The Political Scene in Iran in 2017

The year 1396 (2017) began with the presidential election, and mid-way through, widespread protests added a new dimension to it. In this week's viewpoints program, we have examined the most significant political events of 2017, featuring the presence of Morteza Kazemian, a political analyst in Paris, and Ehsan Mehrabi, a political journalist in Berlin. Mr. Kazemian, let's start with the presidential election. Hassan Rouhani was re-elected as President of Iran on May 29 for a second term. What do you consider the importance of the 2017 election? The year 2017 was undoubtedly influenced by the presidential election, especially in the first half of the year, the political-social atmosphere of the country was entirely affected by this significant event. Particularly, the election took on a bipolar aspect, meaning after Mr. Rouhani's candidacy was confirmed and the opposition front became clear, especially after Mr. Qalibaf withdrew from candidacy, Mr. Raeisi's front was on one side and Mr. Rouhani's on the other, which increased the election's significance. The additional importance of the election perhaps stemmed from the fact that it delineated a dilemma for those wishing to participate: on one side was the continuation of Rouhani's moderate government and its economic policies, as well as the diplomatic trends the government had adopted, and on the other was a fundamental change in the government's framework and the rise of individuals mainly belonging to the camp of moderation and even the far-right in Iran. However, regardless of the election results in Iran and the executive power being held by one of the two main candidates, namely Mr. Rouhani or Raeisi, the 2017 election was also significant in that it could have clarified the moral state of Iranian society. This means that Mr. Raeisi, given his role on the committee responsible for investigating the mass execution of prisoners in 1988 and the serious accusations against him, could have created a negative sign and serious question regarding Iranian society if he had won; this did not happen, and one of the judges of the death courts in 1988 did not get the opportunity to take over the executive branch. Beyond the election results, it should be noted that the presidential election was very important because it might have been tied to the fate of one of the candidates to succeed Mr. Khamenei for the third leadership in the Islamic Republic. Both Mr. Rouhani and Mr. Raeisi have been and are among the candidates for Mr. Khamenei's succession, and naturally, the victory of either could have increased their chances for succession and significantly reduced the opponent's chances, although this does not mean that a candidate like Mr. Raeisi is completely ruled out for succeeding Mr. Khamenei. Mr. Kazemian, how do you view Mr. Rouhani's performance during this time? Many critics have had numerous criticisms of him during his second presidential term. The timing of the presidential election was very important because Mr. Rouhani's rhetoric in the election campaign was completely distinct from his record after becoming president. Particularly, the composition of his cabinet and the alignment of his associates in the new government and his orientations and the overall output of the government did not satisfy even his supporters, let alone parts of society that were waiting for meaningful changes. Part of the issue stemmed from the continued suspension in the post-JCPOA era and Rouhani's failure to attract widespread and increasing foreign investment, although he was not entirely unsuccessful, but part of the problem was limited here, especially with the increase in Trump's approaches in the United States and also domestically, where it seemed Mr. Rouhani preferred to focus on the bloc influenced by Mr. Khamenei, namely the central power and the security forces associated with him, specifically the IRGC intelligence organization and traditional clerical authorities in Qom, which seemed to contribute to the erosion of Mr. Rouhani's supporters and increased disappointment with the successes of Rouhani's government at least among certain segments of society, which later manifested itself in the protests of January. Mr. Mehrabi, one of the most important events that occurred in 2017, which Mr. Kazemian also mentioned, was the nationwide protests in January in Iran. What were the reasons for these protests and what were their consequences? Ehsan Mehrabi: "The January protests and the public protests against compulsory hijab were among the most distinct events of 2017. Although there had been political protests in previous years, these protests were essentially sparked by economic issues and in many areas, economic matters were the initial triggers." The government's response to these protests was, of course, varied. Some conservatives and close associates of Ayatollah Khamenei initially welcomed these protests, feeling that their direction was solely against the government. However, as it expanded, they attributed the issue, as always, to foreign countries and opponents of the Islamic Republic. Mr. Rouhani's government also had a very contradictory performance. Initially, it harshly attacked the protesters, and Mr. Rouhani announced that these gatherings would be dispersed, but afterward, government officials warned that the roots of these protests still existed and that these protests were not limited to economic issues but also included political, cultural, and security matters, which contradicted Mr. Khamenei's view that emphasized that the only reason for the protests was economic issues. Within political groups in the country, especially among reformists, reactions were very contradictory. Initially, some reformists believed that these protests were a sort of coup against the government and publicly opposed the protests, but later some emphasized the legitimacy of the protesters' demands. Ultimately, however, the government did not learn a very specific lesson from these protests, and nothing happened publicly or operationally; even in limited issues like the budget, the previous trend was repeated, and in any case, the severe clashes that these protests had, which for many were unpredictable, practically led to an approach that focused more on strengthening security forces to suppress future protests, and one of the issues that was very evident in these protests was the discussion of the organizing power of social networks, which was different from previous protest examples. Morteza Kazemian: "The year 2017 will be recorded in the history of the Islamic Republic alongside some specific years like 1999, 1997, or 2009, especially from the perspective that political-social developments may be divided into before and after the January 2017 protests." Mr. Kazemian, one phenomenon we witnessed in the final months of the year, which Mr. Mehrabi also mentioned, was the phenomenon of the girls of the Revolution Street. The protest against compulsory hijab even elicited a reaction from Mr. Khamenei. How do you evaluate the phenomenon of the girls of the Revolution Street? It can certainly be said with confidence that it was a very important event in 2017, this protest against mandatory dress, compulsory hijab, by the girls of the Revolution Street. An unknown girl who later became identified, Vida Mohammadi, but after this incident was followed by another girl and in various cities across the country by different age groups, mainly the youth, it became clear how significant the demand for freedom of dress in the country is, and the importance of the matter might be that, after all, the girls were protesting against this undesirable situation, against official norms, and they did this consciously and with individual decisions and accepting the costs associated with it, and all the girls who were arrested emphasized that they were not regretful about their protest and that they had acted consciously for their civil and human rights. It also had widespread reactions. Perhaps the most important was the reaction of the top of the regime, which, despite trying to downplay it and reduce it to the actions of a few girls who, according to Mr. Khamenei, were misled or acted unwittingly or even were paid, as claimed by Mr. Khamenei, showed how much this protest resonated that it forced the top of the political system in Iran to react in an official speech, and of course, I should also point out that it can be said with certainty that this protest indicated a vibrant social movement in the area of protesting against compulsory hijab and could be considered one of the most important social movements currently in Iran. In addition to these, I should mention the significant solidarity of Mrs. Rahnaward from within her seven-year house arrest with these girls of the Revolution Street, and that she emphasized that she opposes compulsory hijab and also in an important message sent again from within her house arrest, expressed solidarity with the women's movement in Iran on International Women's Day, which itself shows that there is an effort in civil society to change the balance of power against the dominant ideologies and approaches in the political establishment. Mr. Mehrabi, we mentioned the protests. Another instance of protests that occurred in 2017 was the protests of the Gonabadi Dervishes, which also turned violent. What were these protests about and what were their consequences? The Gonabadi Dervishes' protests were the main form of protest that differed from past protests and were a new occurrence in the protests of religious groups in Iran. Although regarding the Dervishes, pressures began in 2005 with the destruction of their prayer houses. However, it was said that this clash was sparked by reports about the security forces' attempts to impose restrictions on Mr. Tabandeh, the leader of the Gonabadi Dervishes, and initially, when the Dervishes reached their initial demands, the government somewhat retreated, some groups felt that this could serve as a model for other groups or that the Dervishes might feel empowered. Subsequent provocations began to create new restrictions in that area, and overall, the Dervishes were somewhat provoked into conflict. The essence of this conflict was also somewhat different from the actions of past political or religious groups. They usually did not resist in this way against security forces, but the Dervishes, now due to the organization they had or because of the importance or specific view they had towards their leader, which was accompanied by their religious or critical mixes, chose to resist. This resistance, of course, resulted in the death of one of the Dervishes and led to violence and the deaths of several security personnel. The leader of the Gonabadi Dervishes and some figures of this group distanced themselves from the killing of security personnel. However, the judiciary ultimately only addressed the charges against the Dervishes, and the judiciary officials who should have judged this impartially were themselves the most important part of the dispute, visiting the injured Basij forces in this incident or emphasizing that this death sentence should be executed quickly, which was contrary to judicial standards, and the urgency in executing the death sentence even contradicts Islamic principles regarding judgment, which many political and civil activists protested against this performance of the judiciary. Despite the fact that Mr. Tabandeh called on his supporters to remain calm, provocations from several Shia clerics and officials of the Islamic Republic regarding this issue continue, and it seems that some wish to keep this issue alive so they can deal with the Dervishes severely, especially with Mr. Tabandeh. Mr. Kazemian, following the January protests, several prisoners lost their lives in prison. Human rights organizations called on the Islamic Republic to explain the deaths of these individuals, and Iran announced that these individuals had committed suicide in prison. One of the individuals who, according to the Islamic Republic, committed suicide in prison was Mr. Kavous Seyed-Emami, who was arrested in the case of environmental activists and died two weeks after his arrest in prison. What is your analysis of these suicides in prison, and has this happened before? An important event in 2017 was this bloody suppression of protesters during the January protests, especially the case you mentioned, namely the announcement of the suicide of some detainees. These cases were later not documented, and it was clear that these actions unfortunately occurred under the influence of the horrific violence directed at detainees or even the psychological pressures and, in any case, the harms they suffered in prison. The issue did not only include the detainees of the January protests. In a mass suppression that targeted the detention of a group of environmental activists in Iran, Mr. Dr. Kavous Seyed-Emami, who is considered one of the elite university figures and prominent supporters of the environment in Iran, and of course is among those who are prominent in the sociology of religion in Iran, was announced to have committed suicide in prison, and heavy espionage charges were directed at him and a group of his companions. I should mention that unfortunately in 2017, the judiciary, alongside state media and other government institutions, including and especially the IRGC intelligence organization, demonstrated how much they continue to beat the drum of lawlessness, as despite the fact that these serious accusations against the detainees, especially the late Dr. Seyed-Emami, were not addressed in a fair judicial process and legal proceedings, heavy charges were directed at the detainees.