In the fourth section, the escalation of the tanker war, the American forces' attack on Iran's oil platforms, Operation Akhoundak, and the conflict between Iran and the U.S. in the Persian Gulf, as well as the repulsion of Iranian forces from Faw by Iraq were discussed. In this section, we will discuss the transfer of the oil export center in the Persian Gulf, the use of shuttle tankers and floating storage, the reasons for the failure of Iraq's air attacks against Khark Island, and the cost of transferring oil from Khark to Larak Island. One year after the onset of the tanker war, in 1984, Iran, due to the escalation of the tanker war and the bombing of Khark Island (the main oil export center), chose a new method for transportation and export. This meant that by using several special tankers (shuttle tankers), Iran transported the oil stored on Khark Island to the waters near the secret island in the eastern Persian Gulf to be sent to global markets after being transferred to larger tankers. The transportation of oil to floating storage by Iran was beneficial for foreign tanker owners as it kept their ships away from high risks in the Persian Gulf, thus relatively reducing their insurance costs. In fact, transporting oil from Khark to Larak acted as a subsidy from Iran to foreign tanker owners. Subsequently, due to the increased operational range of Iraqi aircraft, this export center was moved to the vicinity of Larak Island in the Strait of Hormuz, where the oil transported from Khark was stored in giant stationary tankers in the harbor of this island for export. These giant stationary tankers were essentially floating storage for Iran's export oil. The number of these tankers in October 1987 was 18, but three months later, it increased to 25. Of these, 15 (capable of carrying 2.96 million tons of oil equivalent to 21 million barrels) were leased, and the other 10 (capable of carrying 2.69 million tons of oil equivalent to 19 million barrels) were flagged under Iran, belonging to the National Iranian Tanker Company, which was one of the subsidiaries of the National Iranian Oil Company. Furthermore, Iran had 7 tankers anchored at Larak Island and was able to store 2.97 million tons of oil (equivalent to 21.2 million barrels) in them. Most of these tankers were of the VLCC type (each with a capacity of 1.1 to 2.2 million barrels) and ULCC type (each nearly 400 meters long and with a capacity of over 2.2 million barrels). Many of these floating oil storage tankers were relatively old, and their safety and pollution control systems did not meet international standards. Given these deficiencies, most of these old tankers were not usable for transporting oil between ports, and Iran's use of them for oil storage was a golden opportunity for the owners of these ships to sell or lease them. After January 1988, due to the continued heavy attacks by Iraq on tankers, Iran again increased the number of its tankers. During this period, the Islamic Republic had 34 shuttle tankers, 17 of which belonged to the National Iranian Tanker Company, and the rest were leased by this company. Concurrently, Iran increased its number of floating storage units in the waters around Larak from 7 to 12, significantly raising its capacity for oil transport and storage for export. Additionally, Iran employed 6 to 7 more tankers to send oil to European markets and also for importing petroleum products, as the Islamic Republic faced shortages of these products for domestic use. In the first six months of 1988 (mid-January to mid-July), Iraqi aircraft attacked 10 shuttle tankers, and during this period, at least 6 of the tankers were under repair in dry docks in Dubai and Singapore. During the Iran-Iraq War, 192 leased and non-leased tankers of the National Iranian Tanker Company were damaged, and 150 crew members of these vessels lost their lives. In the last 18 months of the Iran-Iraq War, considering the tankers under repair and damaged, Iran's capacity for transferring oil from Khark to Larak remained almost constant. In fact, the addition of shuttle tankers was made with the anticipation of intensified Iraqi air attacks, thus Iran was prepared to fill the gaps left by damaged or under-repair vessels with operational and ready-to-work ships. Concurrently, Iran employed electronic countermeasures and decoys to divert Exocet missiles. According to the then-manager of the National Iranian Tanker Company, the company was under severe pressure during the Iran-Iraq War and managed to fulfill its duties through defensive measures, salvage operations, and continuous maintenance. To transport oil from Khark to Larak, the National Iranian Tanker Company rented double the number of tankers needed for this task, and each time a tanker was damaged due to an air attack, it was replaced with another operational vessel. During the Iran-Iraq War, 192 leased and non-leased tankers of the National Iranian Tanker Company were damaged, and 150 crew members of these vessels lost their lives. Khark Island, the failure of Iraqi air attacks. During the tanker war, cutting off oil flow from Khark Island was the main military objective for the Iraqi Air Force. The coral island of Khark, with its extremely strategic position for Iran, is approximately 8 kilometers long and 4 kilometers wide, located 46 kilometers northwest of Bushehr. During the eight-year war, over 90% of Iran's oil exports were conducted from this island. In fact, oil produced from the oil-rich regions of the south of the country is transported through pumping stations in Ahvaz, Omidiyeh, and Gureh to the multi-way port of Gonaveh and then through underwater pipelines after covering a distance of approximately 32 kilometers to reach the reservoirs of Khark Island. During the war, Iraqi aircraft attacked Khark more than 200 times. These attacks caused significant damage to Khark, but in practice, they never managed to halt oil exports from this island, even though in August 1985, Saddam Hussein claimed that as a result of the devastating attacks by Iraqi bombers, this island had been "reduced to rubble." Some reasons for the failure of the Iraqi Air Force to stop oil exports from Khark include: 1. The excess capacity of Khark Island's oil docks. These massive and modern docks, with extensive facilities and advanced systems, including fire extinguishing systems, were designed and built for exporting over 6 million barrels per day during the Shah's time. The eastern dock (known as Dock T) is 1840 meters long, and the western dock (known as Azarpad) is 1445 meters long, capable of accommodating 14 tankers. While Iran's daily oil exports after the 1979 revolution significantly decreased, during the war, exports rarely exceeded 1.8 million barrels per day, of which about 200,000 barrels were directly exported from the Lavan and Siri Islands in the eastern Persian Gulf (this amount decreased to 50,000 barrels after the U.S. attack on Iran's offshore platforms). In other words, the daily oil exports from Khark were around 1.6 million barrels per day. 2. The excess capacity of shuttle tankers. Given the mentioned export levels, it was sufficient for Iran to dispatch one shuttle tanker carrying oil from Khark to floating storage in the harbor of Larak daily to maintain its daily export levels. Since the round trip distance of 840 nautical miles (1556 kilometers) from Khark to Lavan and back, as well as loading in Khark and unloading in Larak, took 10 days, Iran normally, without war and air attacks, needed 10 shuttle tankers to maintain its daily export levels. However, as previously mentioned, the number of Iran's shuttle tankers initially was 25 and eventually reached 34. Additionally, by storing crude oil in stationary tankers in the waters of Larak, which was at least 21 million barrels, Iran could export oil at a rate of 1.8 million barrels per day for at least 11 days without needing oil from Khark and shuttle tankers. 3. Militarily, Iraq's air attacks on Khark were disorganized and lacked continuity, and their scope was limited, although their cumulative effects, especially in the last three years of the war, were significant. Iraqi pilots sometimes bombed Khark's docks with tankers moored and loading. However, Iranian workers and engineers became very skilled repairers through practice. In most cases, these individuals would restore damaged docks within a few days. Considering the daily export levels, Iran needed to keep 5 of the 14 existing docks operational. Additionally, as an emergency measure, Iran had installed several refueling buoys (floating objects anchored to the seabed) around Khark. These buoys, located in deep waters 2 or 3 kilometers from the shore of Khark, were both to moor tankers and served as oil terminals, meaning that these buoys, connected by underwater pipes to oil reservoirs on the shore, supplied the export crude oil of tankers without needing them to dock at the dock. 4. Khark Island and the vital pumps of Gureh, which played a crucial role in exporting oil stored on this island, were protected by a relatively effective air defense system, and furthermore, Iraqi aircraft conducted their attacks from very high altitudes. In fact, Iraq lacked aircraft capable of conducting precise ground attacks at very low altitudes. Regarding Khark, Iraq did not exploit its air superiority as much as it could have. The Iraqi Air Force never used mass attack methods against Khark, meaning simultaneous approaches of several aircraft from different directions to saturate its air defense systems and thus execute severe and effective attacks. Given the number of attacks against Khark, one cannot overestimate the air defense system of Khark, but it seems that the commanders of the Iraqi Air Force were also unwilling to take high risks for their forces. Perhaps these commanders did not want to reduce the effectiveness of the most potent force of the Iraqi army by taking risks and sustaining losses. Based on an expert analysis, the shuttle service, considering the rental of some tankers, insurance costs, and other related expenses, cost Iran $300 million annually. In contrast, the Iraqi Air Force focused on attacking tankers at sea and limited itself to firing Exocet missiles from 20 miles away at defenseless tankers in the route between Khark and Larak, known as the "Exocet passage," which were easy targets. The cost of the shuttle service between Khark and Larak. Determining the cost of transferring oil from Khark to Larak, considering the confidentiality of the prices of purchased tankers or their rental rates aimed at increasing oil transport capacity, would be challenging. When the tanker war began, there was a clear recession in the market for buying and selling tankers, especially high-tonnage tankers. In other words, purchasing or leasing tankers of the shuttle type between Khark and Lavan was easy and inexpensive. However, with the escalation of the tanker war and the damage to many of them in the Persian Gulf, the prices of these ships in international markets increased. For example, in the last months of 1985 and early the following year, the price of a giant tanker (VLCC) in the market was about $5 million. In contrast, by the last year of the Iran-Iraq War, the price of a similar tanker increased by 190% to $17 million, while the price of a barrel of oil during this period decreased by 35%. Therefore, over time, the cost of transporting oil from Khark to Larak gradually increased. Overall, the cost of transferring oil from Khark to Larak reduced Iran's revenue from each exported barrel of oil by 30 cents, considering the damages inflicted on some shuttle tankers. Based on an expert analysis, the shuttle service, considering the rental of some tankers, insurance costs, and other related expenses, cost Iran $300 million annually.
The Oil Weapon and the Tanker War in the Persian Gulf (5); The Failure of Attacks on Khark
The article discusses the strategic importance of Khark Island during the Iran-Iraq War, focusing on Iran's innovative oil export strategies amidst ongoing attacks. Despite numerous Iraqi airstrikes, Iran successfully maintained oil exports through shuttle tankers and floating storage. This situation highlights the resilience of Iran's oil export capabilities despite military challenges.
👥 Key Players
📰 What Happened
During the Iran-Iraq War, Iran adapted its oil export strategies in response to Iraqi air attacks on Khark Island, utilizing shuttle tankers and floating storage to maintain exports despite ongoing military threats. Iraq's attempts to disrupt these exports were largely unsuccessful.
- Khark Island was responsible for over 90% of Iran's oil exports during the war.
- Iran increased its number of shuttle tankers and floating storage units to counteract Iraqi air attacks.
💡 Why It Matters
📚 Background
The Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) was marked by extensive military conflict, with both nations targeting each other's economic resources, particularly oil. Khark Island served as a critical hub for Iran's oil exports.
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