The Return of Behdar Mardani from New York: 'Without Achievement and Risky'

The reflections of Masoud Behdar Mardani's remarks and positions during his first trip to New York and speech at the United Nations correspond significantly with the events surrounding the lackluster 14th presidential election. The reactions to Behdar Mardani, similar to the indifference of the majority of the Iranian people, were dismissive to the extent that he himself conditioned resolving disputes in the area of the JCPOA on the premise that 'America must regard us as human beings.' The level of reception for Behdar Mardani at the UN General Assembly was even lower than that of Ebrahim Raisi. Raisi delivered a virtual speech in 1399 due to the COVID-19 pandemic but attended the UN General Assembly for the first time the following year. The number of his meetings with foreign officials was almost similar to Behdar Mardani's; he had one less meeting quantitatively but met with relatively more important officials. However, after his remarks, a senior U.S. State Department official responded in Al Jazeera, stating, 'Washington has been following these remarks, but it looks at the actions of Iranian officials, not their words.' During this period, one of the spokespeople from the Foreign Ministry reacted in an interview with a Persian-language television abroad, stating that Behdar Mardani's invitation for interaction with the U.S. was conditional on the seriousness of changing the behavior of the Islamic Republic. While both Behdar Mardani and Abbas Araghchi, the Foreign Minister, and Javad Zarif, the strategic deputy to the President, had called for a change in the U.S. position as a first step to resolve issues. Zarif's remarks in an interview with CNN clarified that 'Iran has bought the JCPOA horse once and will not buy it again.' Furthermore, Zarif considered the reconstruction of the JCPOA to require a change in Biden's administration policy away from the 'maximum pressure' strategy inherited from Donald Trump's administration. Details of Behdar Mardani's meeting with American journalists, as narrated by Lara J. Rosen, are also enlightening. A comparison of the first meeting of Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, the Foreign Minister of the thirteenth government, with Josep Borrell, with a similar meeting of Abbas Araghchi during this period is also revealing. After Amir-Abdollahian's meeting with Borrell, a specific arrangement regarding the negotiations for reconstructing the JCPOA was established, but no discussions regarding an agreement between Araghchi and Borrell were published. Behdar Mardani claimed that it was agreed that the foreign ministers would negotiate how to continue, while none of the foreign ministers of the 1+5 confirmed this claim. In fact, nothing significant happened in New York. The situation is the same as that which occurred in the deadlock of negotiations after the ninth round in Vienna in February 2022. The New York trips of Behdar Mardani and Araghchi did not outline a promising outlook for changing the current situation. Negotiations around the fundamental disagreements in the two documents 'lifting sanctions' and 'nuclear actions' were halted in 2023. Since that point, the Biden administration preferred to advance a third plan (Plan C). According to this plan, efforts were made to distance the Islamic Republic's nuclear activities from a point of no return and dangerous confrontation through a series of hard and soft actions. Currently, the main demand of the European Union is to stop the military cooperation between Iran and Russia in the Ukraine war. The sensitivity of Arab countries regarding the reconstruction of the JCPOA has diminished compared to the past. However, they also seek participation in the process of drafting a new agreement or reconstructing the JCPOA. Behdar Mardani's remarks were part of his statements during a meeting on the second of Mehr 1403 with some media managers in the U.S., which some government officials denied, but an audio file of it was also released. In this audio file, Behdar Mardani states: 'There is no difference in terrorists; whether they are Arab, non-Arab, or Persian. Whether they are Israeli, American, or Iranian. If they commit terrorism, they are terrorists. It is not that one side commits terrorism and calls it self-defense, while if the other side wants to do the same, they are called terrorists. We condemn these actions. This is our general stance...' 'What we can solve through dialogue, we should not solve with missiles and weapons. We are ready to put aside all our weapons, provided that Israel also puts aside theirs. An international organization should come to ensure security in the region. We do not need atomic bombs. We know how to secure our own safety, but no one should come against anyone else. As long as this side is armed to the teeth, this side should not be told that you cannot even build a missile...' Behdar Mardani's positions were contradictory and carried different messages. He expressed the same content as Raisi regarding the Islamic Republic's assessment of changing global power equations and defending the nuclear program and attacking Israel, but at the same time, he tried to use a conciliatory tone that was accompanied by controversial remarks. Given Araghchi's denials, it seems that most of the 'gaffes' stemmed from Behdar Mardani's inability to articulate complex positions and convey intentions rather than reflecting a fundamental change in approach and perspective in solving foreign policy issues. He spoke of the necessity of change, but given the characteristics of the power structure in the Islamic Republic, where the President lacks independent influence, and considering the gap between the words and actions of the Islamic Republic's officials and the high level of tension between the Islamic Republic and the West, these remarks were not taken seriously. The difference in positions between Behdar Mardani and Araghchi also seems to have exacerbated distrust. Zarif also no longer holds his previous position, and his influence in gaining the trust of Western officials has significantly decreased. Although Abbas Araghchi is still present in New York, given the cold reactions of Western government leaders to Behdar Mardani's trip and the upcoming U.S. presidential elections, it is unlikely that any agreements for negotiations will be made. Currently, the authorization that Behdar Mardani has, similar to Raisi, is for direct dialogue with the 1+4 and indirect dialogue through intermediaries with the U.S. Raisi's government also sought to revive the JCPOA, but called it neutralizing sanctions and, like Behdar Mardani, demanded a change in U.S. behavior for interaction. The fundamental policy and demand of both governments are not different; only the tone is different. Moreover, Behdar Mardani has more capable officials at his disposal, but without repeating 'heroic flexibility,' this is not feasible, and today's conditions are also different from the past, and changing the contents of the JCPOA has serious advocates on both sides of the negotiating table. However, domestically, the outcome of Behdar Mardani's trip has not been positive. Some evidence suggests that the authorization to attack his government has been given with the repetitive line of 'countering influence.' The most significant attacks on Behdar Mardani came from conservatives during his remarks in New York. Reformists also largely resorted to wishful thinking. Ali Khamenei's remarks during a meeting with a group of former war commanders, warning against confronting the West, had a significant overlap with the attacks on Behdar Mardani. Behdar Mardani's controversial remarks about Israel and America are also not issues that the dominant power would remain silent about, even with subsequent denials. Overall, it is not unlikely that the outcome of Behdar Mardani's trip to New York was to receive a serious warning from the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist and the system's consideration to prevent his mistakes on foreign platforms.