The Oil Weapon and the Tanker War in the Persian Gulf (2); Strategic Shifts and the Beginning of Confrontation

In the first part, the attacks between Iran and Iraq on each other's oil facilities, the destruction of the al-Bakr and al-Amaya terminals, the cessation of Iraqi oil exports from the Persian Gulf, and the beginning of attacks on commercial ships were discussed. In this section, we will discuss the 180-degree shift in the goals and strategies of Iran and Iraq, the prominent role of the IRGC, the disruption of the balance of power in the air, and the start of the tanker war. After the capture of Khorramshahr by Iraqi forces, the Iran-Iraq war transformed from a dynamic and limited conflict into a static confrontation. Iraq attempted to maintain the territories it had gained and adopted a defensive posture. In fact, until October 1981, with the exception of a few small military actions, the military forces of both countries maintained their stasis. During this time, Iraq's attempts to advance towards Ahvaz failed, and the Iranian Air Force halted the activities of Kirkuk's oil facilities for several weeks through several attacks. In 1981, Iranian forces made extraordinary efforts to push back the Iraqi army and on October 5, 1981, they broke the siege of Abadan through Operation Thamen al-Aimah. Following this success, Iran executed three more operations named Operation Way of Quds on November 29, 1981, in the Bostan and Susangerd areas, Operation Fath al-Mubin on March 22, 1982, in the western regions of Shush and Dezful, and finally Operation Beit al-Muqaddas, which led to the liberation of Khorramshahr on May 24, 1982, freeing most of the occupied territories. At the end of these operations, Iran was in a superior military, psychological, and political position. After these four successful operations, the Iran-Iraq war took a new form. Saddam Hussein announced his readiness for a ceasefire and the withdrawal of Iraqi forces to the borders of the two countries, but the Islamic Republic did not accept it. In a general view, after the liberation of Khorramshahr, the Islamic Republic faced three strategies: accepting a ceasefire and starting peace talks; suspending the war and maintaining a state of neither war nor peace while working to overthrow Saddam's regime through Iraqi opposition; and entering Iraqi territory. The Islamic Republic resorted to the worst option. Officials of the Islamic Republic believed that by advancing into Iraqi territory and securing more victories, they could strengthen their position at the negotiating table. They declared their new goals as the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime and the establishment of an Islamic government in Iraq, as well as receiving war reparations from this country, which was subsequently supplemented by the conquest of Jerusalem through Karbala. Accordingly, the Islamic Republic took the initiative and shifted to a dynamic and offensive war while Iraq adopted a defensive stance. Iran focused on ground operations and often overlooked economic targets, while Iraq extended the war to the rear and conducted counter-offensive operations, targeting Iran's valuable resources and assets, including cities and oil facilities that were not originally military threats. With the change in the nature and objectives of the war, many senior and experienced army officers who opposed the option of attacking Iraq left the army, while the purging, dismissal, and expulsion of personnel in this military organization continued at a level less than the first months after the revolution. As a result, the IRGC and the Basij became the leading forces on the front lines against Iraq, significantly reducing the role of the army. In contrast to the army's emphasis on calculated operations, logistical support, training, and systematic readiness for operations, military decisions at a high level, made with the input of IRGC commanders, did not rely on battlefield realities, military, and professional expertise. Military decisions were based on religious beliefs and a 'divine mission' that prescribed the export of the revolution to all Muslim countries and beyond. For IRGC commanders and Islamic Republic leaders, revolutionary fervor and martyrdom, and the use of human waves took precedence over data and military assessments. In fact, 'devotion' was prioritized over 'expertise.' The balance of power in the air was disrupted due to a series of problems stemming from the revolution and the Islamic Republic's confrontational foreign policy, including a lack of maintenance for aircraft and helicopters and a shortage of parts, which shifted in favor of Iraq. After the liberation of Khorramshahr, in the summer of 1982, the Iranian Air Force had nearly 85 operational aircraft. Iraq, taking advantage of the decline in Iran's air power, targeted Deir ez-Zor, Abadan, and, as previously mentioned, Khark Island and the ships navigating around it. From July 1982 to early March 1984, the Islamic Republic conducted five operations, both minor and major. At the end of these unsuccessful operations, officials of the Islamic Republic spoke of readiness for a 'final attack.' In response, Iraq bombed eleven Iranian cities in early 1984 to prevent this attack, which later became known as the 'first city war.' From July 1982 to early March 1984, the Islamic Republic designed and executed five operations named Ramadan, Muharram, Valfajr Preliminary, Valfajr One, and Kheibar, which, despite some minor advances into Iraqi territory, were unable to break through the country's defensive lines. At the end of these unsuccessful operations, officials of the Islamic Republic spoke of readiness for a 'final attack.' In response, Iraq bombed eleven Iranian cities in early 1984 to prevent this attack, which later became known as the 'first city war.' Despite this, on March 16, 1984, the Islamic Republic launched its largest attack to date, known as Operation Badr, in two phases, aiming for significant advances towards Basra, with nearly 500,000 forces from both Iran and Iraq participating. Iran's only success in this operation, which was affected by severe disagreements between the IRGC and the army over the method of fighting Iraq and command and control, was the capture of the Majnoon Islands oil field at a heavy human cost. This field had 50 wells and 8 million barrels of proven oil reserves. Two years after the war began, officials of the Islamic Republic announced that a joint staff from the army and the IRGC would be formed under the supervision of the commanders of these two military entities, but this never came to fruition, and in practice, the IRGC established its own special ministry. In fact, the command and control systems of the IRGC and the army were not merged, and tensions between the two continued to varying degrees until the end of the war. The Tanker War began in April 1983 after three and a half years of war with Iran, as the Iraqi leader realized that his army could not achieve a decisive victory. By escalating his anti-value operations, he initiated the tanker war with three general objectives: weakening Iran's economy, internationalizing the war and drawing non-regional countries into the Persian Gulf, and reducing pressure on Iraq's ground forces. The Iraqi leader believed that sustained pressure, either by bringing the Islamic Republic to the negotiating table, would end the war or pave the way for the downfall of the Islamic Republic. In this context, one of Iraq's best tools for attacking tankers was five Super Étendard aircraft equipped with Exocet anti-ship missiles that France delivered to the Iraqi Air Force in mid-1983. In its first attack on May 25, 1984, Iraq targeted the 178,000-ton tanker 'Sofina al-Arab,' flying the Saudi flag, which was leaving the Khark terminal after loading oil. Three weeks later, in response to this attack, Iran targeted a Kuwaiti tanker named 'Um Kazba.' During the year 1984 (January 1, 1984, to December 31, 1984), Iraq conducted 21 attacks against commercial ships, 19 of which were tankers. In response, the Islamic Republic attacked 17 tankers in the same year. In the following year, 1985, the tanker war intensified, and the number of Iraq's attacks rose to 30, of which 23 were against tankers. Iran was responsible for 12 attacks, during which 6 tankers were damaged. Although in the early years of the tanker war, Iraq's number of attacks exceeded Iran's, over time, the Islamic Republic increased its number of attacks, so that by the end of the eight-year war, 415 ships were damaged or completely destroyed due to attacks from both countries. More than 52 percent of all attacks were attributed to Iraq.