The Result of a Closed Political Space; Four Points About Masoud Pezeshkian

The second round of presidential elections in Iran is held under the shadow of widespread election boycotts, similar to the previous round. In this context, Masoud Pezeshkian and Saeed Jalili, both emerging from different sections of the government, are set to compete against each other. Here, we discuss several political characteristics and personal positions of Pezeshkian: 1. The Result of a Closed and Bipolar Space First and foremost, the elevation of Masoud Pezeshkian's political status as one of the main candidates for the presidential elections is due to the Guardian Council's decision to approve his candidacy [despite a history of disqualification], the disqualification of other prominent candidates, the closed political environment in Iran, and the 'bipolarity' of this closed space. Although Pezeshkian has previously held positions such as Deputy Speaker of the Islamic Consultative Assembly and Minister, he did not have significant charisma, influence, or a political base at the national level. Whether he wants to or not, he has taken on the leadership of a faction in the current elections, which has somewhat seen its demands reflected in his slogans. The officials of the Islamic Republic have repeatedly emphasized in past elections, including the current one, that the society should not become 'bipolar', as they consider the bloody protests of 2009 to be the result of this 'bipolarity' in elections. However, in a situation where various parties in Iran are inactive, where freedom of expression and political activity are absent, and where many political figures have been exiled, imprisoned, or placed under house arrest, nationwide voting in the Islamic Republic has been limited to two factions: 'Reformists' (previously referred to as 'Left' or later 'Second Khordad') and 'Principlists' (the 'Right' or 'Conservatives'). Nevertheless, the boundaries between these two groups are not very clear, and occasionally, for the redefinition of certain political figures, analysts and domestic media have resorted to terms like 'Moderate Principlist', 'Rational Principlist', or 'Radical Reformist'. For this reason, the political boundaries of many politicians, including Pezeshkian, are not precisely defined. Pezeshkian himself has emphasized his 'non-partisan' stance during debates. Due to the specific mechanism for entering the electoral arena in Iran, candidates do not pass through party filters and are only supported by political groups or figures after their individual registration at the Ministry of Interior and potential approval by the Guardian Council. This mechanism allows individuals not to feel any specific political commitment to a movement or framework, even if they win elections with party support. An example of this is Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's disregard for the principlist groups that supported him during his second presidential term. Now, several figures known as 'Reformists' and 'Moderates' in Iran argue based on Saeed Jalili's positions that Pezeshkian can stand against such positions and advance reformist or moderate policies if he wins the election. Regardless of the extent of presidential powers in Iran, given the authority of the Supreme Leader, past experiences during Mohammad Khatami's and Hassan Rouhani's presidencies have shown that merely associating a president with a set of demands (including those related to individual, social, and political freedoms) has not led that president to advance and fulfill those demands. Particularly in the case of Hassan Rouhani, the failure to adhere to these demands and incidents such as the suppression of the 2019 protests also depended on his personal thoughts and demeanor. Essentially for this reason, many voters are no longer influenced by the bipolar election atmosphere, which could itself be a good incentive for participation, and do not participate in elections. This group of voters, especially, has become severely disillusioned with the changed behavior of figures associated with reformism or moderation after attaining the power and position for which they were elected. 2. A Campaign Similar to 'Preliminary Speeches' Pezeshkian's election campaign, including his speeches and statements, is more akin to the preliminary speeches of parliamentary representatives; brief, fleeting, and scattered, without any specific program, but relatively fiery. He has previously been a representative in the Islamic Consultative Assembly. In a preliminary speech, each parliamentary representative can speak about current issues in the country or problems in their electoral district before the parliament enters its agenda. In these preliminary speeches, no specific plan or framework is formed, and it is merely an opportunity to express views. The current elections are 'early' due to the death of Ebrahim Raisi, and no one was prepared to enter the elections at this time. However, even in this short period, despite having access to many experts, Pezeshkian has not developed a specific program and essentially emphasizes his lack of a specific program, stating that he intends to implement the existing programs. His rival, who claims to have a program unlike him, has used this opportunity to criticize Pezeshkian and accuse him of 'lack of planning'. In several sensitive issues, this 'lack of planning', or more precisely, the absence of a program different from existing and experienced programs, could become problematic for Pezeshkian if he wins the elections. For instance, regarding the fuel crisis in Iran, he has stated that he intends to control the price increase through subsidies to the lower deciles of society; an experience that has been somewhat repeated in the past and has not managed to control the effects of fuel price increases, causing dissatisfaction. Pezeshkian sometimes explains his programs by resorting to verses from the Muslim holy book or sermons and letters of the first Imam of Shiites or other religious texts, presenting his 'model' as the first Imam of Shiites. This is while the officials of the Islamic Republic have repeatedly made such claims since the establishment of this government, yet in practice, the problems and crises in Iran have increased. 3. Some Questionable Backgrounds and Statements Pezeshkian has provided explanations about his background, especially at the beginning of the revolution, in various interviews over the years. He, who was accepted into the medical field at Tabriz University of Medical Sciences in 1976, was a student during the revolution and joined revolutionary students. Pezeshkian has emphasized how he prevented the activities of other non-conforming groups at the university through revolutionary actions. In the television program 'Shenasnameh', he referred to his role in political purges and cleansings at universities, stating that 'even the cultural revolution started from our faculty'. In another television program, Pezeshkian said, 'When the revolution happened, we were in charge of everything.' He referred to his role in banning examinations of women in the medical faculty for religious motivations and reasons, stating that such a prohibition was in place even though the then Friday Imam of Tabriz opposed this prohibition. Although Pezeshkian protested to the Islamic Republic's media about the treatment of Mahsa Amini by security forces after her death, his views on women, as he himself emphasized, are based on the necessity of 'educating girls and women'. He stated that women and girls should be 'educated' by men in society and institutions like clergy, mosques, and media, and if women and girls do not comply with mandatory hijab now, 'the blame' lies with these institutions. He said, 'We have educated these girls and women; foreigners have not educated them.' Regarding the internet, he has repeatedly emphasized his belief in a nationwide internet shutdown during protests or crises; a measure that the Islamic Republic has implemented several times in the past, drawing criticism from activists and human rights organizations. In one of his debates with Saeed Jalili, he stated that he would be willing to step aside so that Saeed Jalili could fulfill the promise of '8% economic growth', but if he fails, Jalili should be 'executed'. Although he made these statements to emphasize the irresponsibility of Islamic Republic officials regarding their promises, many said that such statements reflect a belief in the death penalty. The Islamic Republic has faced severe criticism and protests from human rights organizations and the United Nations due to its high rate of executions among various countries. He has also repeatedly supported the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, both when the U.S. classified it as a 'terrorist organization' and during the recent election campaign. The IRGC is now not only a powerful military force but has also become active in many economic sectors of Iran. Pezeshkian has not clarified in his statements and programs whether he intends to confront the IRGC's interventions in foreign policy and economic sectors or not. 4. The Uncertain Promise of Lifting Sanctions The most important promise that reformists and moderates are banking on for Pezeshkian's victory in the elections is the issue of lifting sanctions through negotiations with the U.S. The topic of relations with the U.S. and how Tehran and Washington negotiate has been one of the most sensitive and complex issues of Iran's foreign policy since the revolution. The sensitivity and crisis surrounding this issue have been such that even some governments of the Islamic Republic have fallen victim to it. Experiences from past decades of Iranian presidents in New York have shown that they do not even have the authority to decide alone about meeting or discussing with American leaders. Pezeshkian has promised to lift sanctions and resume negotiations but has not mentioned the role and interventions of the Supreme Leader in this matter. He introduces himself within the framework of policies set by the Supreme Leader, and it is unclear how he would act in the event of potential opposition from Ali Khamenei to any transformation in this area. In fact, the most significant hope regarding Pezeshkian's potential presidency relates to an area that is not entirely under his control. Kamal Kharrazi, an advisor to the Supreme Leader, has confirmed that depending on the victory of any candidate, there will be 'differences' in the Iranian government's approach, but the 'overall strategy of Iran's foreign policy' is determined by the leader. On the other side of this equation, the United States has emphasized that regardless of the outcome of Iran's presidential elections and who wins, it does not expect 'fundamental changes' in Iran.