The Relationship Between Belief in Conspiracy Theories and the Power Curve in the Islamic Republic

My thesis in this writing is that there is a direct relationship between an individual's position on the political power curve in authoritarian regimes and their adherence to conspiracy theories. Those who are in the upward or upper section of the power curve in authoritarian regimes and perceive a high possibility of gaining power are more likely to believe in and express conspiracy theories than those in the declining section who have no hope of gaining power. This belief is not a deeply held conviction that is difficult or slow to change; rather, it is a practical and functional stance that changes rapidly with changing conditions. Those at the bottom of the power pyramid may also believe in conspiracy theories, but their belief is often a labeling stance rather than a practical one. Of course, those at the bottom of the power pyramid may occasionally resort to this theory to evade responsibility (such as attributing the fall of the Pahlavi regime and the rise of Khomeini to great powers), but they cannot use this theory to suppress others, and its political utility for them is minimal. The three main objectives of resorting to conspiracy theories are quite clear: authoritarian regime officials (such as the Islamic Republic, Communist China, and Putin's Russia) achieve three goals by resorting to conspiracy theories when in power: 1) They want to absolve themselves of responsibility by blaming external factors, especially in crisis situations. A current example is Putin's recent remarks criticizing the United States and the European Union, where he attributes Russia's economic problems to foreign powers rather than to Russia's expansionist actions in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea. The lesser reliance of Chinese officials on this theory in the past decade is due to the country's high economic growth and extensive dealings with Western parties; if one day the country's economic growth sharply declines or public protests arise, the first action will be to blame Western governments; 2) They position themselves as representatives of the nation in a victimized and oppressed role, framing their decisions as aimed at escaping these conditions. Khamenei, Putin, and Chavez (and now Maduro) refer to the efforts of foreign powers to weaken the power of their three countries and the colonialism of Europeans and American imperialism, while Iran and Russia have never been colonized and have acted to deploy military forces to other countries whenever they have had the opportunity; 3) They also suppress opponents by exaggerating or taking seriously the role of foreign powers, attributing them to foreigners. According to human rights organizations, the situation of repression in Russia has intensified in the recent wave of anti-Western propaganda by Russian officials; political repression in Iran did not decrease even during the presidencies of Khatami and Rouhani, and accusations against opponents and critics of receiving money from foreigners and collaborating with foreign security agencies have been constant. All three objectives are pursued by those in power who do not want to relinquish it with the power cycle. Those who see a possibility of gaining power for themselves in this arena are also forced to operate within the same model of gaining and maintaining power, where belief in conspiracy theories is one of its components. Beyond the causes and factors of the current and potential powerful individuals' belief in this theory, to explain this thesis, on one hand, one can demonstrate a strong belief in conspiracy theories among existing officials or forces loyal to the regime who also have ambitions for power. This is easy to show, as readers can simply search the statements of various political, military, judicial officials, and members of parliament and party committees in such regimes. However, there is another way to explain the above thesis, which is to show that the most serious believers in conspiracy theories have distanced themselves from this theory after falling from power or weakening their power. The literature of leaders and high-ranking officials of authoritarian regimes shows that they resort less to this theory after losing power because, apart from the narrative of victimization, their two other objectives, especially suppressing opponents, are no longer applicable. The use of conspiracy theories is a function of the user's position in the political power structure. Therefore, if there is a rotation of political elites in a society and the possibility of dismissing and returning managers to the power arena exists, the use of conspiracy theories decreases. Lifelong power and the minimal role of the people in selecting political leaders create fertile ground for the growth of conspiracy theories. Just as the use of conspiracy theories by Hashemi Rafsanjani and his close associates has decreased since 2009, and the use of this theory by Khatami and his companions has decreased since the 1990s, if Khamenei and his close associates did not have the possibility of lifelong power, neither would the term 'enemy' fill their discourse nor would conspiracy theories become their main theory in understanding the political world. The denial of individual responsibility can be concluded from the relationship between conspiracy theories and placing individuals on the upward slope of the power curve. Conspiracy theories not only lack any explanatory aspect but also merely express a will directed towards power in authoritarian societies and cultures. In democratic societies, there are still those who want to reach power with the same logic as authoritarian societies, but they achieve little success. One of the assumptions of conspiracy theories is the denial of individuals' responsibility in events in which they play a role. Conspiracy theories relieve everyone of the feeling of individual and collective responsibility, which is essential for acquiring individual and collective rights, allowing one to attribute all their problems and unpleasant matters to others. Societies with low feelings of responsibility are more likely to accept conspiracy theories. To clarify the issue in Iran under the Islamic Republic, I will mention four cases. These cases alone cannot prove the thesis of this writing. They are merely mentioned to approximate the subject to the mind: 1. Rafsanjani and ISIS. Hashemi Rafsanjani has been a champion of conspiracy theorizing whenever he felt powerful over the past 36 years. A glance at his sermons in Friday prayers in the 1990s and 2000s suffices. However, for several years now, after being removed from the position of head of the Assembly of Experts and Friday prayer leader in Tehran, he does not immediately resort to conspiracy theories in his analyses. One of these is his analysis of the causes of ISIS's emergence. Official government propaganda attributes the emergence of ISIS to global imperialism and Israel, but Rafsanjani addresses endogenous and historical causes: 'Actions like the killing of Omar and the cursing of the companions and sowing discord among Muslims lead us to al-Qaeda, ISIS, and the Taliban... In my opinion, this great sin that is happening is causing discord among the Islamic community, as the Islamic community of 1.7 billion people with 60 independent countries that could be the largest weight of global power has been weakened to be subservient to other countries.' (Tabnak, November 9, 2014) In this statement, Rafsanjani identifies the causes of the weakness and backwardness of Muslims as primarily internal rather than external, placing part of the responsibility on Shiites. 2. Torqan and Abgoosht-e Bazbash. Akbar Torqan is a senior official of the Islamic Republic who has held ministerial or deputy ministerial positions for three decades. He is an intellectual close to Hashemi Rafsanjani and, like in the past, can resort to conspiracy theories to explain any phenomenon, such as the state of industry in Iran. However, as the sun of this group is declining, they no longer resort to conspiracy theories to explain the situation. Torqan explains the state of industry in the country in a national framework and its capacities: 'Let’s be honest with ourselves; we have no superiority in any industrial technology compared to the world other than cooking Abgoosht-e Bazbash and Ghormeh Sabzi.' (Secretary of the Free Trade, Industrial, and Special Economic Zones Coordination Council, Tasnim, November 10, 2014) One cannot be honest about oneself and the current situation using conspiracy theories. It is because of this honesty that his conspiracy-oriented media have insulted him. 3. Rafsanjani and Bashar al-Assad's Chemical Attack. After the chemical attack by Bashar's regime on Ghouta, Hashemi Rafsanjani said: 'A government that bombs its own people with chemical weapons will face severe consequences; just as Saddam bought eternal disgrace for himself in the bombing of Halabja and faced such a terrible fate.' (Jahan News, August 30, 2013) After pressure from the office and military and security forces, he retracted this statement, but the essence of the statement reflects Rafsanjani's departure from conspiracy theories in analyzing developments in Syria. Rafsanjani did not attribute the chemical attack to the conspiracy of imperialism but to a regime that resorts to any action to remain in power. Had Rafsanjani been in a position of power similar to the conditions before 2009, the likelihood of him making such an analysis would have been very low. 4. Khatami and Solving the Country's Problems. When Mohammad Khatami was president, he used this term very rarely (much less than in the 1980s and generally incomparable to Khamenei), but after the events of 2009 and receiving the label 'leaders of sedition,' he completely forgot this term. When he spoke of the country's problems, he attributed everything to internal management and presented the solution as internal: 'Without the leadership wanting and without coordination with him, problems will not be solved... From the first and second deciles, who are in very dire conditions, to employers and elites, especially the middle class and youth, their hope and trust have been lost, and this must be revived.' (Personal website, May 2013) This issue is, of course, not limited to Khatami. Other leftist religious leaders and reformist activists also used this theory much less in the 1990s (after the disqualification of the fourth and fifth parliament) and have forgotten it in the second half of the 2000s, especially after the Green Movement and widespread arrests.