The Referendum on Kurdish Independence: From Dream to Reality

As the process of holding the referendum for the independence of Iraqi Kurdistan surprised many amid severe regional and international opposition, the transfer of control of areas in the region, including Kirkuk, Sinjar, and Khanqin from Peshmerga forces to the Iraqi army and Hashd al-Shaabi (with minimal resistance) also caused significant astonishment. Especially considering the economic importance of Kirkuk, which is tied to its oil wells, and the historical Kurdish claims over this city, alongside Mr. Barzani's statements before the referendum about keeping this city within the Kurdistan region even at the cost of battle and war, it was assumed that the reoccupation of this city and its oil facilities would not be easy for the Iraqi government and the army that had left the area in 2014 out of fear of ISIS. It was expected that the Kurds, who had shown remarkable resilience and fighting spirit during the battle against ISIS, would fiercely defend these areas! However, not only did this not happen, but the rapid developments and 360-degree shifts have sparked many ambiguities in public opinion. Although a precise analysis of events requires clarification of some dark points and access to more information, it is worth noting the following points: A- The excessive media coverage of the Kurdish independence referendum. The long and arduous struggles of the Kurds are one of the oldest movements in the Middle East. The dispersion of Kurds across four different countries and the oppression and discrimination they have faced—albeit to varying degrees—have always been a breeding ground for their dissatisfaction and protests. Additionally, the betrayal of the British and French during the Sykes-Picot Agreement turned the 'Kurdish issue' into a smoldering fire that has periodically engulfed the countries where Kurds reside since World War I, and in the meantime, the Kurds' efforts for independence and the establishment of a Kurdish state have yielded no results. The developments in Iraq after the Gulf War and the subsequent fall of Saddam and the establishment of the autonomous Kurdistan region created a strong suspicion that the chances for Iraqi Kurds to form the world's first Kurdish state were greater than for other Kurds, especially given the weakening of the central government and the attention of major global powers towards the Kurds during the fight against ISIS. For this reason, the issue of the Kurdish referendum in Iraq, especially under the profound influence of virtual and satellite networks, exploded in public consciousness, and the high percentage of 'yes' votes followed by natural celebrations created an unrealistic expectation that Kurdish independence was imminent and the referendum was its execution document! While the region's officials have repeatedly emphasized the non-binding nature of the referendum, the areas handed over to the Iraqi government are also considered outside the borders of the region. I certainly respect the wounded feelings of the Kurds, but it must be said that neither the world has come to an end nor has politics! We should also be grateful that a new war and conflict in the region, the outcome of which was uncertain for the Kurds, was prevented. B- The historical self-harm of the Kurds. To demonstrate the weakness of solidarity and serious obstacles to Kurdish unity, especially at historical turning points, it is unnecessary to go back to the uprisings of Sheikh Said Piran, Sheikh Mahmoud Barzanjy, or Qazi Muhammad in past centuries; the history of recent decades, in which a large number of its actors are still alive, serves as a living witness to the fact that Kurds in all four regions have often been more wounded by internal rivalries than by external obstacles, and fratricide—a term that is disdained—has been the currency of the era. Some may argue—especially Kurdish readers—that this phenomenon has been imposed on them as a result of enemies' plots, but this does not diminish the bitterness of reality and the agency of the self. In recent events, according to credible reports, negotiations and agreements involving part of the family of the late Jalal Talabani, who has extensive influence in the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (one of the two main parties in the region), with Qassem Soleimani, the commander of the Quds Force, and commanders of Hashd al-Shaabi representing the Iraqi government played a key role in the issue of the Peshmerga's retreat without resistance from Kirkuk and other disputed areas. Of course, much remains to be said about the price at which this agreement was reached and how practical promises such as the formation of a Kurdish region with new geography and receiving a 17% share of oil will be. C- The miscalculation of the Barzanis. Although the formation of an independent Kurdistan is a dream for a large segment of all Kurds, at this current juncture, the Barzani family, led by Mr. Masoud Barzani, was the main orchestrator of the referendum for the independence of Iraqi Kurdistan. Mr. Barzani insisted on holding the referendum at this time despite severe regional opposition (led by Iran and Turkey) and international opposition from the US and Europe to the UN, creating a heavy atmosphere against holding and accepting its results, and unfortunately, the only foreign supporter of this referendum was Israel, which itself exacerbated some of the regional concerns. For this reason, holding the referendum at this time even faced serious opposition within Iraqi Kurdistan, but the hegemony of independence-seeking sentiment and the eruption of long-suppressed feelings overshadowed all opposition. In such an atmosphere, the views of Kurdish opponents of the referendum, who primarily cited maximum external opposition and the unpreparedness of the environment and the possibility of sacrificing the sacred dream of independence, were not taken seriously, and the pre-prepared and very worn-out label of 'betrayal' was hurled at them from all sides, while the miscalculation—especially regarding foreign support for the referendum, which was an undeniable necessity under severe regional pressure—was completely clear. In this highly emotional and simplistic atmosphere, the legitimacy of Mr. Barzani's presidency in the region, the closure of the parliament, widespread administrative and economic corruption, the absence of modern political practices, the lack of democratic relations, family mafia structures, and a highly tribal framework, as well as the lack of economic infrastructure were considered unimportant, and the referendum was held at a time when it can be confidently said that it not only lacked any foreign support but also faced numerous internal obstacles. D- The importance of entering history and becoming a legend. A friend recounted that during the 1990s, amidst the Palestinian peace negotiations with Israel, Yasser Arafat's negotiation style and behavior suggested that he seemed to care more about entering history than the main issue—peace and its impact on the lives of Palestinians! The Achilles' heel of many Middle Eastern politicians is the dream of becoming a legend and emphasizing individual missions in performing tasks that they often mistakenly believe are beyond the capabilities of others! Pride, ego, and the avoidance of emphasizing collective wisdom have cast a shadow over most failures and setbacks of regional movements, including the Kurds. Unfortunately, it must be acknowledged that the manner in which Mr. Barzani presented the referendum issue and his illogical insistence on holding it at any cost, along with the events that followed, strengthen the suspicion that he valued entering history and becoming a legend more than the fate of the Kurdish people, the independence of Kurdistan, and the preservation and strengthening of the region's achievements.