The Return of Autumn in Iran-Europe Relations

The relations between the Islamic Republic and the European Union have entered a new phase, leaning towards divergence influenced by developments in intersecting gaps. Although there are talks about completing a special financial channel for Europe to bypass unilateral U.S. sanctions and facilitate trade with Iran by the last week of January, its status, particularly the details, remain unclear. The weak position of the Islamic Republic and urgent needs have led to it remaining in the JCPOA despite an eight-month delay from Europe and merely issuing warnings to exert pressure to meet the modified expectations after the U.S. withdrawal. According to unconfirmed reports, after the objections of smaller European countries, France has finally agreed to host the special financial mechanism, with Germany taking on the executive management. Britain is also expected to handle the accounting. However, everything is currently at the level of talk, and one can expect that at least part of it will eventually materialize. The implementation of this plan requires more time than its completion, and according to informed sources, even if an agreement on the components and operation of the mentioned financial channel is finalized by the end of January, its execution will be postponed to later months. Even if the implementation of this plan does not face delays, at best, it lacks the capacity to assure large European companies or financial institutions active in the U.S. market, nor does it create an incentive for them to accept the associated risks. Furthermore, given the expansion of disputes in missile and security areas, it seems that this limited capacity has also undergone transformation, diminishing its advantages. Leaked news from negotiations between European officials and Iranians, especially the French government's public warning about the necessity of halting Iran's ballistic missile development and the EU's agreement to impose a new round of sanctions in response to the alleged military and terrorist actions of the government in Europe, indicate that the autumn season in relations between Europe and the Islamic Republic has arrived during Hassan Rouhani's presidency. Now, the equation of Europe and Iran includes variables such as maintaining the JCPOA, curbing Iran's missile program, reducing the Islamic Republic's regional influence, and stopping terrorism in Europe, which involves resolving misaligned vectors. This equation is particularly complex, and finding common ground amid areas of disagreement with the aim of de-escalation, while not impossible, is very difficult. Recently, even accusations of expanding espionage activities have been leveled against the Islamic Republic, and it is rumored that the main reason for the ban on Mahan Airlines' activities relates to this issue. It seems that Europe has reached the same point where the Trump administration's assessments and the political current advocating for a hardline approach towards the Islamic Republic began. According to this assessment, the JCPOA and granting concessions for normalizing relations with the Islamic Republic did not lead to a change in behavior in its confrontational foreign policy with the existing order. Now, European governments expect their assistance to the Islamic Republic in circumventing unilateral U.S. sanctions to be met with flexibility in missile and regional areas, and most importantly, that the Islamic Republic does not carry out provocative actions within European territory. However, on the other side, the Islamic Republic not only lacks the will to change its strategic policies but also views the JCPOA and the very presence of someone like Javad Zarif at the head of Iran's diplomacy as a tactical retreat to escape threats. Now, the regime considers standing firm on missile and regional positions as a key part of its security strategy, while also being highly sensitive to opposition movements due to internal vulnerabilities stemming from the economic crisis. Additionally, the regime expects Europe to accept the current state of the Islamic Republic with superficial changes as a reality. In this environment, the regime sees a powerful presence in the Middle East, especially gaining the upper hand in Syria, Yemen, and Iraq, as its strength in creating balance and reaching a point where new agreements do not incur heavy costs, and the regime's existence and influence in surrounding areas are stabilized and not threatened. In this framework, maintaining relations with Europe and resisting the U.S. over a certain period is important for the Islamic Republic to monitor conditions and prepare for the right time to return to the previous agreement or achieve a new agreement with minimal concessions. However, before that, the escape routes must be practically evaluated. Factors such as Russia and China's ability to circumvent sanctions, the impacts of Turkey's support, and the JCPOA gap between Europe and the U.S. must be tested in practical scenarios. Therefore, attracting Europe's attention for the regime and both its factions at this juncture is important despite apparent competition, but at the same time, there are limitations that compromise and interaction should not cross the red lines of missile and regional policies. Here, Rouhani's government and its claimed interactive capabilities are completely at an impasse. This reality shows that the formation of the JCPOA, in fundamental analysis, was the product of the acceptance of its principle and the preparation of groundwork by the institution of the Supreme Leader, not the skills and electoral promises of Hassan Rouhani or Zarif's diplomatic capabilities. However, Europe insists that its interactions with the Islamic Republic and opposition to the U.S. should be accompanied by gaining more concessions from the Islamic Republic. The disagreement between Europe and the U.S. is over how to deal with the Islamic Republic, and there is a fundamental shared view between the two sides that the classic form of the Islamic Republic poses a threat to the integrity of the West and the international order after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In this context, European officials are unlikely to meet the Islamic Republic's expectations until they achieve tangible results that prove the advantage of their approach over the U.S.'s reactive stance. The continuation of the current impasse has the potential to place Europe on a similar path to the U.S., pressuring the Islamic Republic to accept its demands. Of course, the current sanctions envisioned by Europe will be approved and implemented, but their immediate impacts are not high and do not exert decisive pressure on the Islamic Republic in the current conditions. However, Europe has not yet lost hope in the Islamic Republic. Europe's main consideration in the importance of an agreement with the Islamic Republic and maintaining the JCPOA is more rooted in security aspects, with economic issues being prominent around it. The joint efforts of the leadership and Rouhani have so far pursued the goal of not accepting European demands while ensuring that interactions do not lead to a break in negotiations. At the same time, it should be noted that the patience of both sides is not unlimited, and the current situation cannot be prolonged, especially since the opportunity for U.S. oil purchase exemptions will end in less than three months. The time frame for the Islamic Republic until the end of winter 2019 is considered cold and stormy. The U.S. government, aware of the obstacles and challenges of negotiations between Iran and Europe, is thinking of increasing pressure on the Islamic Republic relying on its Western and Middle Eastern allies. In this context, the Poland conference has emerged, which, contrary to initial assessments, does not have an immediate impact on Iran's political equations. The Islamic Republic's warning to Poland, a country that has expanded its trade relations with Iran in recent years and positively evaluates its presence in the Iranian market, alongside the opposition of some European officials and the negative stance of the Russian government, has led to at least a superficial adjustment of the conference's goals, moving away from focusing on the Islamic Republic. However, despite the visit of Polish officials to Tehran and their de-escalation efforts, the Poland conference will undeniably have effects on increasing global and regional pressures on the Islamic Republic. It can be said with high confidence that this conference will not result in military confrontation with the Islamic Republic, nor will regime change be a policy sought by the West, but coordination among opposing governments and increased cooperation among them to contain the Iranian government will rise. The intensification of current disagreements between Iran and the European Union may also complicate the Poland conference's challenges for the regime. However, Russia's support, which is currently seeking to contain the West and restore lost global authority, alongside supportive stances from Turkey, Qatar, and non-aligned countries, strategic relations with the governments of Iraq and Lebanon, and the reluctance of India, Pakistan, and China to isolate Iran globally, are the Islamic Republic's points of reliance in neutralizing pressures. Moreover, public support for the missile program and regional power is greater than for the nuclear program in Iranian society, but insisting on it at the cost of worsening economic conditions is questionable. However, in this unstable situation, influenced by multiple misaligned variables, the beginning of divergence in relations with Europe, alongside the growing sensitivity of Israel and opposition from Arab countries to the Islamic Republic's regional capabilities, could compel the regime to soften its stance in missile and regional policy. Of course, interaction with Europe is relatively achievable at lower costs for the regime, but it requires parting with the expansion of the Supreme Leader's power in the Islamic world under the guise of "Islamic Awakening." The coming weeks will show what choices the Islamic Republic and Europe will have. Although it can be predicted that enduring the pressures resulting from the alignment of Europe and the U.S. is beyond the Islamic Republic's capacity, on the other hand, without a meaningful change in foreign and regional policy, maintaining the rift between Europe and the U.S. is nearly impossible. Therefore, it is not incorrect to say that Europe and the U.S. pursue a unified strategy to contain the Islamic Republic with different methods and scopes. Regardless of the outcome of the Poland conference and which European countries participate, tensions between the European Union and the Islamic Republic are on the rise. In this situation, the JCPOA becomes more moribund and feeble.