The Result of the Iraqi Kurdistan Referendum is Not Achieving Independence

The independence referendum in the autonomous region of Iraqi Kurdistan is an "non-binding" experience without an execution deadline, which, despite its peaceful nature, could confront the war-torn country of Iraq with a new security crisis and, in turn, present new challenges to the region. Previously, on January 30, 2005, coinciding with nationwide elections in Iraq, the first "non-binding referendum" on the independence of Kurdistan was held in the northern and western regions of Iraq (Kirkuk, Nineveh, Diyala, Sulaymaniyah, Erbil, and Duhok), and as expected, 99 percent of nearly two million votes cast were positive. In 2004, shortly after the fall of Saddam's regime, a Kurdish political activist residing in the U.S. gathered signatures in support of "Southern Kurdistan's independence" and submitted a petition with one million seven hundred thousand signatures to Ms. Karina Pierli, then head of the UN elections division. None of these actions led to the declaration of independence for Iraqi Kurdistan. In the past 12 years since the last unsuccessful attempt to declare independence for Iraqi Kurdistan, developments have occurred both inside and within Iraq's neighboring borders, each of which could affect the outcomes of the current actions of the Kurdistan Regional Government regarding separation from Iraq. One of the most significant events was the declaration of an Islamic state in Mosul, which, as a consequence of the defeat of ISIS, led to the deployment of Peshmerga forces (security forces of the Kurdistan region) in Kirkuk province, which has a mixed population of Arabs, Turkmen, and Kurds. Another determining factor mentioned in the statement opposing the referendum by the UN Secretary-General is the "necessity of continuing the fight against ISIS and Islamic extremists in Iraq and Syria," which, after the defeat in Mosul and Deir ez-Zor, have not yet been cleared and remain scattered in the region. On September 14, at the request of Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, the National Assembly of Iraq, which had voted two days earlier against holding the Kurdistan independence referendum, dismissed Najm al-Din Karim, the governor of Kirkuk, who had supported the referendum in that region, with a majority of 173 votes. Following the legal vote of the Iraqi National Parliament declaring the independence referendum illegal and the dismissal of Najm al-Din, who is now supported by the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Barzani government, the local council of Kirkuk was called to a meeting where out of 41 members, only 24 attended and voted positively for participating in the referendum. Internal Kurdish disputes, despite a large number of smaller Kurdish parties operating inside and outside Iraq, have seen Iraqi Kurdistan controlled over the past few decades by the Kurdistan Democratic Party led by the Barzanis, the Patriotic Union led by the Talabanis, and the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) led by Abdullah Öcalan, whose main roots are in Turkey. During negotiations to form the central government of Iraq, which is administered federally according to the new constitution of that country, without explicit mention of the issue in the constitutional text, and by modeling the power-sharing system in Lebanon, the presidency was allocated to the Kurds, the government leadership to the Shiites, and the parliament presidency to the Sunnis. Masoud Barzani, who saw his long-term future in an independent Kurdistan, handed over the presidency to Jalal Talabani, the leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, and took on the position of president of the autonomous Kurdistan region himself. Based on this power-sharing method among the Kurds of Iraq, the Barzanis took control of Erbil, the capital of Kurdistan, while the province of Sulaymaniyah was entrusted to the Talabanis. The region and the level of influence of the PKK in Iraqi Kurdistan are affected by the changing conflicts or negotiations between the Democratic Party and them, as well as regional developments (the internal situation in Syria). In the local parliamentary elections of the Kurdistan region held in September 2013, only residents of three areas, Erbil (Hewler), Duhok, and Sulaymaniyah participated, and for this reason, in a parliament that had been suspended for two years and was called to session to confirm the decision to hold the independence referendum, Kirkuk does not have a representative. At the height of military conflicts with ISIS forces and simultaneously with Masoud Barzani's statements regarding "discussions about the possibility of declaring independence for the Kurdistan region," Najm al-Din Karim, the Kurdish governor of Kirkuk, had called for "the independence of Kirkuk" and its separation from the autonomous Kurdistan region and the central government of Iraq; an action that at that time provoked an immediate and strong reaction from Diari Hussein, the deputy chairman of the leadership council of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, who described this action as "treason" in an interview with the official news agency of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iraq. Kirkuk is now one of the areas where the independence referendum is also to be held, and Najm al-Din Karim, having changed his previous stance, has joined the ranks of supporters of holding the independence referendum. Among the Kurds of Iraq, who are a mixture of diverse and conflicting intellectual and political views, it seems that the Barzanis see themselves aligned with Israel (and the U.S.), while the Talabanis align themselves with the Islamic Republic of Iran. The PKK, with its socialist ideological stance, lacks a specific known foreign support line, but has always been present in the power struggle with the two main political branches of the Kurds of Iraq. The PKK considers itself stronger than the Barzanis due to the larger population of Kurds in Turkey (about 14 million compared to 5.2 million Kurds in Iraq according to the 2014 census) and having unrivaled influence in Kurdish regions of Syria. The local parliament of Kurdistan, which was only called to session to give legal legitimacy to the recent independence referendum after two years of suspension, had been effectively suspended for two years due to internal Kurdish disputes and rivalries. In October 2015, supporters of the Kurdistan Democratic Party opposed the entry of Youssef Muhammad Sidiq, the head of the parliament, and a group of its members into the parliament, which led to the suspension of the local parliament of the Kurdistan region of Iraq. In the Kurdish local parliament, in addition to supporters of the Barzanis and the Talabani Patriotic Union, representatives of the Gorran Party, which is reformist and calls for "change" in the political system of the autonomous region, and other parties with Islamic and non-Islamic tendencies are also present. The tribal government in Kurdistan two years ago, on the eve of the end of the extended term of President Masoud Barzani in the autonomous Kurdistan region, he was thinking of extending the presidency again, while opposition parties were planning to hold demonstrations in Erbil to express their opposition to this decision. The protests were mainly led by the Gorran party, and the PKK also supported these protests. With the parliament suspended and amid internal tensions, four days before the expiration of the presidential term, with the vote of the judicial commission, which is a unit in the Ministry of Justice of the autonomous government, and with the support of the Patriotic Union (the Talabanis), President Masoud Barzani's term was extended again until the next elections. According to a previous decision, this extension of Barzani's presidency had already occurred once in 2013 for two years. The Prime Minister of the autonomous Kurdistan region of Iraq, Nechirvan Barzani, is Masoud's nephew and the grandson of Mullah Mustafa, who has lived in Iran for a long time and graduated with a degree in political science from the University of Tehran. Senior government officials and officials of the autonomous government have also been divided according to the power-sharing arrangement between the two branches of Barzani and the Talabanis, and the Kurds advocating for a change from a presidential system to a parliamentary system have been deprived of it. The current system governing the Kurdistan region of Iraq follows a hereditary presidential model, similar to Syria and Azerbaijan, and its democracy should be defined within the framework of "tribal democracy" where minorities and opponents have little place. It is noteworthy that in the now-suspended local parliament elections of Kurdistan, which has been called to session to stamp approval for the referendum, the Gorran party in Sulaymaniyah, which is administered by the Talabanis, won 25 seats, which was surprising even for local Kurds at that time. Another point indicating deep political divisions among the Kurds, which is overshadowed by the fervor of the independence referendum and "unified support for Kurdish aspirations" outside of Kurdistan, is the boycott of 46 representatives of opposition parties against the referendum and their non-participation in the parliament, which was held with only 65 members present. External opposition, in addition to the internal disarray caused by the continued power of a single ruling group in Erbil, and also the political divisions of the Kurds of Iraq, the holding of the referendum and the image of forming an independent Kurdish state on Iraqi soil, even in its "non-binding" form, has been officially opposed by all of Iraq's neighbors and major powers and international organizations, except for Israel. Iran and Turkey, the two major neighbors of Iraqi Kurdistan, with a population composition three times that of Iraqi Kurdistan within their borders, have expressed their opposition to this action, and Iran has even taken serious measures in this regard prior to Shamkhani's recent interview regarding "revising border agreements with the autonomous region," which has led to recent violent encounters with "Kolbers" in Iranian Kurdistan as a direct consequence. The central government of Iraq and its National Assembly have declared the referendum illegal, and this judgment has been supported by the Iranian government based on the constitution of the Federal Republic of Iraq. The United States, the European Union, and the United Nations have explicitly declared their support for the central government of Iraq and the preservation of its integrity. Iraqi Kurdistan, whose local government has debts of about 20 billion dollars and is currently facing difficulties even in paying the salaries of government employees, if it declares independence and severs ties with the central government in Baghdad, will only increase its current economic and political burdens, and in the best-case scenario, will find itself on a path similar to that of Chávez's Venezuela. In the event of declaring independence, Iraqi Kurdistan will have little chance of official recognition from other countries, will be deprived of membership in the United Nations and global institutions, and if coordinated communication and economic pressures are imposed by Iran and Turkey, due to lack of access to the outside, will practically face the dangers of free breathing; if the independence referendum is held in Iraqi Kurdistan, a new problem will be added to the set of regional issues.