The Revolutionary Guard: The 'Greatest Danger and Threat' to Any Nuclear Agreement

The crisis stemming from the Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear program, which the United States and other major powers are trying to resolve, was discussed on Tuesday, March 10, at a meeting of the non-governmental Council on Foreign Relations in Washington. At this meeting, several experts from four American think tanks shared their views on the potential consequences of a nuclear agreement in Iran with the audience. Among these experts was Ali Alfoneh, a Persian-speaking researcher and senior Iran affairs expert, who recently joined the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. He emphasized that contrary to the perception of some public opinion, opposition to the nuclear agreement primarily comes from the Revolutionary Guard in Iran. Alfoneh stated in a brief interview with Radio Farda in Washington that even if a nuclear agreement is reached, the Revolutionary Guard will continue to oppose it. He said, 'Any nuclear agreement between the P5+1 and the Islamic Republic of Iran will have significant effects on the internal politics of the Islamic Republic. We know that the Revolutionary Guard has previously opposed such agreements and believes that President Rouhani's government has effectively conceded to the United States. I also believe that after such an agreement, the Revolutionary Guard will continue its opposition, and perhaps on the day when Mr. Rouhani is no longer in government or his power within the government as president is not as strong as today, the Revolutionary Guard will practically determine the political line of the Islamic Republic regarding the nuclear issue. No agreement will be definitive, and the Revolutionary Guard can change it, which I believe is the greatest danger and threat to any agreement made between the United States and the Islamic Republic.' What role will Ayatollah Khamenei, the leader of the Islamic Republic, play in this? Alfoneh noted that Khamenei has certainly given the green light to Rouhani's government to participate in these nuclear negotiations and may even agree to such an agreement in the short term. However, his opinion may change in the future, especially if Khamenei is under pressure in domestic politics and needs the support of the Revolutionary Guard, as he did in 2009 when he relied on the Revolutionary Guard to maintain the regime against millions of protesters who took to the streets of Tehran and other cities. In such a situation, Khamenei will have no choice but to follow the Revolutionary Guard's policy rather than the agreement reached by Rouhani and the U.S. government. Given that if no agreement is reached, sanctions will undoubtedly increase, and the impact of sanctions on Iran's weak economy will be severe, what role can the Revolutionary Guard play? Can it continue to oppose? The Revolutionary Guard has a theory that suppressing protesters and even the hungry in Iran may be feasible in the short term, but at the same time, the Islamic Republic must strive to gain access to a nuclear bomb as soon as possible. Once Iran obtains a nuclear bomb, these sanctions will certainly be lifted, as they know that the United States and its allies do not want an economically bankrupt nuclear power. Because in such a situation, it is really unclear who will control the nuclear bomb.