The Second Step of Engineering the 96 Elections: Arranging Candidates and Directing Campaigns

In the article "Election Engineering Has Begun," I explained the first step actions in engineering the 96 elections regarding public opinion, vote buying, initial advertising, financial resource provision, and the role of state institutions. Among the first step actions, one can add the unprecedented increase in subsidies for low-income groups in 96 up to three times (for a single-person household covered by the Welfare Organization and Imam Khomeini Relief Committee, 95,000 tomans; for a two-person household, 189,000 tomans; for a three-person household, 253,000 tomans; for a four-person household, 337,000 tomans; and for a five-person household, 365,000 tomans, Tabnak, April 28, 1396) and an increase in pensions by up to 27%. However, the most important step in election engineering is the arrangement of candidates and directing campaigns. The Guardian Council approved 6 out of 35 known political candidates (all committed to Khamenei's leadership) and rejected the rest (governors, members of parliament, former ministers, former vice presidents, heads of foundations and state organizations, responsible newspaper editors, university professors, and former presidents), while all 31 disqualified candidates were believers in the Velayat-e Faqih, and most of them had executive backgrounds. Thus, the disqualifications are no longer related to the lack of specific characteristics outlined in the Constitution for the head of state or ideological reasons, but rather there are other reasons for such arrangements. Attention to these reasons in disqualifications can be referred to as the second step of election engineering. The engineering of elections regarding the approval of candidates in the 96 presidential elections was based on experiences gained from previous elections and considered four goals to address four concerns and worries: the disqualification of Ahmadinejad and Baghaei, alongside threats from judicial officials, indicates that Khamenei desires a very calm and tension-free election and a less tense government for the next four years. There is even no need for the people to directly engage in the struggle between factions. This can also be inferred from the decision of the presidential election advertising commission not to broadcast live debates among the candidates of the 96 presidential elections and from the summons of 50 student activists to judicial authorities and the suspension of seven Islamic associations. Balance between factions: Among the six approved candidates, three are from the government or moderate faction (Rouhani, a former member of the Combatant Clergy Association, and Jahangiri and Hashemi Taba, members of the Executives of Construction Party) and three are from the opposing faction (Mir Salim, a member of the Coalition Party, and Ghalibaf and Raisi, representatives of the Popular Front of Islamic Revolution Forces). Thus, the Guardian Council has sought to establish a balance between the forces of the two moderate and principlist factions even in the number of candidates, a policy that Khamenei abandoned during the 84 and 88 periods with full support for one faction and paid significant costs for it: the Green Movement and the presidency of someone who disregards the recommendations of the Supreme Leader. Two reformist representatives, namely Rahami and Kaveh Khabar, have been disqualified. Individuals like Zakeri, Haji Babaei, and Bazarpash have also been disqualified to maintain this balance. It seems that the policy of Khamenei's office is to create greater political stability with a balance of forces between the two factions within the government. Heating up the oven is unnecessary: The disqualification of Ahmadinejad and Baghaei, alongside threats from judicial officials, indicates that Khamenei desires a very calm and tension-free election and a less tense government for the next four years. There is even no need for the people to directly engage in the struggle between factions. This can also be inferred from the decision of the presidential election advertising commission (which includes the Attorney General, Minister of Interior, Secretary of the Central Executive Election Committee, Head of the Supervisory Council on Radio and Television, and the Head of the Radio and Television Organization or their representatives and a representative observer from the Guardian Council) not to broadcast live debates among the candidates of the 96 presidential elections and from the summons of 50 student activists to judicial authorities and the suspension of seven Islamic associations. Denying a bipolar election: Khamenei's office and members of the Guardian Council know that the candidacies of Jahangiri and Hashemi Taba are precautionary, cover, and supportive nominations, and they will not remain until the end. They also know that Mir Salim has no chance and was not even among the five candidates of interest to part of the principlist faction in the Jamna voting. Therefore, the election will be a three-way competition in the first round: Rouhani, Ghalibaf, and Raisi. Of course, if Ghalibaf or Mir Salim do not withdraw, Jahangiri may remain in the scene to reduce the votes of the opposing side and attract votes from those who do not want to vote for Rouhani, making the election a four-way contest in the first round. In any case, it is clear that Khamenei and his office and the security institutions do not want a bipolar election. Khamenei explicitly referred to this desire in advising Ahmadinejad not to run, and now it can also be seen in the arrangement of candidates. Measuring the votes of Raisi and Ghalibaf: Ghalibaf has two corruption cases, namely the transfer of astronomical assets in the municipality and the case of hiring four thousand mourners (with salaries of 9 to 11 million tomans) in the Tehran metro. He has also tried his luck in the presidential elections twice and lost. In this regard, he has a low chance of winning. Thus, the final arrangement of candidates by the Guardian Council (under the guidance of Khamenei's office and security and military institutions) is directed towards a competition between Rouhani and Raisi. However, since the security and military institutions and Khamenei's office are not sure about the level of support for Raisi, Ghalibaf has been kept in the scene to challenge Rouhani and his government and to measure his own votes until the last week. The security and military institutions of the Islamic Republic constantly conduct opinion polls during elections, but the results are only available to the leader, Khamenei's office, and high-ranking military and intelligence officials. New roles of the Guardian Council: In recent election cycles, where it no longer faces challenges from non-affiliated candidates and the opposition of reformists regarding disqualifications and supervisory oversight, the Guardian Council has effectively taken on three roles in the presidential elections: 1) Conducting preliminary elections for factions by eliminating some of their candidates (especially those considered more radical or unpredictable), a task they must perform in intra-faction elections but lack the mechanism for (Jamna has been a start for this); 2) Engineering electoral campaigns and post-election protests by eliminating candidates like Hashemi Rafsanjani in the 92 elections and Ahmadinejad in the 96 elections, which create security concerns for the military and security apparatus; and 3) Reducing the political costs of the government by lowering the possibility of elections going to a second round. The fewer the number of candidates, the greater the chance of a one-round election, and the Guardian Council, with its narrow filter, increases the possibility of this one-round election. Engineering and not appointment: Those who think that the head of state or members of the parliament or the Assembly of Experts in Iran are directly appointed by Khamenei or the IRGC are mistaken. The authoritarian system in Iran has many devotees who want to benefit from privileges and rents by getting closer to it. Khamenei's office and security and military institutions have a bag of these courtiers and reliable pawns, but they make every effort to ensure that in every election, someone emerges from the bag who, first and foremost, has the highest loyalty and obedience, and secondly, alongside total obedience to the leader and the system and the clergy, also enjoys some public favor (of course influenced by advertising and both negative and positive sensationalism). If this were not the case, the government would not need hundreds of websites and dozens of newspapers and monopolized radios and televisions to constantly advertise for or against one or several groups. Election engineering precisely means actions taken to prevent the emergence of disloyal candidates, filtering loyal candidates, and selecting a loyal candidate who is somewhat favored by part of the public. If elections were conducted in a crude manner and through direct appointments, then part of the religious reformists, Iranian leftists, and Westerners who believe in the reformability of the system would not exist, and the competition between the moderate faction and the radical faction would not be credible. The art of the Islamic Republic in conducting this manipulation is such that elections are not entirely appointments, but also no disloyal individual emerges from the ballot box, while part of the public believes that they have elected the head of state themselves.