The People's Republic in Conflict with the Non-People's Republic of the Guardianship

The Leader's statements over the past month reflect a desire to manage the post-election atmosphere following the twelfth presidential election. Khamenei's agenda was made public during his speech on the anniversary of Ayatollah Khomeini's death. As in previous years, he warned against distorting Khomeini's views and implicitly accused reformists and Khomeini's family of portraying an image of Khomeini that contradicts the historical positions of the founder of the Islamic Republic. The difference in interpreting Khomeini's positions is one of the foundations of the rift between the two main factions of the regime, specifically the leadership and the reformists and the former leftist faction. This rift also existed during Khomeini's lifetime, but after his death, it deepened alongside the widening divide in the power bloc. Now, a facet of the divide between defenders of the classic image of the regime and revisionists has emerged in differing interpretations of Khomeini's views. However, Khamenei, during an iftar gathering with regime officials, explicitly criticized Rouhani and implicitly warned him not to follow the path of Abolhassan Banisadr. The issuance of a command for 'fire at will' to Basij students and other aligned forces was a provocative act by Khamenei, which openly revealed the will of the Guardianship institution to prevent the implementation of the government's reformist programs in political and cultural areas. Rouhani did not remain silent and, in multiple speeches, emphasized the necessity of public acceptance as the basis for the legitimacy of governance. Khamenei's close associates, the Assembly of Experts, and some religious authorities have come forward and taken a stance against Rouhani. However, Rouhani has not backed down and has stood more firmly on his views and opposition to the Guardianship institution's confrontation with the people's demands. In statements that seem primarily directed at the Leader, he said: 'You are not above the Prophet or Imam Ali! The polarization of society is the result of your impatience! Increase your tolerance and bear with the opposition!' The publication of a clip regarding Banisadr's dismissal on the Leader's Instagram account and the broadcast of Rouhani's statements accusing Banisadr of conspiracy against the Islamic Republic is a targeted action that reflects the intensification of the conflict. Now, Rouhani is more radical than the moderate reformists led by Mohammad Khatami. Instead of compromise, submission, and competition for proximity to the Leader, he has taken the path of resistance and critical accountability regarding the illegal interventions of the Guardianship. Hardline conservatives and forces known as 'Velayatmadar' have intensified their attacks against the twelfth government by likening Rouhani to Banisadr through various written, media, and graphic forms. The peak of field attacks so far, reminiscent of the destruction of Khatami, Mousavi, Karroubi, and Ahmadinejad after opposing the Leader's positions, occurred during the Quds Day rally. Some forces known as 'Velayatmadar' appeared at the location of Rouhani's presence during the rally and chanted slogans such as 'Rouhani, congratulations on your connection to Banisadr,' 'Death to the hypocrite,' and 'Death to the American cleric.' But what will be the outcome of this conflict? Is the coexistence and collaboration between Khamenei and Rouhani nearing its end after nearly four decades? Or will both sides continue on a path of cautious pragmatism for the sake of expediency? Speculation on this issue in the current ambiguous political trajectory of Iran is difficult and depends on various factors and variables, most of which are uncertain and variable. It can be said with a high degree of confidence that Rouhani has exited the Leader's white zone and is considered a problematic element in the hard core of power, whose control is necessary to consolidate the current political situation. The explicit statement from Khamenei and Rouhani's unambiguous response both indicate a will to pursue a program. However, observing Khamenei's behavioral model, particularly his approach to Ahmadinejad's later disobedience, shows a preference for a strategy of containment over leaving the presidential term unfinished. In fact, Khamenei has preferred to manage presidents as much as they have diverged from his outlined lines for managing the system, so that through imposing restrictions and neutralizing their ability to seek change, their terms come to an end. However, this behavioral pattern does not guarantee that Rouhani will not meet a fate similar to Banisadr. It seems that Khamenei's warning message pursues the goal that his patience and tolerance are not unlimited and that if he deems it necessary, he will go to the end. Hassan Rouhani has thus far advanced his agenda through verbal therapy and has not deviated from the red lines of the Guardianship institution in practice. However, the new conditions have complicated the continuation of this behavior. The first factor in changing Rouhani's position and character is that he underwent a transformation in the second half of the electoral campaign for the twelfth presidential election. This event was primarily the result of social pressure and the polarization of the electoral atmosphere, which pushed Rouhani to distance himself further from the current political situation. Rouhani emerged beyond expectations during the 96 elections and moved outside the regime's desired boundaries. He now stands between Khatami and Mousavi and Karroubi. Rouhani's acceptance in the 92 elections was aimed at ensuring that his claimed moderation would not only close the Green Movement's file but also encourage reformism to pivot more towards the regime. The Rouhani of 92, who sought to be a mathematical midpoint between hardliners and reformists, has distanced himself significantly from this orientation in 96 and has surpassed the new position of parliamentary reformists. Hassan Rouhani has thus far advanced his agenda through verbal therapy and has not deviated from the red lines of the Guardianship institution in practice. However, the new conditions have complicated the continuation of this behavior. The first factor in changing Rouhani's position and character is that he underwent a transformation in the second half of the electoral campaign for the twelfth presidential election. Now, Rouhani is more radical than the moderate reformists led by Mohammad Khatami. Instead of compromise, submission, and competition for proximity to the Leader, he has taken the path of resistance and critical accountability regarding the illegal interventions of the Guardianship. Although these confrontations are still at the discursive and verbal level, their potential and actual capacities have created serious concerns in the dominant power sector. Khamenei and aligned forces expected Rouhani's presidency to be a period for the leap of depoliticization in society, but Rouhani in 96 became the platform for reintroducing politics as the main demand of various segments of Iranian society, and his second government heralded the formation of a new chapter in the struggle to change the balance of power to weaken the absolute power structure and strengthen social actions aimed at changing the status quo. The type of presence of Eshaq Jahangiri in the elections also had a similar trend to Rouhani, which increased political vitality and the desire for change. This situation, especially the prominence of political actions aimed at change, is not pleasing to the Leader. Rouhani's ability during his first presidential term was mainly focused on achieving the JCPOA, which had a broad commonality with the Leader in this area, and the frictions were at the micro and tactical levels. However, now the arena of conflict encompasses political, cultural, and to some extent security domains. Therefore, the Leader seeks to manage the space and distance the government from activities aimed at transformation in political and cultural arenas, confining its programs to the economic sphere. Khamenei has activated his tools. It seems unlikely that his controlling actions will initially begin with the removal or direct confrontation with Rouhani. He has prepared pressure groups and a repressive mass society and has given them permission to disrupt the government's reformist activities through arbitrary actions. On the other hand, it can be expected that the IRGC and the judiciary will harass and persecute Rouhani's close associates and supporters, and prune the government tree by cutting its branches and leaves. From this perspective, Khamenei's warning and the analogy with Banisadr may also aim to intimidate the forces cooperating and aligned with Rouhani. The actions and reactions of Rouhani's supporting forces are an important element in the outcome of the current conflict. The experience of the Reconstruction and Reform periods also reminds us that the Guardianship institution has been stricter with uncoordinated presidents in their second terms and tightens the siege. The balance of power within the real and legal structure of power favors the Leader. The President can only defend and uphold the will of the people by mobilizing public opinion. Overall, it can be said that another chapter of dual governance in the Islamic Republic has begun, and once again the rift between Guardianship and the Republic has been activated in the form of reliance on the celestial and earthly aspects of governance legitimacy. An important factor that can be speculated based on the activation of the state-nation rift is the composition of Rouhani's second cabinet. If the new ministers, especially in political ministries, are individuals who align with the demands of voters and particularly emphasize lifting the house arrest, and are willing to stand against the interventions of the Guardianship institution, then a heated political season and a showdown between the non-people's republic and the people's republic will take shape. The people and the protesting forces against the current situation, including ordinary forces and activists, will play an important role in these circumstances. However, if the new cabinet is roughly at the same level as the current government and the reactions and critical statements of the President remain at the level of words, then it is highly likely that the experience of Khatami's and Ahmadinejad's second presidential terms will be repeated, both of whom, despite opposing the views of the Leader from various angles, ultimately succumbed in practice to his supremacy and the pressure of the repressive structure.