The Shadow of Mirbagheri and the Controversy Surrounding Jalili: Four Points About Saeed Jalili

The second round of the presidential election in Iran is being held under the heavy shadow of widespread election boycotts, similar to the previous round. In this context, Masoud Pezeshkian and Saeed Jalili, each emerging from different factions of the government, are set to compete against each other. Here, we discuss several political characteristics and personal positions of Jalili: 1. Resistance Against Qalibaf and Silence on Election Boycotts. Jalili reached the second round of the presidential election as the only unified candidate of the so-called 'principlists.' However, he ignored his faction's efforts to achieve a single candidate for the election before this stage. Amir Hossein Ghazizadeh Hashemi and Alireza Zakani, two other principlist candidates, withdrew from the race before the first round, but unlike the previous presidential election, Jalili did not take similar action. In June 2021, Jalili, along with Zakani, had withdrawn in favor of Ebrahim Raisi, but this year he did not intend to make a concession regarding Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, another prominent principlist candidate in the first round. This refusal to withdraw from the election further highlighted the rift among the principlists and revealed the lack of popular legitimacy of at least one of the power holders (Qalibaf is the current Speaker of the Parliament). If the official statistics announced by the Islamic Republic are assumed to be 'correct,' Jalili managed to attract more votes from the social base of the principlists with more populist slogans compared to Qalibaf, as well as presenting a 'simpler' and 'cleaner' image of himself compared to his principlist rival. Jalili alongside Qalibaf. Qalibaf's image, especially in recent years, has been severely tarnished due to the exposure of multiple corruption cases. However, Jalili's claim of being popular seems contradictory as he simultaneously ignored the majority of Iranians who did not participate in the elections. In the debates between the two rounds, despite the issue of election boycotts being raised, he did not mention the reasons for the boycotts by the people. Analysts and figures associated with the 'reformist' movement in Iran have always said that low public participation in elections benefits the principlist faction. 2. Insistence on 'Shadow Government.' Jalili has announced that for years, since Hassan Rouhani's presidency, he has been researching the problems and crises of the country by forming a mechanism called 'Shadow Government' and has found solutions for them. He claims that over these years, specialized working groups have been formed within this 'Shadow Government' and various trips have been made to meet with groups and guilds. He repeatedly emphasized his 'Shadow Government' during the election debates and presented it as his superior feature. However, his rival accused him of lacking executive experience and fundamentally dismissed what Jalili presented as the results of this Shadow Government as not being a 'documented program' that is written based on programming criteria and is executable. One of the controversial aspects of this program is Jalili's plan for generating '153 million dollars from the production and export of animation' in Iran, which media outlets have described as 'strange.' Additionally, Jalili's gasoline plan known as 'Plan One' has also been described by some economic media as a 'dangerous plan.' Pezeshkian, referring to Jalili's closeness to Ebrahim Raisi's government and emphasizing the impracticality of his plans, asked him: 'Why were you in the shadow during Raisi's government? Well, you should have come to the sunlight.' Former parliament member Ezzatollah Yusefian Molla, referring to this closeness, said: 'The question for Mr. Jalili is why you could have entered the government and stood powerfully alongside the government to help it, there was no reason to go to the shadow.' Mostafa Pourmohammadi, another election candidate, also said that 'Jalili has always been in the shadow government and has never come to the light,' while 'our country is a country of sunlight and moonlight, not shadows.' The news website Khabar Online, close to Ali Larijani, quoted one of its experts as saying that Jalili's claim about the Shadow Government is 'fundamentally wrong' because 'this issue pertains to parliamentary political systems.' Furthermore, media outlets published a photo of Javad Sadati-Nejad, former Minister of Agriculture, in one of Jalili's Shadow Government meetings; Sadati-Nejad's name is mentioned in the 'Dabesh Tea' corruption case. This is not the first time Jalili's Shadow Government has faced criticism from his opponents. In the 2017 presidential election, Mohammad Shariatmadari, then Deputy of Hassan Rouhani and his campaign head, reacted to Jalili's proposal by saying that 'his Shadow Government will not be formed, but sitting in the shadow has its own world.' 3. Apocalyptic Politics. Jalili, 58, who has published a book titled 'The Foreign Policy of the Prophet,' is a staunch opponent of the Islamic Republic's rapprochement with the West. Such an inflexible foreign policy, which was previously tested during his negotiations as Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council in Iran's nuclear case, stems from a worldview known as 'apocalyptic worldview.' In such a perspective, the Islamic government stands in the position of 'right,' and its opponents and enemies are entirely 'evil and false'; the result is that if the Islamic government cannot eliminate its enemy, it must at least make it 'regret.' In such an approach, dialogue with the 'enemy' holds little meaning, just as the nuclear talks during Jalili's tenure yielded no results. Now, Jalili has repeatedly defended his opposition to the JCPOA in election debates, stating that if elected President, he will be 'demanding' from the U.S. and will ensure that Washington 'regrets' its sanctions against Iran. In fact, Jalili presents the same claims that Iranian officials have made over the past years, more vividly; that the current Iranian government is to connect to the promised government attributed to the twelfth Shia Imam. In some election advertisements broadcast for Jalili, it is explicitly stated that if Jalili wins, 'the Imam of Time will appear by next year, but Pezeshkian is preventing the appearance.' The newspaper Shargh, in late Khordad, confirmed the 'apocalyptic' nature of Jalili's policies. According to this newspaper, Jalili's policies resemble those of the previous Ahmadinejad government. However, Shargh wrote: 'Although some candidates like Saeed Jalili have an apocalyptic view of politics, the current time and context do not see him as the savior of this change.' 4. Controversial Support from Mohammad Mahdi Mirbagheri. In addition to the policies and positions declared by Jalili himself, the support of Mohammad Mahdi Mirbagheri, a hardline cleric in Iran, has become controversial. Mirbagheri, who is currently a member of the Assembly of Experts and the head of the Academy of Islamic Sciences in Qom, is considered a successor to Mohammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi due to his extreme and radical positions. The newspaper Etemad has written in this regard that 'some consider Mirbagheri to be the ideologue of the Stability Front after Mesbah Yazdi.' In recent days, an audio file was circulated on social media against Mirbagheri, claiming that he is seeking to become a 'leader.' Additionally, incidents such as the serial poisoning of schoolgirls in Iran have been attributed to him. He also, like Ali Khamenei, the leader of the Islamic Republic, considered the consequences of the COVID-19 outbreak to be the result of a 'conspiracy.' Mirbagheri previously stated in a television program: 'We are not opposed to the education and employment of women, but we oppose the Western model of it.' Jalili himself has also defended mandatory hijab in election debates, stating that hijab is a condition for women's social activity. Mirbagheri has also warned about the return of 'moderates' to power, stating: 'The Western-oriented political faction that calls themselves moderates has not clarified their boundaries with the idea of overthrowing and is standing in the middle. I think they want to return to power in the name of savior and attracting the masses.' These positions are precisely those of Saeed Jalili, who has repeatedly warned in his debates with Pezeshkian against the formation of what he called 'the third government of Hassan Rouhani.' According to a report by the newspaper Etemad, Mirbagheri fundamentally does not believe in elections in the Islamic Republic. In a lecture on 'vote and allegiance,' he presented theories similar to those of Mesbah Yazdi, stating: 'In a society that is formed based on votes, the charter of that vote is not the religion of God.'