The Seven Layers of Repression Organization in the Islamic Republic

The important question these days is whether the new wave of anti-government protests has subsided. The government claims to control and manage the protests, while opponents say it is repression. This is the third confrontation of the Iranian government with protesting citizens in the past decade: first in 2009 during the Green Movement, second in the protests of December 2017, and now in the protests following the increase in the prices of the dollar, gold, and essential goods, including in cities like Shiraz, Karaj, Isfahan, and areas of Tehran. The protests of 2009 and 2017 were seen by the government as controlled and managed, while opponents viewed them as repression. The fate of the 2018 protests is still uncertain. But who or which institutions carry out this control and management or repression? Evidence and documentation of at least five significant experiences of government forces entering the streets to control, manage, or repress anti-government protests on July 9, 1999, July 9, 2003, the Green Movement of 2009, the protests of December 2017, and the current protests show that the forces controlling and managing or repressing popular and anti-government protests in Iran belong to a multi-layered and multi-dimensional structure and organization that has become broader, more complex, and better equipped after each of these experiences. The structure and organization responsible for confronting protests in the Islamic Republic is not just the police and law enforcement; it includes various paramilitary, military, intelligence, operational, judicial, media, and propaganda sectors, and even financial aspects, which the government's opponents consider a multi-layered and multi-dimensional repression organization. The first layer: the intelligence sector. The first step in all control and management bodies or organizations repressing protests worldwide is intelligence. All governments collect information about their potential and actual opponents, and the Islamic Republic does too. A look at the cases of political and civil activists arrested in the Islamic Republic over the past three decades shows that various intelligence agencies are continuously collecting information about critics and opponents of the government and, when deemed necessary, even arrest protesters and critics before any protests occur in the streets. Officially, the existence of 16 intelligence agencies is acknowledged and announced in the Islamic Republic, but not all of them have the same role and weight in the arrest of critics and protesters. In recent years, four intelligence agencies have played the most active roles: the Ministry of Intelligence, the Intelligence of the Law Enforcement Force, the Intelligence Protection of the Judiciary, and the Intelligence of the Revolutionary Guard. The level of activity of each of these intelligence agencies depends on various equations such as the composition and power tendencies within the government and the degree of alignment of the government with institutions like the leadership and the Revolutionary Guard. The Ministry of Intelligence has played a central role in the arrest of critics and opponents since its establishment in 1984. However, when a government has been in power that has differences with the leader or the Revolutionary Guards, the role of the Ministry of Intelligence has diminished in favor of other intelligence agencies like the Revolutionary Guard's Intelligence (for example, during Rouhani's presidency) or the Judiciary's Intelligence Protection (during Khatami's presidency). The Revolutionary Guard's Intelligence Organization, which has been the most active and growing intelligence agency in recent years, was formed in 2008 when the Intelligence Deputy of the Revolutionary Guard was transformed into an Intelligence Organization. Since its formation and under the leadership of Hossein Taeb, the quality and quantity of the government's dealings with critics and opponents have undergone fundamental changes. The Revolutionary Guard's Intelligence Organization has shown that in dealing with protesters and critics, it has acted in a way that even disregards the Ministry of Intelligence despite its legal powers and has marginalized it. An example is that in the arrest of environmental activists, despite the Ministry of Intelligence's expert opinion that the detainees were not spies, the Revolutionary Guard's Intelligence has refused to release them. The Judiciary's Intelligence Protection and the Law Enforcement's Intelligence Protection, two other intelligence agencies that had a more active role in dealing with critics during Khatami's presidency, have shown less activity in recent years despite the high mobility of the Revolutionary Guard's Intelligence. The second layer: the operational sector. A look at the active forces in controlling and managing or repressing protests in 1999, 2009, 2017, and now 2018 shows that the forces present in the field and streets to confront protesters are a combination of at least four operational forces. Level one: regular law enforcement. Level two: special units of the Law Enforcement Force. Level three: active forces from Basij bases and mosques. Level four: the Revolutionary Guards, including Imam Ali's security battalions. Depending on the government's assessment of the intensity and severity of protests at any given time, various levels and combinations of operational forces have always been dispatched to the streets to control and manage or repress protesters. In some cases, attempts have been made to manage protests only with the presence of regular police or the non-confrontational presence of special units, while in other cases, the special units, accompanied by Basij forces, have directly repressed protesters, and in instances like July and August 2009, the Tharallah Headquarters of the Revolutionary Guard has been the highest level of operational crisis management in the center of the Islamic Republic, entering the field and managing and commanding the forces of the Law Enforcement, Basij, intelligence, and the Revolutionary Guards. The third layer: the judiciary. Alongside intelligence agencies and operational sectors, a third layer that has been devised for controlling and managing or repressing anti-government protests in the Islamic Republic of Iran is the judiciary layer. This layer, consisting of some prosecutors, investigators, interrogators, prosecutors, judges, and prison officials and managers, is responsible for forming judicial cases against critics and protesters, prosecuting, and issuing prison sentences or financial penalties and even exile against them. Critics and protesters against the government have repeatedly stated in recent years that many prosecutors and judges, and even prison officials, are under the control of intelligence agencies, including the Ministry of Intelligence and the Revolutionary Guards' Intelligence, and that judges execute the orders of intelligence interrogators. The fourth layer: the media sector. Another structural layer that participates in controlling and managing or repressing popular and anti-government protests is the media sector. This sector, which critics and opponents of the Islamic Republic believe consists of newspapers and news agencies close to the Revolutionary Guards, Basij, state television, the judiciary, and the more radical factions of conservatives, is seen by opponents as playing a complementary role alongside intelligence, operational, and judicial sectors, tasked with creating an advertising and psychological environment for repressing critics and opponents. For example, protesters and critics of the Islamic Republic believe that state television has repeatedly acted as part of the structure and organization confronting protesters and critics by broadcasting confessions obtained under pressure from detained activists. Critics also cite the broadcasting of films such as the mass and non-public trials of detained Green Movement activists in 2009 as another example of the media sector's collaboration with other sectors of control and management or repression of protests. They believe that the media sector of the repression organization has moved beyond newspapers and news agencies in recent years, towards creating film and documentary production organizations, even receiving large and official budgets, and attempting to control and manage the cinematic atmosphere of the country. The fifth layer: the motivational layer and the production of loyal forces to the regime. In all instances where the government has acted to control and manage or repress street protests in 1999, 2009, 2017, and 2018, forces known as plainclothes agents have always been seen alongside intelligence and armed forces. These forces, separate from plainclothes officers, are usually seen at the forefront when confronting protesters and participate with more motivation and activity in controlling and managing or repressing protests and protesters.