The Security Threat of ISIS and Iran's Military Presence in Iraq

On Wednesday, Mohammad Javad Zarif stated at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute that "Iran has no intention of a military withdrawal from Iraq." This reflects a policy that may continue until the fall of ISIS in Iraq and, if necessary, could lead to an increase in Iran's military presence in Iraq; a development that Saudi Arabia, Iran's other neighbor, finds difficult to tolerate at its borders. The Islamic Republic's extraterritorial behaviors, although influenced by sectarian beliefs and Sunni-Shia rivalries, can be interpreted as a result of pragmatic calculations in Iran's foreign relations and security assessments, particularly in supporting Iraq's geographical integrity and a preemptive military defense to maintain its central government in Baghdad. Iran's participation in military operations in Fallujah is aimed at a larger goal of ultimately countering ISIS's presence in Iraq and reclaiming Mosul from the "Islamic State of Iraq and Syria" (ISIS). Despite the Islamic Republic's exaggeration of ISIS's security threats against Iran's western borders, the ongoing unrest and internal conflict in Iraq, close to Iran's western borders, can lead to unrest spilling over into Iran, as recognized by established rules; a situation that groups like the Taliban and others such as "Jundallah" and "Jaish al-Adl" can exploit in the east of the country and along the shared borders with Afghanistan and Pakistan. Iranian public opinion and foreign wars: Besides national security considerations at the western borders, the Islamic Republic views its military involvement against ISIS in Iraq as an opportunity to compensate for domestic public criticism regarding military intervention in Syria. The organized and targeted release of images of Qassem Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force, on the battlefield in Fallujah, which drew widespread critical reactions from American officials, the Saudi government, and even Sunni representatives in the Iraqi parliament, was solely due to Tehran's assessment of the public's positive inclination towards the war against ISIS. Nevertheless, the main reason for the Islamic Republic's military presence in Iraq should be seen as a result of Tehran's evaluations of ISIS's security threats. If ISIS continues to control Mosul, Iraq's second-largest city, maintaining the country's integrity will be impossible, and the stability of the government in Baghdad will be threatened. Despite having endured an eight-year war with Iraq, the Islamic Republic does not view the fragmentation of that country into three parts—Kurdish, Shia, and Sunni—as aligned with its interests. In the event of Iraq's fragmentation, Iran's sphere of influence would be limited to the Shia region, the Sunni government of Iraq would align with Saudi Arabia, the land route to Syria and aid to southern Lebanon would be cut off, and the establishment of an independent Kurdish state in the west would pose separate security threats to Iran. Pushing ISIS back from Fallujah is a significant step towards reclaiming Mosul and avoiding Iraq's fragmentation. Additionally, the defeat of ISIS in Iraq is expected to dismantle its branches in other regional countries, including Afghanistan and Pakistan, and along Iran's eastern borders. Despite the repeated anti-American slogans from the leaders of the Islamic Republic, the U.S. has always been considered a compatible "enemy" of the Iranian Islamic government. The recent release of documents regarding the alleged correspondence between Ruhollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic, and then-President John F. Kennedy after the unrest in 1963 in Tehran is an example of the religious leaders of Iran's accommodation with the West regarding larger goals while maintaining anti-American rhetoric. Khomeini's correspondence even extended to the communist leaders of the Soviet Union and Cuba, and later by the Tehran government (Ahmadinejad) to U.S. presidents, which in turn strengthens the speculation about the authenticity of Khomeini's letters to Kennedy. In relation to Iraq, many of the broad outlines of current U.S. foreign policy and military considerations align with those of the Islamic Republic. Iran's alignment and cooperation with the U.S. in Iraq began in 2005, in the absence of official political relations between Tehran and Washington, and has continued uninterrupted since. After the fall of Mosul in 2014, the Islamic Republic sent 140 tons of light and semi-heavy weapons and ammunition daily to Iraq, especially for the autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government, and also provided more advanced military equipment, including missile systems and drones known as "Ababil" for reconnaissance on the battlefronts, while the U.S. remained silent despite Iran's arms export ban and ignoring UN Security Council resolutions in this regard. In the second phase of Iran's military assistance to the Iraqi government to counter ISIS and during preparations for an attack on communication routes and reclaiming the Anbar province, the Islamic Republic also provided MiG-25 aircraft to the Baghdad government. In a retaliatory move, ISIS forces occupied the town of "Jalawa" within 25 kilometers of the Iranian border with Iraq on August 12 of that year. This time, not only were "advisory" assistance and IRGC paramilitaries involved, but units from the regular Iranian army also participated in military operations within Iraq. According to reports from the International Institute for Strategic Studies (Chatham House), mechanized divisions from the 71st Brigade stationed at Abu Zar and the 181st Armored Division from the Islamabad West region participated in these clashes with American M60 tanks. Learning lessons from the eight-year war with Iraq and having sufficient strategic depth against hostile forces in the west of the country, Iran prefers preemptive defense within the territory of its neighbor—similar to the defensive behaviors of other powerful regional countries like Turkey regarding Iraq and Syria, and Israel against Palestinians, Lebanon, and Jordan—to neutralize external threats, rather than defending within its own borders. Last year, to counter "Jundallah" and "Jaish al-Adl," Iran adopted a similar approach by sending its military forces into Pakistan's territory, while during Khatami's administration, when Taliban forces attacked in August 1998 in Mazar-i-Sharif and killed eight diplomats and threatened Iranian territory, Iranian forces refrained from entering Afghanistan despite having 30,000 troops stationed at the borders. Undoubtedly, ISIS remains a threat to the tranquility of Iran's western borders until its complete overthrow within Iraq, and although this threat does not jeopardize Iran's territorial integrity due to their limited military capabilities, it can lead to unrest in border areas, terrorist actions, and the kidnapping of citizens. From this perspective, and due to national security considerations, rather than pursuing Sunni-Shia rivalries that have become an influential factor in Iran's foreign policy, military confrontation with ISIS, utilizing all available capacities and possible opportunities, is a justified action and, unlike the military engagements of the Quds Force in Syria, enjoys sufficient support among the Iranian public, and should continue despite the discontent of other neighboring countries.