The Shadow of Distrust Over the Revival of Military Relations Between Iran and Russia

Recently, Brigadier General Hossein Dehghan, Iran's Minister of Defense, emphasized the implementation of the military cooperation agreement between the two countries in a letter to General Sergei Shoigu, his Russian counterpart. In this letter, Dehghan accepted Shoigu's invitation to participate in the 'Moscow International Security Conference - 2015' and referred to the upcoming visit of the Russian Minister of Defense to Iran in January as a turning point in Tehran-Moscow relations, especially in the military and technical sectors. The agreement, which Dehghan and his Russian counterpart signed on Tuesday, January 30, emphasizes long-term and multi-faceted cooperation between the two countries in military affairs, countering terrorism, separatism, and extremism, as well as enhancing cooperation for regional peace and security. General Sergei Shoigu, the only Russian Minister of Defense to visit Iran in the past 15 years, spoke at a joint press conference with Dehghan about the practical aspects of military cooperation between the two countries, including the exchange of delegations, the movement of naval vessels to each other's ports, conducting staff negotiations, participating in maneuvers as observers, training military personnel, and exchanging experiences in peacekeeping and counter-terrorism activities. Last October, Viktor Bondarev, the commander of the Russian Air Force, also emphasized military cooperation in the air sector during a four-day visit to Tehran and discussions with the commander of the Army Air Force and the commander of the Aerospace Force of the IRGC. Turbulent Background In the margins of the signing of the aforementioned agreement, some media outlets in the Islamic Republic reported on the agreement between the defense ministers of Russia and Iran regarding the resolution of the S-300 system issue. These reports and speculations gained strength when General Leonid Ivashov, head of the 'International Center for Geopolitical Studies' and former head of the International Cooperation Department of the Russian Ministry of Defense, told RIA Novosti: 'In the context of cooperation in military technology and economics, a step has been taken that includes at least defense systems like S-300 and S-400. We will probably deliver these systems to Iran.' Although high-ranking officials from both countries have not yet officially commented on the S-300 issue and how to resolve it, Russia's keen interest in reviving military relations with Iran—relations that have a history of obstruction, delays, and even reneging on official contracts by Russia—raises questions about Moscow's new approach. Russia's eagerness to revive relations with Iran can be seen as a sign of goodwill from this country and a positive step, but looking at Russia's previous approaches and the dual nature of its foreign policy towards Iran over the past three decades necessitates some caution in evaluation and conclusion; a point that has not escaped the attention of some Russian media. For example, the 'Moscow Times' noted that the new agreement between Russia and Iran and the tumultuous history of military relations between the two countries suggest that Shoigu's visit to Tehran could pave the way for the sale of non-lethal weapons such as radar, but a leap in arms exports to Iran will not appear unless Moscow convinces Tehran that it will adhere to its contracts and agreements. Incomplete Implementation of Contracts After the Iran-Iraq War, the Islamic Republic turned to Russia for rearmament and supplying equipment for the Army and IRGC. In this context, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, then Speaker of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, visited Moscow on June 20, 1989, aiming to open a new chapter in Iran-Soviet relations, and officials from both countries signed agreements in the fields of military, scientific, technical cooperation, and trade. The military cooperation agreement, which was the most significant achievement of Rafsanjani's visit, formed the basis for several arms contracts and technical assistance that were subsequently concluded between the two countries. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia, as the successor to the contracts made with Iran, only partially implemented the agreements due to disputes with the Islamic Republic over the amount of Soviet debt to Iran, Iran's financial problems, and Moscow's insistence on cash payments from Iran, although the most significant deterrent in this matter was pressure from the U.S. Nevertheless, Russia met some of the military needs of the Islamic Republic until the mid-1990s, including the sale of 422 T-72 tanks, 413 BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles, self-propelled artillery, SA-5 and SA-6 surface-to-air missiles, 12 Sukhoi-24 aircraft, 24 MiG-29 aircraft, and three Kilo-class submarines along with a number of torpedoes and mines. The memorandum of understanding between Viktor Chernomyrdin and Albert Gore, who viewed the Islamic Republic as a source of instability in the Middle East, especially in the Persian Gulf, and were concerned about the delivery of these weapons to the Islamic Republic, made extensive efforts to prevent further military supplies to Iran by leveraging the post-Cold War reconciliation between the U.S. and Russia. Ultimately, Boris Yeltsin, then President of Russia, retreated under U.S. pressure during a meeting with Bill Clinton in May 1995 in Moscow, committing to complete the implementation of all military contracts with Iran by 1999, refrain from continuing to export offensive weapons to Iran, and not to conclude new military agreements with Tehran. Nearly two months later, on June 30, 1995, these agreements were formally arranged in a confidential memorandum that was later revealed, and Viktor Chernomyrdin, then Prime Minister of Russia, and Albert Gore, then Vice President of the United States, signed the document. According to the 'Moscow Times', the signing of this document and Russia's commitments to the U.S. resulted in 50 to 70 percent of the contracts concluded with Iran not being implemented, causing Russia to lose at least four billion dollars. In the meantime, the Islamic Republic was also deprived of meeting some of its defense needs. Putin, A New Phase of Cooperation The financial losses and damage to Russia's reputation as an unreliable and dependent party prompted the newly empowered Vladimir Putin to refuse previous agreements with the U.S. and inform Washington at the end of 2000 that it was withdrawing from the Chernomyrdin-Gore protocol. Following this action, in late December 2000, Igor Sergeyev, then Minister of Defense of Russia, visited Iran and met with his Iranian counterpart, Ali Shamkhani, announcing the beginning of a 'new phase of military and technical cooperation between the two countries.' Despite this, between 2000 and 2005, the value of military contracts between Iran and Russia did not exceed 400 million dollars, and Russia exported five Mi-17 helicopters and nearly 700 shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles (SA-18/16) to Iran. Dmitry Medvedev and the S-300 System The contract for the purchase of the S-300 air defense system was signed between Tehran and Moscow at the end of 2007, with Russia committing to deliver five batteries of this system worth 800 million dollars to Iran. However, shortly after the contract was signed, the U.S. opposed this agreement, and gradually, the delivery of this system became more of a tool for Russia to extract concessions from the U.S. than a factor for military cooperation. Ultimately, with the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1929, the fourth resolution against Iran, a legal basis from Moscow's perspective was provided for canceling the aforementioned contract, and Dmitry Medvedev, then President of Russia, signed a decree in September 2010 prohibiting the sale of the S-300 system and heavy weapons to Iran. This resolution, which Russia voted in favor of, like previous Security Council resolutions, prohibited countries from selling military vehicles, fighter aircraft, ships, missiles, and related systems and supplies. Accordingly, the Islamic Republic, due to the cancellation of the contract by Russia, submitted a complaint to the 'Arbitration Court' in Geneva (affiliated with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) seeking 4 billion dollars in damages. 'A vessel with a hole cannot be righted with wax and glue' *Considering the tumultuous military and political relations between Iran and Russia over the past three decades, and the fact that Moscow has used Iran as a card to maintain its political and strategic interests in its relations with the U.S. and other countries, even reneging on its agreements with Iran, Dehghan's emphasis to his Russian counterpart on the implementation of the latest military cooperation document is not surprising. Russia is eager to revive military, technical, and trade relations with Iran, and the Islamic Republic is also inclined to this. The Islamic Republic and Russia have common geopolitical interests, especially regarding Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, the South Caucasus, Central Asia, and also concerning the Caspian Sea and keeping foreign countries away from this water area. Both have serious disagreements with the West, especially with the U.S., and both want to increase their political and geopolitical influence in the Middle East. Both countries have a completely suitable capacity for developing economic relations, such as arms sales and expanding trade exchanges. However, one of the most significant obstacles to reviving relations is the lack of trust. Russia has used Iran instrumentally in pursuing its interests in several cases and has sometimes reneged on its commitments under U.S. pressure. Over the past 30 years, the Islamic Republic's relations with Russia have been influenced by its tense relations with the West and its isolation, and therefore have not been based on Tehran's real needs with Moscow. At least the current form of Iran's relationship with Russia is not based on Iran's strategic choice. Iran turned to Russia to limit international pressures and escape isolation, and now Russia has turned to Iran, India, and some other countries to counter Western pressure and sanctions. The latest military cooperation agreement between the two countries could be a breakthrough, but establishing sufficiently strong military relations requires fundamental steps to alleviate Tehran's distrust of Moscow. One of the initial steps could be the cancellation of Medvedev's decree that prevents Russia from selling key weapons to Iran. In this regard, it is also necessary for Iran to withdraw its legal complaint against Russia. In any case, extensive military cooperation between the two countries will only be possible when UN Security Council sanctions against Iran are lifted or suspended, and this is directly related to the outcomes of the ongoing nuclear negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 countries. Until then, it is not expected that military relations between the two countries will extend beyond cooperation in counter-terrorism, personnel exchange and training, and port visits of naval vessels from each country. If the nuclear negotiations succeed and Iran's relations with the West normalize, the Islamic Republic may emerge from Russia's shadow and could even break Russia's exclusive presence in the European energy market, becoming a competitor to Russia, although achieving this goal in the short term is not feasible. This competition does not have to be accompanied by enmity; on the contrary, it can transform into synergy and convergence and could even have a solid foundation because the relations between the two countries in such a situation would not be influenced by isolation, sanctions, and necessity. *A vessel with a hole cannot be righted with wax and glue - Nasimi Ganjavi, Sharafnameh..................................................................................................... The author's opinion does not necessarily reflect the views of Radio Farda. Hossein Aryan is a military and strategic affairs analyst.