The Nuclear Issue and Elections in Iran; Fear of Hardliners and Voter Indifference?

Eleven years ago, in June 2013, when Hassan Rouhani took out a key from his pocket during the presidential election campaign and promised to unlock the nuclear sanctions, a turning point emerged regarding the importance of the Islamic Republic's nuclear activities; a new scale for evaluating election promises and the performance of presidents in Iran. Rouhani, relying on those promises to lift sanctions and reach an agreement with global powers, managed to defeat his rivals who had no clear approach towards nuclear negotiations and UN Security Council sanctions. He succeeded in using the discourse of 'solving the nuclear issue' for his victory in that year's election while the UN Security Council had passed six resolutions against Tehran during Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's eight-year presidency, yet the then-president referred to those resolutions as 'pieces of paper.' Among Rouhani's domestic rivals in the nuclear dispute was Saeed Jalili, the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, who had nothing but UN Chapter VII sanctions to show for his years in office. Another rival, Ali Akbar Velayati, the foreign minister under Ali Khamenei and Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, spoke most about this issue during the electoral debates due to his diplomatic background. Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf and Mohsen Rezaei also had no clear plans or solutions for what was then a primary concern for Iranian voters. This series of developments was likely one of the most important factors that turned the Islamic Republic's nuclear activities into a focal point of electoral discussions and ultimately led to Rouhani's victory in the 2013 election. Now, a group of hardliners linked to the central power circles are worried about the repetition of the 2013 experience. Gholamali Haddad Adel, who was also a candidate in that year's election but withdrew before the election day, has recently warned that 'the lack of consensus among candidates of the revolutionary front' could lead to a repeat of the 2013 event. Knowing this background, perhaps the anger of Hossein Shariatmadari regarding the issuance of a resolution by the International Atomic Energy Agency's Board of Governors is also understandable. The editor-in-chief of the Kayhan newspaper and representative of Ali Khamenei wrote on June 7 that 'America and the European troika, with their 'fly-brain' analysis, are under the illusion that they can use the mentioned resolution as a stone in the path of the Islamic Republic of Iran and use this incident as a crutch for the Western-oriented presidential candidates in Iran.' Shariatmadari refers to a resolution issued after 18 months by the Board of Governors against Iran, demanding that Iranian officials immediately expand their cooperation with the Agency and respond to questions and ambiguities related to this case. This has occurred while, during the 34 months of Ebrahim Raisi's presidency, his government and supporters have tried to downplay the importance of nuclear negotiations by emphasizing ideas such as 'not tying people's livelihoods to nuclear negotiations.' They attempted to portray this issue in public opinion as if Tehran could enrich uranium to 60%, increase its uranium reserves, and at the same time, not only not respond to the Agency's questions and ambiguities but also expel the inspectors of this international body without any consequences. It seems that after 18 months, Western countries, especially Europeans, have concluded that the previous approach towards Iran is unresponsive and that Iranian officials do not intend to take positive steps towards de-escalation and confidence-building regarding their nuclear program. This resolution may indeed be the first step towards the complete destruction of the nuclear agreement known as the JCPOA before its expiration next year, so that the restrictions that end at the 10th anniversary of this agreement effectively disappear. However, whatever the reasons, it has fueled fears among a group within the power circles of the Islamic Republic; as previously noted by Ali Shamkhani, political advisor to Ali Khamenei and former Secretary of the National Security Council, on his X page (formerly Twitter), 'If some misinformed European countries want to adopt a hostile stance towards Iran's peaceful nuclear program at the upcoming Board of Governors meeting before the Iranian presidential election, they will face a serious and effective reaction from our country.' This series of approaches and events in the presidential elections of 2013 and 2017 shows that the more hardline section of the government in Iran is worried that the recent resolution from the Board of Governors will turn the nuclear program into one of the key issues in the upcoming electoral competitions; especially as the term of their supported president, Ebrahim Raisi, is coming to an end and he has not been able to make any progress in this regard over the past three years. Although it seems that the hardliners of the government are afraid of the JCPOA and nuclear negotiations becoming a key electoral issue and have tried to dissuade Western countries from issuing this resolution by repeating previous threats, according to the procedure for determining presidential candidates in Iran, it is the Guardian Council that, with the sword of 'approval of qualifications,' determines who is allowed to run in the elections. As a result, a significant part of the concerns of the hardliners could be alleviated with an approach similar to what the Guardian Council has adopted over the decades, especially in the 2021 presidential elections; that is, the elimination of any candidate who has even a slight divergence from the core power in the Islamic Republic. However, to see the final output of the Guardian Council, we must wait a few more days to clarify what mechanism the 12 members loyal to Ali Khamenei will ultimately consider for the upcoming presidential election. Assuming that a reformist candidate or someone like Ali Larijani, who has become more of a moderate and close to Hassan Rouhani in recent years than a principlist, can pass the hard filter of the Guardian Council, can we consider the matter settled and the future government a cabinet of moderates and reformists? It can be expected that any moderate or reformist candidate who makes it to the final list will speak of the capacity to resolve disputes in nuclear negotiations and revive the JCPOA and similar issues. Even now, a group of them has published a statement signed by 151 people, urging Iranians to participate in the elections to prevent 'the continuation of the path of extremism in foreign policy and the polarization and imposition of sanctions against Iran.' However, it seems unlikely that even these promises can have an impact on the disheartened and exhausted Iranian society and change the heavy atmosphere of 'boycotting the elections.' Even those who speak of the necessity of reviving the JCPOA and nuclear negotiations and lifting sanctions during the electoral competitions cannot ignore the short lifespan of the diplomatic achievements of Hassan Rouhani's government in this area; whether it was the Trump administration's withdrawal from the JCPOA or the missile attacks by the Revolutionary Guards, Khamenei's opposition, or Israel's sabotage, ultimately the 2015 nuclear agreement did not last long. Despite the enthusiasm and hope that arose in Iran after that agreement, all the dreams of that period quickly faded, and now nothing remains of the JCPOA but a name; to the extent that it seems that for eligible voters in the elections, neither Fordow nor Natanz holds any importance, nor do the Board of Governors or the Security Council; and probably for most of those who do not seek solutions among the circles of the Islamic Republic's officials, it will not matter whether centrifuges spin or cement is poured into the nuclear power plant.