The 'Seven Principles' Framework for a One-Stage Agreement

"One-stage agreement" is not a new topic for those following Iran's nuclear negotiations. Throughout these months, officials from both sides of the nuclear talks have repeatedly emphasized the famous phrase that until both parties agree on all issues, it is as if they have agreed on nothing. However, when the highest authority in Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, stresses this issue, news and analytical circles once again turn their attention to it, and the "one-stage agreement" returns to the headlines. Iran and the 5+1 group, when they could not reach a comprehensive and final agreement in Vienna last December and decided to extend the talks, set two deadlines for themselves; one by the end of March (early Farvardin) to achieve a general framework or political agreement, and then by the end of June (Tir 94) to finalize details and reach a comprehensive and final agreement. It seems that setting these two deadlines led to the perception that Iran is seeking a two-stage agreement. About two weeks of confusion ended with remarks from Marzieh Afkham, the spokesperson for the Foreign Ministry, who stated that Iran aims to achieve a political understanding by Nowruz and then a comprehensive agreement by Tir. However, Ms. Afkham did not provide further explanation about this understanding regarding the general framework or political understanding. The general framework, the basic principles of which are outlined on the last page of the Joint Action Plan agreed upon by Iran and the 5+1 in November 2013 (Azar 92), includes seven items as parameters for a comprehensive and final agreement. These seven items have been studied and negotiated from political and technical aspects by the six countries and Iran for over a year, and as stated at the end of this round of negotiations in Geneva, progress has been made in some important areas. The following explains these seven items. 1) First, the parties must reach a comprehensive consensus on a timeline for the final agreement. This issue has long been under scrutiny by news and analytical circles regarding the nuclear negotiations. U.S. officials have been questioned about this repeatedly. At one point, during negotiations for a comprehensive agreement, an American negotiator stated that the target time frame for the U.S. is "double digits"; some analysts even proposed a twenty-year timeline for this agreement. However, a longer timeline is seen as detrimental to Iran, as it implies that the process of lifting sanctions will also be prolonged in response to the verification of Iran's nuclear program. Currently, the estimated timeline for the agreement with Iran in Geneva is between ten to fifteen years. 2) The second item proposed as a goal for the comprehensive and final agreement is that this agreement must reflect the rights and obligations of the signatories of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as well as other related agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This issue does not seem to require much negotiation and bargaining since the obligations and rights of each party are specified in the NPT and other international agreements. Lifting the United Nations Security Council sanctions, unilateral and multilateral sanctions is another goal of the comprehensive and final agreement stated in the Joint Action Plan, which will occur based on a timeline agreed upon by the parties. 3) Lifting the United Nations Security Council sanctions, unilateral and multilateral sanctions is another goal of the comprehensive and final agreement stated in the Joint Action Plan, which will occur based on a timeline agreed upon by the parties. The timeline for lifting these sanctions is among the serious and challenging issues raised. Naturally, Iran seeks to lift sanctions as quickly as possible so that the country's economy can return to normalcy. However, what is currently being discussed is the suspension and gradual lifting of sanctions. This step-by-step process will proceed with Iran's verification measures. On one hand, Iran faces the Security Council's sanctions, which the five permanent members are currently negotiating with Iran. Iranian officials have previously stated that they seek an action from the five countries to guarantee the lifting of sanctions in exchange for Iran's actions. There have also been discussions that Iran wants the five countries to go to the Security Council and provide this guarantee to Iran in the form of a new resolution; a request that remains unclear whether any progress has been made on. Another group of sanctions is the unilateral U.S. sanctions. Many of these sanctions require a vote from the U.S. Congress, which is currently controlled by a Republican majority; a significant number of influential Republicans are not in favor of continuing the negotiations in their current form, raising concerns among Iranian negotiators about the possibility that the timeline for lifting sanctions may not be implemented as agreed upon after a deal. Another set of sanctions is from the European Union, which many analysts believe can be lifted more easily than those from other groups. Although these sanctions are not as significant as those from the Security Council and the U.S., they could help normalize Iran's position in the international economic sphere. 4) The Geneva agreement specifically addresses the enrichment program, stating that Iran and the 5+1 must work to agree on the scope of this program based on practical needs. Discussions revolve around how much enrichment and at what level should be conducted and the fate of enriched uranium stockpiles. Analysts in the field of nuclear energy and disarmament, official negotiators, and other officials, including Israeli officials, have very different views on this matter. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei estimates Iran's practical and real need at 190,000 SWU, while analysts and Western officials argue that Iran does not need a program of such magnitude. However, it should be noted that Iran must impose these restrictions on its nuclear program only for a period of, for example, ten to fifteen years. Currently, as negotiations progress and both sides attempt to narrow the gap in opinions, despite clear criticisms from some U.S. congressional representatives and senior Israeli officials, discussions are underway about keeping several thousand (around 6,000 to 7,000) centrifuges operational at Iran's nuclear facilities. This number has increased from hundreds to several thousand as negotiations have progressed, but it still means that several thousand of Iran's centrifuges will be deactivated. Iran currently has fewer than 10,000 active centrifuges. Analysts in the field of disarmament argue that Iran's nuclear program should be limited in such a way that the "breakout time"—the time Iran needs to acquire a weapon—should not be less than one year. Technical discussions are currently aimed at imposing restrictions with this goal in mind. 5) The Arak heavy water facility, which has been a topic of discussion among negotiators since the early days following the initial Geneva agreement, is another issue that the six negotiating countries are concerned about due to its design, which could lead to plutonium production, as plutonium can be used in the production of nuclear weapons. In the months following the Geneva agreement, Iran announced that it could address the international community's concerns by making changes to the design of this facility, but it emphasized that it does not want this facility to be converted to light water. Although at one point it seemed that this issue was resolved with Iran's proposal, officials have repeatedly stated that this matter has not yet been finalized. 6) Another issue proposed as a goal of the agreement is Iran's actions for transparency regarding its nuclear program and oversight of it, as well as signing the Additional Protocol. In this regard, the Iranian side has repeatedly stated during and on the sidelines of negotiations that it is ready to fulfill its commitments in this area and is also prepared to sign the Additional Protocol. This protocol was previously agreed to by Iran during negotiations with the European troika but has been suspended for years since the breakdown of talks. 7) Nuclear cooperation, including issues related to light water facilities and research reactors and related equipment, is also among the topics. In this section, the issue of fuel supply and research and development efforts are also mentioned as means of nuclear cooperation. This parameter of a comprehensive and final agreement, although considered one of the easier aspects of a potential agreement, remains significant as it includes issues such as fuel exchange. Some reports have previously indicated that Iran is ready to obtain the fuel needed for its facilities from abroad (Russia). Such an action could also assure the 5+1 that the stockpile of enriched uranium in Iran would not be at a level that would raise concerns about its potential use in weapon production. As negotiations intensify and become more compressed, particularly between the foreign ministers of Iran and the U.S., it seems that the differences in finalizing this seven-item framework have diminished. Some observers assess the movements of critics of these negotiations, including Israeli officials, as signs of the convergence of views between Iran and the 5+1. Iran and the six countries have until the end of March, early Farvardin, to reach a framework based on the items mentioned above by the end of their four-month deadline. A mutual understanding and agreement reached before Nowruz 94 could significantly impact the political landscape within Iran—from the leader's designation of the year to the parliamentary elections in Bahman 94.