The Role of the Concept of 'Civil Society' in the Second Khordad Movement

If we believe in the definition of 'civil society' as a community that is lawful, based on social contracts, transparent, protective of individual rights, based on national sovereignty, and a distributor of power within the framework of parties and councils, then it can be understood why Mohammad Khatami brought up the discussion of civil society and sought to prepare the ground for its acceptance by the conservatives. However, civil organizations and the dynamic sectors of society, namely women and youth, did not wait for the acceptance of the conservative front and began their activities to realize this important goal. The One Million Signatures Campaign, the establishment of NGOs, and the strengthening of women's rights advocacy organizations are examples of these efforts to lay the foundation for what 'civil society' meant to the activists in this field. Qasem Shoaleh Saadi, a political science professor and former parliament member, explains to Radio Farda the nature of these organizations and their level of success: 'In the absence of the real performance of parties and syndicates, such as labor and employer syndicates, which is also due to the structure of power and government in Iran that is not democratic, meaning according to the constitution, the second principle states that sovereignty and legislation belong to God, and people must submit to God's command. Even in the Islamic system, a legislative assembly does not exist in the true sense because it states that the law is what has been conveyed to the Prophet through revelation. Therefore, above the parliament, there is the Guardian Council that can veto the parliament's decisions if they are deemed contrary to Islamic law. Thus, the structure of power and government in Iran is undemocratic. In such a structure, civil organizations can play a significant role, although they also face structural problems. For example, an organization called the Human Rights Defenders Center was established, but all its members were arrested. The Bar Association, which can be said to be the oldest and most important non-governmental organization, was hit first by the five-year plan bill presented by Khatami's government. These organizations may have had a point because any action they took faced heavy costs.' After Mohammad Khatami introduced his concept of civil society as the 'Medina al-Nabi,' it became clear that the perspective he presented differed in several fundamental ways from that of civil society organizations. Khatami believes that Islam possesses concepts that can potentially meet the contemporary human needs for freedom and a society based on civil institutions. This model of civil society can be seen as part of what Khatami calls 'religious democracy' and 'Medina al-Nabi.' Civil society organizations and, consequently, other segments of society realized that there were differences between what they envisioned as civil society and what Khatami had in mind. On the other hand, the conservative faction within the government also opposed Khatami's 'Medina al-Nabi,' meaning Khatami's perspective faced opposition or at least skepticism from both the people and the government. Hossein Ghazian, a sociologist residing in the US, criticizes Khatami's view of civil society, stating: 'Mr. Khatami was successful in some aspects but unsuccessful in many others. He was successful in that he introduced the discourse of civil society, which had perhaps emerged and revived a decade earlier in the world, into the political and public discourse of Iran, and this word and related terms found an important place in public speeches. However, as a politician who was now president, held power, and had a parliament aligned with him (the sixth parliament), he could not carry out the actions expected of a politician to operationalize those words and turn them into programs, laws, administrative processes, institutions, organizations, and something that could not be easily tampered with. In this regard, he was unsuccessful. For example, we do not see an important law regarding civil society, professional issues, and similar matters that has been passed during this period to strengthen civil society. Or there were no processes established in the administrative and executive structure of the country that could not be easily tampered with later. Because reformists had power at that time, the public space was in their hands, and the cost of opposing their actions was heavy. But later, when they weakened, anyone could oppose them, and Mr. Khatami retreated for this reason. He and his government could not take effective actions in this area, so overall, we see that this failure in this domain caused civil society to be somewhat dismantled when Mr. Ahmadinejad came to power, and its shaky foundations were destroyed, and the situation worsened. Therefore, in this regard, I think he was unsuccessful, but in terms of introducing a new discourse into the public sphere of Iran, he was successful.' However, the concept of civil society, with the hopes it had planted in the hearts of the people, was like an arrow released from a bow. Even the NGOs that had been established for a short time did not want to give up on what they believed in. This was when intelligence and security agencies, assessing the dormant, rebellious, and unpredictable power of civil society, realized that to weaken and immobilize it, they needed to incorporate a series of security measures into their agenda. Alongside intelligence and security agencies, the anti-reform front also did not remain idle and engaged in organizing and planning. They formed a 'hidden government' and used governmental and media capacities to counter reforms, even appropriating Khatami's slogans of legality and using the pretext of 'legality' to suppress and carry out widespread arrests. The breaking of university boundaries in response to the protests of July 9, 1999, known as the 'attack on Tehran University dormitory,' is considered one of the significant instances of opposition to civil society supporters. The serial murders of several writers and political activists were also examples of this type of opposition, particularly to instill fear. Although the suppression of civil society supporters slowed the process of people's demands, and in the first term of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's presidency, there seemed to be no trace of it, the protests of the people against the results of the 2009 elections once again proved that this demand was like a fire beneath the ashes. Occasional protests after the unrest of 2009 and student gatherings in various parts of Iran during Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's second presidency demonstrated this reality to the authoritarian elements within the government. Ardshir Amir Arjamand, an advisor to Mir Hossein Mousavi and a political activist residing in France, believes: 'All the events that have occurred since the second Khordad of 1997 show that the people's desire for organization and strengthening civil society has been a national demand that has persisted and remained despite the suppression. The demands, contrary to what they think, have not disappeared but have expanded and deepened. At the same time, civil society has found alternative ways to circumvent the suppressive power. A clear example is the events of 2009, and after that, we see that suppression intensifies and organization, especially in civil society, slows down, but as soon as an opportunity arises, it re-emerges. Civil society in Iran has found a way to confront suppression and outlines a very bright prospect. At the same time, it should be noted the diversity of civil movements. If previously civil society movements were limited to specific sectors such as women's, youth, and minority demands and human rights discussions, today we witness these movements in many other areas, such as environmental movements that had not been seriously pursued for a long time but now have become very important. The discussion of intervention in social harms in various fields has strengthened, indicating that, in any case, Iranian society must go through this path, and all people know this, and the government is also compelled to submit to the will and demands of the people. In examining the obstacles to establishing civil society in Iran, it is necessary to refer not only to the issues discussed but also to the social, political, and economic foundations in Iran that play a deterrent role against civil society.