The Shortness of Breath of the JCPOA and Khamenei's Pressures

Simultaneously with parallel discussions in Washington between Valiollah Seif and Jack Lew, the U.S. Treasury Secretary, as well as Zarif and John Kerry, the U.S. Secretary of State, regarding the possibilities of facilitating Iran's foreign trade transactions based on the dollar, Ali Khamenei, in response to the labeling of Hezbollah by Saudi Arabia as a terrorist organization, described the Saudi government as corrupt. Khamenei's harsh attack on the Saudi government occurred at a time when Barack Obama was in Riyadh responding to his host's sharp criticisms of Washington's generosity towards the Islamic Republic during the nuclear negotiations that led to the JCPOA. Last year, at a similar summit of the leaders of the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council, hosted by Doha, Qatar, the Arab leaders participating in the JCPOA were officially supported at the request and recommendation of the U.S. About a year later, Arab countries, alongside numerous criticisms of U.S. foreign policy regarding the Middle East and the Gulf, see Washington as an indirect encourager of actions pursued by the Islamic Republic in Syria, Yemen, Iraq, and Lebanon. Khamenei's expression of anger towards the Riyadh leaders was an example of the Persian proverb "speaking to the door - to be heard by the wall" and practically targeted the current U.S. government, which considers the JCPOA its greatest achievement in "inward-looking" foreign policy. The right-wing faction of the Islamic Republic's governance, led by Khamenei, believes that the U.S. played Iran during the JCPOA negotiations, and after neutralizing Iran's capabilities and removing its nuclear reserves, it is now evading its commitments under the agreement. The Obama administration, due to internal pressures and the flow of electoral competition in the U.S., and to some extent due to external pressures (from Saudi Arabia and Israel), was unable to be more flexible towards the Islamic Republic. Obama, after increasing economic pressures against Iran since the beginning of 2012 and opening negotiations with the Islamic Republic after its resistance capacity decreased, pursued two specific goals: 1- Blocking Iran's path to a nuclear bomb without incurring costs or resorting to military capacity 2- Gradually reintegrating Iran into the global community and regional cooperation by resorting to internal changes and transformation of the regime from within. The model that Obama achieved with Cuba was supposed to be implemented regarding Iran as well; a premise that, due to the resistance and inconsistency of the military and with the support of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, remained incomplete, and due to its incompleteness, like any other unfinished building, is either condemned to forced completion or destruction. The Islamic Republic's governance is well aware of the extent and depth of dissatisfaction within society and sees the opening of political doors as a way to break the dam and unleash a flood. The conservative branch of the Islamic governance in Tehran also does not tolerate internal transformation, which Khamenei recently criticized under the pretext of hypothetical dissenting claims. For this reason, it will neither voluntarily open the doors to normal relations with the West, especially the U.S., nor welcome the expansion of individual, social, and political freedoms. The Islamic Republic and Khamenei agreed to enter negotiations with the U.S. and the nuclear agreement to regain lost financial power by neutralizing sanctions and to return to the previous path without politically approaching the U.S. in the next opportunity. The Islamic Republic also expected that by breaking sanctions from Europe, all sanctions would be lifted, and the continuation of financial and economic pressures from the U.S. would be impossible; another premise in which the Islamic Republic had made a miscalculation. Months after the implementation of the JCPOA, the domestic market of Iran has shown no signs of returning to prosperity and trust, while since January 16 of this year, the European community has removed numerous obstacles to the development of trade with Iran - including banking and insurance services, sanctions against oil and gas and petrochemical materials, shipping, shipbuilding, transportation industries (agreements for the sale of passenger planes and Italy's assistance in developing railways in Iran), gold and precious metal transactions. Despite the great enthusiasm of Europe and Asia to sell goods and services to Iran, Iran's foreign trade is still unable to move in a normal and free manner, for a simple reason that the U.S. and its monetary system are excluded from Iran's foreign transactions. On the one hand, the Islamic Republic does not want to enter into political reconciliation and gradual normalization of relations with Washington, and on the other hand, it demands services and facilities from the U.S. that were not mentioned in any of the nuclear negotiation documents. If the Islamic Republic's foreign behaviors were guided by a single source, and in relation to the U.S., it moved towards normalization like Cuba, granting access to financial markets and dollar-based transactions to Iran would be a reasonable expectation - but by keeping the doors closed in political relations and referring to U.S. leaders with unconventional terms and verbally and practically threatening their regional allies, meeting this expectation is neither within the capability of the current U.S. government, which is on the brink of collapse, nor in the taste of the next occupant of the White House.