The Result of Committee Management and Rentier System: Resource Waste, Project Failures or Delays

The management style in the Islamic Republic can be explained through three aspects: 1. Centers for training or certifying high-ranking managers. These include Imam Sadiq University, Baqir al-Uloom Institute, and other theological and hybrid schools that mix a bit of English language training with jurisprudence and principles, believing they are training managers for today's world. A significant number of managers have obtained their management doctorates without attending any educational programs (apparently participating in management programs for military personnel). It has been predetermined who will be managers, and they are dressed in management attire. Loyalists to the clergy in these centers try to replicate themselves. 2. How one becomes a manager. Becoming a high-ranking manager in the Islamic Republic is done either through appointment by the leadership (in the public sector) or through the allocation of rents and privileges (in the seemingly private sector). The criteria for these two are loyalty to the Supreme Leader and avoiding criticism and opposition (tawalli and tabarri). Non-competitive scholarships are one way of credentialing these loyal managers. 3. The mechanism of management in Iran. This mechanism is based on relationships within power circles that are entirely committee-based. Work is also done in a committee manner. These committees have no regard for meritocracy and expertise, research and study, scientific project management, or feedback and evaluation. A group gathers and takes on a task without prior planning and study. There is neither rational division of labor, accountability, nor competition in obtaining projects. The entry of military and security forces into economic activities has closed the door on any form of competition and meritocracy. Some may deny all the mentioned characteristics and claim that these allegations are not based on research and field surveys. Given the closed nature of research avenues, the above points rely solely on three decades of the author's observations. However, let’s assume that the above points cannot be substantiated with evidence and statistics. Perhaps explaining the country's managerial conditions and the allocation of resources analytically may not be convincing for many, but this management style can be better explained by its results than ever before. Even if we ignore more than 20,000 unfinished projects from the Fourth Development Plan (World Economy, September 1, 2013), the issue can be illustrated with a few cases, all related to national and very costly projects. These are projects whose financial performance reports have not been presented to the public by the government. The cracked tunnel and geological science: The cracks in the Tohid Tunnel have become so apparent that officials have been forced to react: "The construction of the Tohid Tunnel was a design-and-build project, meaning the contractor was both the designer and builder. At the time of designing this project, the contractor believed there was no need to use waterproof layers that were used in the Niayesh, Hakim, and other tunnel projects... The contractor of the Tohid Tunnel claimed that the groundwater level was lower than the tunnel floor level and that groundwater would not enter the project, so they thought they were doing the right thing. Of course, at that time, we protested that they should not do this, but because the project was a design-and-build one, the responsibility was theirs, and the contractor executed their design... After the tunnel was opened, we realized that surface waters, including rainwater, water from leaks in urban drinking water pipes, sewage channels, and qanats that exist, entered the tunnel from the surface... After the opening of the Tohid Tunnel, we sealed the western part of the tunnel using other methods. However, after that, we saw that in other parts of the project where a pipe had burst or there was a qanat, water was entering the tunnel." (Deputy Executive of Tunnel Projects at the Tehran Engineering and Construction Organization, Tasnim, June 19, 2015) The Tohid Tunnel was constructed as if geological science had not yet entered Iran. As a result, water accumulates at the bottom of the tunnel, and the municipality drains it. About 600 billion tomans (with the dollar at 1200 tomans at the time of construction, half a billion dollars) was spent on building this tunnel. The construction of the Amir Kabir Tunnel was also carried out without preliminary studies: "During the execution of the project, the contractor encountered surface water networks, sewage pipes, etc., based on which the employer ordered a change in the design instead of resolving the conflicts." (Technical and Civil Deputy of Tehran Municipality, Tasnim, July 1, 2014) The construction of the salt lake by damming the Karun River and the Gotvand Dam, built on a salt mountain, has become one of the tragedies of the water and dam industry in the country. This dam has posed such a danger to the region that discussions of its complete destruction are underway. For the study group of this dam, geological science had not yet taken shape. The project for this dam was assigned to the Khatam al-Anbiya Headquarters of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Three billion dollars have been spent on this project. Apart from this, dozens of dam projects by the Islamic Republic have essentially been a waste of resources. For example, the 15 Khordad Dam was built in an area near Qom where there was neither a river nor sufficient rainfall. This dam did not even reach the filling stage. The Tehran Prayer Hall, which has not been completed after thirty years, has been consuming public (government and municipal) resources like a bottomless pit for thirty years but remains unfinished. Even during the oil boom, with annual revenues of about 100 billion dollars, this project did not come to completion. This project, like other large projects, was handed over to the IRGC. The government has not even provided a single document regarding the expenses incurred for this project. Ultimately, this project was transferred to the Tehran Municipality for completion, but the IRGC denied this transfer. Only from 2011 to 2014, about 300 billion tomans were spent on the construction of the prayer hall. According to the former civil deputy of Tehran Municipality, completing this project requires a budget of 3 trillion tomans to finish this work in three years. (Project Executor of the Prayer Hall and former civil deputy of Tehran Municipality, Nameh News, May 5, 2015) The situation of what has been done over the past thirty years on the most expensive land in Tehran, covering 204 hectares of Abbas Abad land, is such that the country's managers do not consider this place suitable even for holding an exhibition, and holding the book fair was imposed on the cultural managers. For a very short time, Friday prayers were transferred to this location but were moved back to the University of Tehran. The 12-year project of a 50 billion toman mosque: Since 2003, a mosque has been under construction in the Student Park area of Tehran by the government. So far, 31 billion tomans have been spent on this mosque, and the contractor is demanding another 19 billion tomans. Regardless of the correctness or incorrectness of such projects, this project has been stuck in the design phase after 12 years. A group wants a dome and minaret for it (the municipality), while another group does not see the minaret and dome as necessary (the project executor). The Tehran City Council has also called for the project to be halted. The Cultural Heritage Organization has also requested the project to be stopped on the grounds that this mosque is located in the theater city’s vicinity and may be excluded from national registration if constructed. The 44-year sewage project of Tehran: According to Rahim Midani, Deputy Minister of Energy, only 56% of Tehran's subscribers have been covered by the sewage disposal network so far. For Tehran's sewage, more than 145 million dollars have been borrowed from the World Bank and 200 million euros from the Islamic Development Bank. Additionally, resources are planned to be attracted through pre-selling sewage connections, selling participation bonds, and selling surplus assets of the water and sewage company. Each sewage connection has cost between 250 to 300 thousand tomans. (Stock Exchange Hall website, July 24, 2015) Over 500 billion tomans wasted: According to Bijan Haj Mohammad Reza, head of the fuel station owners' association across the country, more than 50 million fuel cards have been issued, with the cost of each fuel card being over 10 thousand tomans. In addition to the 50 million fuel cards issued, some fuel cards have been reissued due to being lost or broken. The government imported this number of fuel cards at a very high cost from China, but the amount charged to the public was 10 thousand tomans. Typically, during the week, each station would return 15 to 50 lost fuel cards to the National Oil Distribution Company, most of which were reissued. With the unification of gasoline prices, the 50 million fuel cards are no longer useful. (Etemad, July 6, 2015) This waste goes back to a decision made to reduce fuel consumption, which was never realized. Other projects, such as the new Tehran airport, took decades to complete. All the above cases are related to the type of management, and no other justification can be found for them. The reduction of water resources can be attributed to drought (despite the waste and unlimited extraction of groundwater), but the cracks in the tunnel cannot be attributed to natural factors. The drying up of a river can be linked to a lack of rain (which is not always the case), but the salinization of a dam cannot. Thirty-three or forty-four years for an unfinished project only reveals the corruption and inefficiency embedded within it. Only an unaccountable and incompetent government spends national income on projects that, despite being unnecessary, ultimately get halted or take decades to complete.