The Nature of Post-Ahmadinejad Presidential Elections

After quotes and speculations regarding Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's opposition to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's candidacy, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran finally stated last week that to prevent the polarization of society before the twelfth presidential election, he advised Mr. Ahmadinejad to refrain from running in the May elections. It was then reported that Mr. Ahmadinejad accepted Khamenei's advice during their in-person meeting in September. With Ahmadinejad not running, who some experts believe was the most viable candidate for the conservative camp opposing Hassan Rouhani's government, what will the elections look like? This is the main question posed by Radio Farda to three guests on this week's program: Mojtaba Vahedi, former editor of the Aftab Yazd newspaper in Washington, Morteza Kazemian, journalist and political activist from the National-Religious faction in Paris, and Ali Haji Qasemi, head of the Political Science and Social Policy Department at Södertörn University in Stockholm. Mojtaba Vahedi: Last week, Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, said that his recommendation for Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to refrain from announcing his candidacy in the elections was to prevent the political polarization. What is your analysis of the background that led the leader to make such a suggestion? Mojtaba Vahedi: I believe the reason is the same as what Khamenei apparently opposed, which is the polarization of society. Khamenei himself has been a model for creating polarization in many elections. In the 1997 elections, he entered the field in such a way that the atmosphere became completely polarized, and a significant portion of Khatami's votes were due to the polarization Khamenei created. In the last examples, in the February 2016 elections, by introducing the 'English list,' Khamenei naturally created polarization in society, as people voted negatively against the clear pole of this polarization, which was Khamenei himself. Regarding Ahmadinejad, I think Khamenei and his allies had a concern that if Ahmadinejad came this time, it wouldn’t matter how many votes he received; those votes would be his own, not the conservatives', and then they would inevitably face a polarization where if a large number of people voted under the impression that he stood against the leader at the end of his presidency and later made moves or threats indicating his opposition to the leadership, if he received votes, this could create a model of polarization with Khamenei on one side. I believe the main reason was that before Ahmadinejad could start gathering supporters in the cities and raise discussions that would certainly strengthen this polarization, Khamenei opposed him. I do not believe he is generally against polarization, but he fears polarization that results in people voting for a pole opposite to him. I think this has been the main reason. Morteza Kazemian, what do you think? What were the backgrounds for such a decision? Morteza Kazemian: I think he tried to prevent a crisis and assessed prevention as better than cure. He had an assessment of Ahmadinejad as a self-willed adventurer, and considering the eleven-day strike in April 2011, Ahmadinejad's entry and possibly his presidency would not have been pleasant for the supreme leader. Additionally, the polarization issue that Mr. Vahedi mentioned was very important. Ahmadinejad's candidacy could polarize society. On one side would be someone who described the Greens as debris, emerged from an electoral coup, and on the other side, millions of citizens who protested the results of the 2009 election. Of course, Khamenei stood alongside Ahmadinejad in that election. Furthermore, Ahmadinejad's candidacy raised serious and important questions related to the cases of embezzlement and corruption that the Rouhani government is currently filled with, which could implicate many individuals and entities. Overall, I think Ahmadinejad's candidacy could have been very costly for the political power structure, especially its core. Although I must emphasize that this statement and intervention by the Supreme Leader has somewhat violated the fundamental rights of Ahmadinejad and his social supporters. Ali Haji Qasemi, what is your opinion? Ali Haji Qasemi: I think avoiding the polarization of society, where Ahmadinejad would be a problematic figure for the regime and for Iranian society, was the most important factor that led the Supreme Leader to intervene and set Ahmadinejad aside at the beginning of the electoral campaign. Because I think our view of the Supreme Leader should change a bit. For him, preserving the regime, stability, and tranquility of society seem to be the most important goals, and he has achieved this in recent years. Therefore, if we look at the conservative camp, after Mr. Nateq-Nouri, who represented this faction in an electoral battle 20 years ago, we have not had an acceptable conservative figure until now. Ahmadinejad can be said to have been a rebel who dominated the conservative faction and showed them the taste of victory, and they abandoned their candidate midway and clung to him. But they will not repeat this mistake because Ahmadinejad's victory would not be a victory for the conservatives, and they have learned this lesson and are assured that he works for himself and for his radical faction in the conservative camp, does not obey anyone, and does not make deals with anyone. Naturally, such a president, if he came and won, would not be beneficial for the conservative camp. Conservatives are actually freer now and can operate from their traditional conservative position and negotiate with Rouhani's government and not be willing to pay the price for the mistakes or extremism imposed by someone like Ahmadinejad. There is a rationality in rejecting Ahmadinejad in this electoral battle. Mr. Vahedi, in the absence of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, what shape can the upcoming elections take? Is the possibility of polarization that the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran says he wants to prevent eliminated, or could another type of polarization emerge? Mojtaba Vahedi: Let me briefly respond to Mr. Haji Qasemi and Mr. Kazemian's remarks. I disagree with the notion that Ahmadinejad is solely tied to the radical conservative faction. Compare the positions of Ahmadinejad in the last two years of his presidency and his last three years with the positions of those who are currently dominating the podiums and institutions with the support of the leader. Look at the positions of Alim al-Huda and Jannati on social and cultural issues, the positions of Saeed Jalili on the war and the JCPOA, and the positions of 99% of conservatives regarding the JCPOA. Are they more radical than Ahmadinejad's positions? I believe Khamenei's and his allies' concern is not the dominance of extremists. Khamenei implicitly supported the attack on the Saudi embassy. Of course, it is true that he has made a superficial opposition. But he says do not suppress revolutionary forces. I do not believe that their concern is the dominance of the radical faction. Their concern is something else. However, regarding what happens in the absence of Ahmadinejad, I believe there are two issues. One is that conservatives have suffered a loss. In the sense that Ahmadinejad would not have been a candidate for conservatives but could have played a destructive role against reformists. No one can do populism like Ahmadinejad, whether for destruction or attraction. I think conservatives made a mistake in this regard. No one can come and destroy with Ahmadinejad's language, and his destruction would resonate with some of them. In this regard, they have suffered. On the other hand, it can be said that the statements that Mr. Mir-Tajeddini and Mr. Raoufian and other friends from the conservative faction have made will at least reduce one of those who could have attracted some of the votes of the opponents of reform to the main candidate of the conservatives. In this regard, I think this will benefit conservatives. However, how much the outcome of this benefit and loss will ultimately favor conservatives is too early to judge. We need to see what candidate they enter with, and then it can be said whether Ahmadinejad's presence was beneficial or his removal. Mr. Kazemian, first of all, Mr. Vahedi says neither conservatives nor the leader wanted to eliminate radicalism but wanted to prevent this type of polarization. Additionally, the question I asked, which was part of his last answer, was what kind of electoral competition we will enter in May in the absence of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad? Morteza Kazemian: I think we must differentiate the layers of conservatism, and there are significant differences. However, it seems that significant parts of conservatives are increasingly aligning themselves with the central power's directives, where the Supreme Leader and the military-security establishment define it. From this perspective, they are trying to distance themselves from those areas or individuals and factions that are somewhat rebellious or have their independent projects, like Ahmadinejad's faction. I would also like to emphasize that it seems that the long-term management experience of Khamenei has led him to the realization that a president cannot advance his projects for a single term, and changing management in the executive branch can consume a lot of energy and time from the bureaucratic apparatus and the executive branch, which is not justifiable in terms of cost-benefit. Therefore, it seems that they will introduce other figures from the conservative camp who are not entirely unknown, from Ghalibaf to Saeed Jalili, Velayati, Hadad-Adel, and even Zohrehami and Zarghami, whose names are mentioned. There have been some repeated names who participated in previous periods, including Ahmad Tavakoli and Manouchehr Mottaki. But I do not think any of them can mobilize even the critical layers of society, let alone the supporters of the government against Rouhani. One option remains, and that seems to be Parviz Fattah, who is currently the head of the Imam Khomeini Relief Committee and has been the Minister of Energy in Ahmadinejad's government and has good relations even with the IRGC and Khamenei himself and established extensive relations through the Relief Committee. As a technocrat and a specialist, he naturally has a good image among the middle class that does not have political concerns. Mr. Fattah or a similar candidate could leverage the widespread dissatisfaction in the post-JCPOA period and present views that resonate with the core of power and the socially disadvantaged layers, leading to a significant drop in Rouhani's votes and almost forming a (albeit mitigated) polarized election, where Rouhani might ultimately win. Let us not forget that in 2013, if we accept the official statistics, Rouhani became president with a margin of about 300,000 votes. That is, a president who cannot state against Khamenei that he is backed by 20 to 25 million votes, and on the other hand, it seems that not all those who voted in 2013 for Rouhani still have that motivation, especially since Ahmadinejad will not be in this election to stand behind Rouhani again. For this reason, I think that in the conservative camp, currently, with Ahmadinejad's removal, there is not a particularly attractive figure unless Mr. Fattah can attract a significant number of votes through the IRGC and Basij network and the Relief Committee. Until now, he has not explicitly stated that he will not run. Mr. Haji Qasemi, Mr. Vahedi's criticism is mainly directed at your opinion. He says that the leader and conservatives like the Friday prayer leader of Mashhad also have radical positions to some extent. Therefore, according to Mr. Vahedi, contrary to your analysis, the goal was not to eliminate radicalism but to remove Ahmadinejad. First, respond to this opinion and then address what shape the elections will take in May.