The Role of Rouhani's Government in the Attack on the Saudi Embassy

It has become almost clear that the attack on the Saudi embassy was carried out by organized elements likely from some military institutions (Revolutionary Guards) from Qom and Karaj. It can be said with high confidence that the intelligence agencies (Ministry of Intelligence and the Intelligence of the Revolutionary Guards) have also fully identified the details of the provocations, organization, and transportation of these individuals. Although the duty of an intelligence agency (such as the Ministry of Intelligence) is to be aware of such issues 'in advance' to prevent events with security implications for the country, it is not far-fetched for any political figure (let alone an intelligence officer) with average intelligence and experience to predict such attacks, especially given the news of the execution of Sheikh Nimr and others in Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, the attack in Tehran occurred in two phases, and while the first phase was repelled by the police, the second phase cannot be considered a surprise. Additionally, today, the voice of one of the (probably) police commanders calling on his forces not to intervene with the attackers is circulating on social media. The more explicit aspect of this is the clear position of the police spokesperson who stated that in some cases, people cannot be harmed, implicitly acknowledging the police's passive observation of this anti-national act. Apart from the operational aspect mentioned above, from a political perspective, it is also predictable and assessable for any political observer with average intelligence and experience that the attack on the Saudi embassy was designed and executed to create a crisis for the government, and this foolish and, more precisely, mischievous act will pose a significant challenge for the government's foreign policy and will severely damage the outcomes of the past two years of diplomacy. Therefore, considering the continuous sabotage by the government’s opponents, who, as the president has said, have been active in the field for a long time, the actions of these unethical opponents against national interests are not far-fetched. Moreover, the 'suspicious' dimensions of this issue relate to saving Saudi Arabia from external pressures and exacerbating the division between two major political poles in the region in favor of Israel. It has been well perceived that Saudi Arabia has been seriously worried and wounded by the process of de-escalation between Iran and the West, and at the time of executing some of its political dissidents, it is in a position of human rights weakness, and this attack could significantly alter the equation that could have benefited Iran and been against Saudi Arabia on an international and regional level. The 'suspicious' nature is also highlighted by the fact that many intelligence and Revolutionary Guards elements are in Iranian prisons for espionage for Israel, and some higher-ups have stated that Israel has infiltrated the Islamic Republic to its core! The president's position against this attack, albeit with a damaging ten-hour delay, was clear and decisive. He condemned it strongly and spoke of the consensus of 'all system officials' to deal with it. It was also heard that he strongly protested such acts in private negotiations with the Supreme Leader, who reportedly agreed to accompany him and recommended correspondence with the judiciary to expedite action against them. He also stated that despite severe pressure on him to impose a religious boycott on Hajj, he would not do so. The repeated silence of the leader in subsequent speeches 'somewhat' confirms this hearing. The analysis of the relationship between hardline groups and the leader and his faction is another topic that requires further discussion, both generally and specifically in this case. However, what is often forgotten in this political uproar (including the positive language surrounding the news of the embassy attack and even the explicit support from some Friday prayer leaders for it, followed by subsequent shifts in the language of the news and even the astonishing reversal of previous positions by some hardline elements) is the 'role of the police' in this matter, which has become normalized due to its recurrence, much like the statistics of embezzlements. So, what is the purpose of the enormous budgets allocated to intelligence, military, and police institutions? Specifically, shouldn't the police have been able to prevent the attack just as they did in the first attack? When Mr. Rouhani vehemently and rightly condemns this incident or protests to the leader, and all of this, along with the severe reaction from Saudi Arabia and other consequences of the incident, influences the political atmosphere of the country to the extent that the attackers are labeled as ignorant and infiltrators, a serious question remains: could this suspicious, insane, and anti-national incident not have been 'prevented' and 'stopped'? So, what is the purpose of the enormous budgets allocated to intelligence, military, and police institutions? Specifically, shouldn't the police have been able to prevent the attack just as they did in the first attack? Did the experts and managers and operational elements of the Ministry of Intelligence have doubts about preventing this attack and, like other incidents, act in alignment with hardline elements against the government's policies? Here, the discussion is about the interests of 'the entire system,' a system whose leader is in such a position that he has refrained from taking a simple stance on this matter and, contrary to usual practices, refers the blood of Sheikh Nimr to God and the Day of Judgment, suggesting that it will be avenged upon that government. Here, the question must be emphasized: why was this attack not prevented by the government? And it is at this point that the role of the police, which has been overshadowed, must be brought to light. The status of the Islamic Republic's police is another example and symbol of the nature of power and its operational practices in the Iranian political system! According to Article 2 of the statute of this institution, 'The Islamic Republic's police is an armed organization under the command of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and affiliated with the Ministry of Interior.' It seems that all problems stem from this dual and ambiguous meaning and structure (the ambiguity that exists throughout the system): 'under the command of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces' and 'affiliated with the Ministry of Interior!' What does 'under the command' mean and what does 'affiliated' imply? This entire law does not provide a clear interpretation in this regard. In the single note of this article, it states: 'The commander of the Islamic Republic's police is appointed by the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.' Beyond this, there is nothing else in explaining and interpreting 'under the command of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.' The rest of the provisions of this law (except for two or three cases) are like the laws and statutes of any other governmental institution. Article 4 of this law addresses the 'missions and duties' of this force. Principle 3 of this article introduces 'ensuring security for holding gatherings, formations, marches, and legal and permitted activities and preventing and stopping any unauthorized formations and marches and confronting disturbances, disorder, and unauthorized activities' as the missions and duties of this force. Just as Principle 5 of this same article (fourth) mentions 'protecting classified non-military locations, facilities, equipment, and services and maintaining their sanctity, except in sensitive and vital cases as determined by the Supreme National Security Council, which will be the responsibility of the Revolutionary Guards,' and Principle 6 'protecting domestic and foreign officials and personalities throughout the country, except inside military barracks and installations, unless in cases where, according to the Supreme National Security Council, the principles of the revolution or its achievements are at risk, which will be the responsibility of the Revolutionary Guards,' as other duties of this institution. Interestingly, in the note of Principle 15 of this article, it states that 'the police can, when necessary, use the forces of the Basij Resistance Force in coordination with the Revolutionary Guards.' This means that in these cases, the Basij must also operate under the command of the police. Up to this point, all legal provisions regarding the duties of this institution have been enumerated, and only the right to appoint the commander of the police has been granted to the leader. However, under Principle 26 of the same article, which refers to 'continuous and persistent efforts to establish the complete dominance of Islamic culture and regulations in the police forces,' there is a note that mentions another power of the leader: 'The heads of ideological, political, and information protection organizations are appointed by the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.' Up to this point, the powers of the leader have been outlined regarding appointing the commander of the police and the heads of ideological, political, and information protection organizations of this institution. However, at the end of this statute, in one article, namely Article 10, there is a sentence that is clearly not recommended by any legal expert due to its ambiguity and lack of clarity: Article 10 - The powers of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces are not limited to the cases specified in this law!! The meaning of this article can negate all previous articles and, in fact, render the entire statute meaningless. Thus, the police have more 'practice' than 'law.' This legal ambiguity has never been resolved during the various governments; a necessary action that could clarify one of the foundations of the government's power on one side and define the responsibility of the system's leader on the other. If the police are 'affiliated with the Ministry of Interior' according to Article 2 of this statute, do the government and its affiliated organs (especially the Ministry of Intelligence, which is repeatedly mentioned in this law regarding the coordination of the police institution with this official intelligence agency) have a role other than providing funding for it and not determining its practical policies? And if 'under the command of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces' means the leader, in which intelligence and security institution are the practical policies of this institution designed and communicated regarding the security and policing issues assigned to it? Here, the police, caught between two orders and designers, namely the Ministry of Intelligence and the Revolutionary Guards (which are also obliged to coordinate with it in other sections of its statute), face a dual and contradictory situation in 'practice.' Now, if the government (and its hypothetical Ministry of Intelligence) and the leader (and the Revolutionary Guards under his command) are aligned, there will apparently be no problem. However, if the President does not fully align with the leader and, for instance, there is a 'policy disagreement' between the intelligence and the Revolutionary Guards (as was seen during Mohammad Khatami's presidency), what is the police's position? If we pay attention to the essence and core of the law, Article 10 of the statute grants absolute authority to the leader, and if we focus on 'practical practice,' this force, due to its lack of power and independence, will inevitably be under the command of 'both'! the Revolutionary Guards and the intelligence. We have directly witnessed this duality in relation to some memorial ceremonies at the Hosseiniyeh Ershad, which needed permission from the police, where the local police officials implicitly and sometimes explicitly mentioned the differing approaches of the Revolutionary Guards or intelligence, and in any case, the opposition of one (despite the silence or even approval of the other) to holding that ceremony, to which the police were also compelled to comply. Thus, 'in practice,' the stricter policy or the policy closer to the Revolutionary Guards and the establishment is implemented. Now, in the attack on the Saudi embassy, what role does Rouhani's government and its Ministry of Intelligence have, assuming that the prediction and preparation to prevent this attack (in practical coordination and cooperation with the police) is also their responsibility? Let us not forget that the police, according to its statute, has two 'special' and 'NoPo' forces for extraordinary conditions; if military security analysts consider the protests of the Green Movement a 'security threat' and bring these special forces (and those above them) to the scene, should they not also consider the attack on the embassy a 'security threat'? At this point, the President, despite his clear and decisive yet ineffective stance in 'preventing' the incident, cannot solely look at the opposing side and place the entire burden of responsibility on the opposing side (and the uncontrolled hardline movements) whose anti-national, anti-ethical (and sometimes suspicious) nature in domestic political competitions is evident and clear. The Rouhani government has also been negligent in this incident. The President (and his Ministry of Interior) must not only correctly dismiss the deputy and security official of the Ministry of Interior but also dismiss the relevant official of the Ministry of Intelligence. More than that, this costly and anti-national incident could serve as a 'headline' for the government and for the President himself, that if not in the text of the police law, which now the balance of power on one side and the weak response of the government on the other do not allow for such an option and permission, at least in practice and execution, this official institution, namely the government (and in fact its Ministry of Intelligence), should be able to use the police under the control of the Revolutionary Guards, according to its legally specified duties in its own statute and also the police statute, to strongly and decisively prevent these national harms. I wish Hassan Rouhani would use his legal powers in domestic policies as much as the previous president did, of course with wisdom and not mockery. If serious preventive policies had been taken in this regard, this crisis could have easily been managed in favor of the government's diplomacy. Just as it had been in the past, and sometimes if the judiciary under its command did not deal with the elements of chaos, but at critical moments, preventive security and policing actions were taken against such elements and movements. We have witnessed these actions in the past when, for example, American wrestlers came to Iran for the first time after the reform era, in transferring some of the leaders of the rioters from Tehran to the provinces, or just recently in the reopening of the British embassy under strict protection on the day of reopening and similar examples. I wish Hassan Rouhani would use his legal powers in domestic policies as much as the previous president did, of course with wisdom and not mockery.