The Power Struggle Between Khamenei and Hashemi Rafsanjani Over Hassan Khomeini

Hassan Khomeini has been nominated for the Assembly of Experts, but his qualifications were not confirmed by the Guardian Council. Conservatives, military, and security forces have made several clear claims regarding this matter: First, Hashemi Rafsanjani forced Hassan Khomeini to run for the Assembly of Experts election. Referring to Hassan Khomeini as 'Ayatollah' and 'Allameh' was a pretext for this. Second, Hashemi Rafsanjani advised Hassan Khomeini not to take the exam for qualification by the Guardian Council, arguing that a recognized 'Allameh' and 'Ayatollah' does not need to take an exam. However, firstly, religious authorities have praised Hassan Khomeini but have not confirmed his qualifications. Secondly, the law assigns the responsibility of confirming candidates' qualifications to the Guardian Council, not to religious authorities. Evidence supporting the first and second claims is abundant in the statements of conservatives. For example, on February 1, Hussein Shariatmadari, a long-time representative of Ayatollah Khamenei in Kayhan, stated that 'there are credible reports, and some reformist claimants close to Mr. Hashemi have confirmed that the respected son of the late Imam did not intend to run for the Assembly of Experts, and his registration was done at Mr. Rafsanjani's insistence. Mr. Hassan Khomeini was prepared to participate in the Assembly's exam, but some reports indicate that Mr. Hashemi prevented his participation in the exam, which, even if not true - which it is - does not change the issue.' Third, Hashemi Rafsanjani intended solely to exploit the credibility of the Imam's household to secure a high vote in Tehran. Therefore, when he realized negotiations were underway that would lead to Hassan Khomeini's qualification, he gave a harsh speech against the Guardian Council in defense of Hassan Khomeini. On February 1, he stated: 'Some do not accept the qualifications of a personality who resembles his grandfather Imam Khomeini; they should be asked where they derived their own qualifications from, who gave them the authority to judge, and who granted them the powers, weapons, podiums, Friday prayer platforms, and media outlets? If it weren't for the Imam, if that movement hadn't existed, and if there hadn't been that popular will, you wouldn't exist either; you have wronged the Imam's household, and when you should have congratulated them during this period, you offered them congratulations that were inappropriate; may God forgive your mistakes, and you should apologize.' These 'insulting and vulgar statements' were made to ensure that the Guardian Council would not confirm Hassan Khomeini's qualifications, allowing Hashemi to emerge first in Tehran through controversy. Consider the following: Hojjatoleslam Abdollah Hajisadeqi, deputy representative of the Supreme Leader in the IRGC, responded to Hashemi on February 2, stating: 'These remarks are merely propaganda; they are worried about whether they will win votes or not, and they are using the Imam's household for their own ends; to undermine the Imam's thought, the way is to maintain appearances. The Supreme Leader is concerned about the dignity of the Imam's household and is worried about their respect; therefore, the Imam's household should not be manipulated and become a pawn for others. These individuals are using the Imam's household for their own interests; if they claim to be 'Allameh', they have ulterior motives.' Reza Sarraj, one of the main teams in significant security cases and an analyst for Fars News Agency, wrote: 'Mr. Hashemi knows better than anyone that due to his weaknesses and so-called Achilles' heels (family background and public disapproval of his behavior), a large portion of public opinion has formed against him. This issue, along with concerns about losing votes in the Assembly elections and political defeat, are Mr. Hashemi's primary worries these days. Therefore, it seems he is trying to exploit the high status of the late Imam and sacrifice the family of that unique gem, attempting - in an unchivalrous effort - to polarize society and expand his voter base.' Hojjatoleslam and Muslim Nabavi, deputy for propaganda and practical training in seminaries, stated on February 1: 'He is very concerned about the Imam's household; it is clear he is upset. I feel that they have plotted a lot against the household. You have brought a young man [Hassan Khomeini] who has no serious executive experience in the country, and you want to elevate him suddenly in a country with so many capable forces under the name of the Imam, and then manage him however you want; we know what you are up to... Are you upset about the Imam or your plots?' Mohammad Soleimani, a member of the Islamic Consultative Assembly and part of the Steadfast Front, stated: 'The general perception of Mr. Hashemi's remarks is that he seeks to exploit the Imam's grandson, and this is not good for the grandson or the Imam's household.' Fourth, Hashemi Rafsanjani is in a personal conflict with Ayatollah Khamenei. With the imprisonment of his children, his own marginalization, and the criticisms he has faced, he seeks revenge against the regime and leadership. To achieve this goal, he will sacrifice Hassan Khomeini, reformists, and moderates. Consider the following examples: Hojjatoleslam and Muslim Mojtaba Zolnoor, advisor to the representative of the Supreme Leader in the IRGC, stated: 'Those who narrate new dreams from Imam Khomeini every day have forgotten the clear statements of the Imam, who said that the Guardian Council is the criterion, and if anyone speaks against the actions of the Guardian Council, they are corrupt on earth and should be prosecuted as such. If the Islamic system abandons its compassion, these individuals should be transferred alongside their privileged children to Evin; those whose privileged children caused 57 billion dollars in damage to the country in the Karsant case for five million dollars, why do they burn when they are confronted, and why do they create turmoil in the country and attack legal institutions? Do they want to serve the Imam? Why should we trample on the Imam's ideals?' Hojjatoleslam and Muslim Nabavi stated on February 1: 'I say clearly, they only seek to be in power themselves. Who has confirmed you in such a way that you expect your child, who has embezzled so much in the country, to roam freely and not be prosecuted? Several times he has gone to the Leader asking that my child not be prosecuted. On what basis should your child be free? And now that your child is being prosecuted and convicted, the entire system should be destroyed because of your child? Your wife, whose documents are now on state television, and your daughter, who incited the people and sought to overthrow the government. In the most modern countries, their punishment is death. I say that these gentlemen are very concerned about the Imam's household; we ask what the Imam did to Mr. Montazeri, and how serious was Montazeri's crime against you? Did you see Hashemi's wife on television? She said people should be in the streets to get their rights. There are speeches from his daughter, Fa'ezeh. In any system, their punishment would be death. And they are still demanding from the system.' The Paradoxical Situation of Khamenei and Conservatives Assume that all the claims made by conservatives, military, and security forces regarding Hashemi Rafsanjani's plans are true. That is, Hashemi Rafsanjani only exploited Hassan Khomeini to secure a high vote in Tehran. If Hassan Khomeini is present in the elections, he is likely to come first in Tehran, which is not good for Hashemi Rafsanjani at all. However, now that he is not, Hashemi Rafsanjani will likely come first in Tehran with the wave he has created for a long time. It is said that in recent days, at the request of Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi, Hassan Khomeini had a private meeting with him. Ayatollah Yazdi told Hassan Khomeini that he had read his books and considers his qualifications confirmed. Conservatives claim that Hashemi Rafsanjani made his remarks on February 1 with knowledge of this news. Now, what is the fate of Ayatollah Khamenei, the IRGC, the Guardian Council, and conservatives? Should they not confirm Hassan Khomeini's qualifications even after knowing of his qualifications to thwart Hashemi Rafsanjani's plans? If they confirm Hassan Khomeini's qualifications, he is likely to come first in Tehran, which would be a significant defeat for a prominent figure like Hashemi Rafsanjani, who does not consider Hassan Khomeini more than a 'seminarian.' Thus, Khamenei and the Guardian Council can stifle Hashemi's schemes in their infancy by confirming Hassan Khomeini's qualifications. This means not allowing Hashemi Rafsanjani to become a symbol of defense for the 'Imam's household' while Khamenei, the Guardian Council, the IRGC, and conservatives become symbols opposing the 'Imam's household.' Let us speak in the language that Khamenei and conservatives prefer. They compare everything to events from the early Islamic period. For example, Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi has said: 'Even before the Prophet was buried, some sought to appoint a successor for him; they believed that appointing a successor was a non-religious matter and had nothing to do with religion! Therefore, they took it upon themselves to appoint a successor to the Prophet. This led to a situation where someone, claiming to be the Prophet's caliph, drank alcohol and prayed while intoxicated! This was not long after the event of Ghadir Khumm, which people could not have forgotten.' For hundreds of years, jurists have lamented why, after the Prophet's demise, such treatment was meted out to his family and companions. Now Hashemi Rafsanjani has managed to position himself as a defender of the family of Ayatollah Khomeini and his companions - Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mehdi Karroubi, Ayatollah Sanei, Mohammad Khatami, and others - while Khamenei, the IRGC, and all conservatives are positioned as their imprisoners. Confirming Hassan Khomeini's qualifications would thwart Hashemi Rafsanjani's schemes. However, the issue is not as simple as stated. Ayatollah Khamenei, the IRGC, and conservatives know that Hashemi Rafsanjani's plans are more complicated than these claims. This plan has many unacceptable consequences: First, if a list for the Assembly of Experts is presented by reformists and moderates in Tehran, with Hassan Khomeini, Hashemi Rafsanjani, and Hassan Rouhani at the top, that list is likely to win. Second, Hassan Khomeini coming first with high votes in Tehran is absolutely unacceptable to Khamenei and conservatives. This would be a significant defeat for the most prominent figures among conservatives, who do not consider Hassan Khomeini more than a 'seminarian.' Third, what is the purpose of Hassan Khomeini's presence in the Assembly of Experts? Once they can quickly elevate him to 'Ayatollah' and 'Allameh' and send him to the Assembly of Experts with high votes, why can't they position him as a future leader? Hashemi Rafsanjani is five years older than Khamenei. He knows that military commanders, security forces, and conservatives are against him. Hashemi is thinking about the historical moment of Khamenei's death. He needs Hassan Khomeini for that moment. Ayatollah Khamenei and conservatives, considering these points, cannot accept confirming Hassan Khomeini's qualifications. This game is a win-win for Hashemi Rafsanjani. Khamenei and conservatives find themselves in a paradoxical situation. They have engineered both elections to ensure 'royal assemblies.' However, the 'election institution' has unintended functions that cannot all be predicted in advance and controlled. The nuclear agreement also has countless unintended consequences that will gradually become apparent. Hassan Rouhani has stated that after the external JCPOA, it is time for the internal JCPOA.