The 'Principlist' Current: Divergent and Chaotic

Less than a month and a half before the elections on May 29, 2017, the fate of the candidates for this election is still unclear. This ambiguity stems from the government supporters' concerns about the supervisory oversight and the possibility (albeit slight) of disqualifying Rouhani, and from the opposition's internal decision-making mechanisms and disagreements over executive policies. Consequently, government supporters are seeking a cover candidate (likely Masoud Pezeshkian, the Deputy Speaker of Parliament), while the government's opponents are trying to find a unifying candidate. The support from some of the government's opponents for Ebrahim Raisi's candidacy is more based on the hope for his unifying potential than on his qualifications from the principlist perspective. Ebrahim Raisi is attempting to realize this aspiration by selecting some members of the Stability Front in his campaign and coordinating his candidacy with the newly established 'Popular Front of the Revolutionary Forces' (Jemna). What is the political and intra-factional situation of the current that considers itself principlist? Can this faction overcome its fundamental disagreements and enter the elections with a single candidate? The convergence of the moderate Islamist pragmatists, after two decades of experience with engineered elections, limited press and party activities, widespread arrests and televised confessions, and severe repression of social movements (women, students, workers, and teachers), has reached the point where reforming the structures of the regime (for example, by abolishing supervisory oversight and increasing the president's powers) is impossible with Khamenei and the IRGC, and one can only prevent the situation from worsening by participating in power (while adhering to everything that the IRGC and the Leader's office desire) and simultaneously benefiting from being in power. With this view, after the failure in the Green Movement, this current supported a figure like Rouhani (security-oriented but pragmatic, advocating repression and violation of the rights of non-compatriots domestically but conciliatory in dealing with global powers). Thus, the so-called 'former reformist current' (as they have all become moderates) and 'moderation' have found their place in the system: by not challenging the decisions and policies of the Supreme Leader, accepting the existing share of the IRGC and security forces in the country's power and wealth, avoiding provoking Khamenei's close associates, while keeping an eye on the cultural and social demands (not political) of the protesters. The former reformist current has established its place in the system to the extent that one of its current strategists criticizes Hashemi Rafsanjani for not coordinating with Khamenei before announcing his candidacy in 2013. The current known as 'principlist', which in reality believes in nothing but its complete power, has still not been able to reach specific frameworks for political activity and governance, as well as resolving its internal disputes. In the months leading up to the 2017 presidential election, we have witnessed various statements aimed at defining the frameworks and charter of the fundamentalist Islamist current in Iran, but none of them, apart from mentioning generalities that cannot serve as a factor for the cohesion of political currents and circles (belief in revolutionary methods, continuation of Islamization, obedience to leadership, and Basij thought; see Alireza Zakani's third statement), have made any progress. Some candidates (like Saeed Jalili) did not sign the covenant that was prepared to ensure the withdrawal of certain candidates. For this reason, the disagreements within this faction regarding the selection of a single candidate seem unsolvable. It is still unclear whether the outcome of the 'Popular Front of the Revolutionary Forces' gathering in Esfand 95 resulted in 14 candidates or 10; whether an agreement will be reached on five final candidates on Farvardin 17 or on five Jemna candidates from which a single candidate will be introduced; what the views of Jemna candidates from Ahmadinejad's government are regarding Baghaei's candidacy and where they will go if they are not Jemna candidates; and whether Jemna is negotiating with the Stability Front or not. There is also fragmentation within the factions. Members of the Stability Front lean towards three potential candidates: Raisi, Jalili, and Fattah, and the fate of their final candidate is unclear. They claim to vote for the best candidate, but at the same time, they want their candidate to also attract the votes of the regime's supporters. The very formation of 'Jemna' and the reactions to it within the principlist faction is evidence of this faction's divergence. Jemna aims to unite forces that have no consensus under the banner of a single candidate, while this very formula was pursued in the previous election cycle among Qalibaf, Hadad Adel, and Velayati, ultimately resulting in all three becoming candidates. The Stability Front perceives Jemna's methods as based on trickery, and the faction close to Ahmadinejad is also pursuing its own 'Spring Government'. In this situation, the idea of a single candidate against Rouhani appears to be an unexpected illusion, which even its followers seem uncertain about believing. The reason for the fragmentation of the fundamentalist Islamist current encompasses three factions: the Messianic faction, which has issues with clerical rule (the allocation of governance to Shia clerics) and adopts an aggressive stance in both foreign and domestic policy. The nuclear program has been the centerpiece of this faction's political presence both domestically and internationally; this faction seeks global management (shaping Shia imperialism) and its cooperation with the Shia clergy has been based on this goal. This faction believes that through messianism, it can gather the necessary forces to construct this dominant power in the world; Mesbah Yazdi and the Stability Front are ideologically very close to this faction but have differences over some tactics and figures; the clerical faction. This faction has sought to strengthen the power of the clergy in the country since February 11, 1979. Foreign policy and creating tensions abroad have not been central issues for this faction, but they have used them to consolidate power domestically. The political forces of this faction have sought to acquire and maintain maximum power, wealth, and status for the clergy and their close associates. This faction is closest to the Society of Combatant Clergy of Tehran and the Society of Teachers of Qom; the militaristic faction. This faction is mostly composed of former forces close to the IRGC and security forces. The Coalition has fluctuated between this faction and the clerical faction. Movements like Abadgaran and Etesargaran have been past representatives of this faction. They fully supported Ahmadinejad for a period, but Ahmadinejad sidelined some of them, especially in his second term. The principlist or fundamentalist current today is as fragmented and chaotic as in 2013 because these three factions have different perspectives on governance (domestic policy and especially economic policies) and relations with the world (foreign policy) and have not yet been able to reach a common denominator. Do they have austerity and isolationist policies (Abu Talib's branches and resistant economy) in mind, or do they seek give-and-take with the world? Do they want to repair relations with Europe and the countries of the southern Persian Gulf, or do they want to insult the entire world? The clerical faction is both a defender of the market and has a stake in trade and does not want to cede this stake to the militaristic faction. However, the militaristic faction, with slogans focused on production and employment, seeks to reduce the share of clerics from $50 billion in official imports and $25 billion in smuggled imports. The Messianic faction only temporarily aligned with the other two factions to suppress the reformist current but has very little commonality in terms of ideological foundations and interests with them. It is expected that the clerical and militaristic factions could form a coalition government if victorious, but the Messianic faction, especially after the events of Ahmadinejad's second government, will not align with them. Opposition to a figure like Rouhani has also been unable to and cannot unify them. Among the three factions, the clerical faction has cooperated the most with Rouhani's government, while the militaristic faction has opposed Rouhani's government from the very beginning: from expressing 'concerns' during nuclear negotiations to the recent uproar over astronomical salaries. These three factions do not even agree on how to approach Rouhani's government. Those who formed Jemna believe that by bringing three thousand forces to their gatherings, they can overcome the fundamental disagreements within these three factions, but realities and positions testify otherwise.