martyrs.' Most clerics believed – and some still believe – that if possible, every effort should be made to prevent bloodshed and killings, and that 'the blood of the people' is worth more than to be spent on unclear paths, while Khomeini promoted in his speeches and writings that 'be killed and kill...' to the extent that Mr. Seyyed Hamid Rouhani, Khomeini's official historian, addresses this issue in a book titled 'Analytical Study of Imam Khomeini's Movement' and clearly – and indeed proudly – shows how 'Imam Khomeini' was not afraid of 'the blood and lives' (pages 310 to 314). 'Although the issue of 'blood and lives' is outside the scope of this writing, I pursued it to respond to those lazy charlatans [referring to clerics who oppose bloodshed] who justify their shameful silence in the face of dangers threatening Islam and the Islamic community (to prevent bloodshed) and (to preserve blood and lives) and criticize the great leader for initiating a movement that led to the killing of Muslims by the Shah...'. The official historian of Khomeini does not forget to attribute this 'decisive determination and iron will' to the Shia Imams so that anyone who considers 'bloodshed' to be against religion and spirituality is crushed and silenced, depriving opponents of the courage to breathe. '[Khomeini] heroically and fearlessly charged forward, following the great leaders – Imam Ali, Imam Hussein, and other saints of God and outstanding men of Islamic history...' Thus, we see that Khomeini's following of the Shia Imams in bloodshed, alongside his hatred for the Iranian people – and his insatiable desire for power and rule – had reached a point where to reach his destination and kiss the forehead of power, he welcomed the slaughter of the Iranian people and made their blood a collateral for his power acquisition. Khomeini's hatred for the Iranian people had expanded to such an extent that he – despite all religious teachings – expressed and instilled the following view about the officers of the Shah's Imperial Guard to his supporters: 'These executioners are often the offspring of the illicit unions of deceived, lustful, and corrupt men and women who, after being abandoned in the alley and at the mosque door, are taken to municipal orphanages, raised there, and educated in the arms of foreign mercenaries, and then enter the army and are assigned to the Imperial Guard, and since they know nothing of God, religion, and... and are without real parents, they are the only group in the army loyal to the Shah and love him to the point of worship.' (Quoted from the book 'Analytical Study of Khomeini's Movement,' p. 340) Truly, Khomeini's knowledge, humanity, and religious integrity were unique! (It may be interesting and necessary for dear readers to note that: the late General Syad Shirazi, who was assassinated about ten years ago by the People's Mujahedin with the collaboration of a faction of the security apparatus of the Islamic Republic in Tehran, was one of the officers of this Imperial Guard and, contrary to what Khomeini propagated about such individuals and accused their mothers and fathers of prostitution – was a very devout man and rose to the highest military positions in this Islamic Republic. This itself is an example of how Khomeini instilled hatred towards the Iranian people without having the slightest understanding of them. It is also a striking example of the indecency of a man who calls himself a 'clergyman.') Khomeini's method – contrary to the norms of spirituality and humanity – for destroying his opponents...