The Perilous Straits of the Islamic Republic Against U.S. Aggression

The verbal war between officials of the Islamic Republic and the U.S. government has reached its most intense level. Although this situation has raised concerns due to the increasing potential for confrontation, an examination of the Islamic Republic's behavior shows that the escalation of verbal threats has not necessarily been accompanied by corresponding actions and has even paved the way for behind-the-scenes preparations for reconciliation. In fact, the bluster and confrontational rhetoric serve as a cover for managing the atmosphere in the target society, maintaining internal cohesion within the power bloc, and preserving apparent dignity and authority. For example, at the height of Ayatollah Khamenei's harsh rhetoric during the nuclear adventure, secret negotiations with representatives of the U.S. government to find a way for nuclear reconciliation were conducted through the mediation of the Omani government. Ayatollah Khomeini also issued permits for negotiations with the then U.S. government through three secret channels alongside fiery statements against America and threats to prosecute American diplomats during the hostage crisis. Now, let us assume, as Hassan Rouhani and the commanders of the IRGC claim, that the Islamic Republic has many straits at its disposal to contain and strike at the U.S. if the U.S. government intends to cripple Iran's economy. The article will further examine which straits these are and how credible the government's claimed capabilities are. The primary strait referred to is the Strait of Hormuz, which holds a strategic position in energy transit in the Middle East. A brief review suggests that Iran's military forces have the capability to close this international waterway, but the main question is how long the Islamic Republic can keep this strait closed and whether it can afford the costs of doing so. It can be said with a high degree of certainty that the government's ability to block oil transfer routes is unlikely to last more than a week. This action, which would be a declaration of war against the international system, would quickly lead to the formation of a large global military coalition to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. U.S. warships and those of other Western countries are already present in the Persian Gulf and can create a strong force by utilizing the facilities of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Kuwait, which the Islamic Republic cannot withstand. The likelihood of Qatar joining this coalition is also high due to its strategic relations with the U.S. Additionally, the multinational force that has experience dealing with Iraq after the occupation of Kuwait, along with the European Union, China, and Russia, would at least politically oppose the Islamic Republic. China has clearly stated its opposing position in response to Iran's threats. On the other hand, the government's success requires high public support in Iran, which is unlikely to be achieved given the deep government-people divide and disagreements among factions. However, the main negative consequence of this confrontation is the potential expansion of the conflict within Iran and the targeting of military bases in the country. Decision-makers in the power bloc may have calculated that rising oil prices and their destructive impact on the global economic cycle would force the U.S. government to retreat. However, even if this happens, it would be unstable and short-lived, and the global coalition would be able to re-establish energy transit from the Persian Gulf. Conversely, Iran's ability to produce and export oil may significantly decrease due to attacks on oil facilities and refineries, effectively fulfilling the U.S. government's demand to bring Iran's oil sales to zero. Closing the Strait of Hormuz would provide the necessary pretext for the U.S. and its allies, who are eager to initiate conflict. Any spark, given Trump's adventurous spirit, could create a dangerous and unpredictable situation that could escalate into full-scale military confrontation. The experience of conflict with the U.S. at the end of the war with Iraq, which led to the destruction of Iranian oil platforms and frigates and influenced the acceptance of Resolution 598, is illuminating. Therefore, the heavy cost that Iran incurs is far greater than the potential benefits. The term 'strait' may also refer to the vulnerability of U.S. military and advisory forces at Iran's borders. In this area, the government's capabilities are relatively greater, but conducting harassment operations would displease the governments of the targeted countries. The initiation of conflict between Iranian and U.S. military forces in Iraq, Syria, Bahrain, and Yemen through proxy wars exacerbates instability in the Middle East, which would provoke global public outcry. Indirect confrontations and avoiding responsibility for attacks on U.S. targets, given the threats and the very harsh stance of the current U.S. administration, cannot serve as a shield for protecting the government, and such actions become an excuse for the U.S. and its allies to target Iranian forces in the region. The result of these confrontations would be an escalation of tensions in Iraq and Syria, overshadowing the fight against terrorism and, considering Israel's impatience, effectively weakening the positions of the Syrian and Iraqi governments. The outcome of this perilous confrontation is unlikely to favor the Islamic Republic in the medium term. The use of speedboats by the IRGC is another option for the Islamic Republic. Containing this military tactic would be difficult for U.S. aircraft carriers, but not impossible, and defensive engagement would not only involve them but likely target all military centers in Iran, especially missile bases. Since it is unlikely that the U.S. military and its allies will engage in a ground attack, their aerial superiority would ultimately make deterrence impossible for the Islamic Republic. Initiating unconventional and asymmetric actions, including covertly targeting U.S. forces worldwide and destabilizing other target countries, is another strategy that holds advantages for the Islamic Republic. However, given the radical current controlling the U.S. government and their hardline and unpredictable views, the costs of these actions are high and could lead to limited military confrontations with Iran, which, considering the dire economic situation and multiple escalating mega-challenges, would further entrap the government and increase its internal vulnerability. Overall, the aforementioned issues indicate that beyond the current threats and bluster of the Islamic Republic, it does not hold effective cards for deterrence against U.S. aggression, and resorting to these threats could negatively impact the resistance of the European Union, China, and Russia, which, in the current context surrounding the preservation of the JCPOA, is a relatively reliable support for the Islamic Republic. Although it too cannot completely prevent actions against Iran and can at most minimize the damages.