On Thursday, July 25, the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic announced Iran's inflation rate for July of this year at 10.2 percent. Since the inflation index announced by the Central Bank (and not what is calculated by the Statistical Center of Iran) is referenced by expert and academic circles in Iran as well as international organizations, this note also relies on that index to examine the country's developments in the price arena. For the people of Iran, who are facing one of the toughest conditions since the war with Iraq, the inflation rate announced by the Central Bank does not reflect the severe fluctuations they feel in the prices of goods and services necessary for their daily lives. In other words, the Central Bank's statistics, from the perspective of a large segment of Iranian consumers, differ significantly from the actual inflation rate as they perceive it. Here, we set aside this difference and will use the Central Bank's statistics as they are to assess the prices of goods and services in urban areas of the country. We will see that even based on these statistics, which are met with disbelief by a large portion of public opinion in Iran, the Iranian economy is grappling with severe inflationary tensions, and if the current situation continues, the prospect of a real storm in the price arena looms ahead.
Inflation Rate in Three Narratives In the economic information framework of the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic, the inflation rate is announced in three ways, which must be understood to grasp the reality of this index and its future trajectory. Here, we will examine the three methods of reporting this index based on the latest inflation rate announced by the Central Bank (for July):
1) The first type is called 'average 12-month inflation,' which is the official inflation rate. In this method, the average inflation rate over the past 12 months is calculated compared to the 12 months prior. The Central Bank states in its announcement on July 25 that 'the inflation rate for the 12 months ending in July 1397 compared to the 12 months ending in July 1396 is 10.2 percent.' We reiterate that 'average 12-month inflation' is the official inflation rate in Iran. This index, due to the way it is calculated, is an average based on price changes over the 24 months prior to its announcement and does not necessarily reflect what people currently feel. The rate announced for July indicates a return of the inflation index above 10 percent (the inflation rate becoming double-digit again) and remains at a level much higher than the global average inflation rate (around three percent). However, given Iran's inflation tradition, 10.2 percent does not in itself provoke severe concern and can be tolerated.
2) The second method of calculating and announcing the index of consumer goods and services prices in urban areas of Iran is 'point-to-point inflation.' This refers to the increase in prices in the month under review compared to the same month of the previous year. Here, the statistics become more tangible for the people, and understanding price changes for goods and services becomes easier. In the Central Bank's announcement on July 25 regarding this 'point-to-point inflation,' it states: 'The index of consumer goods and services prices in July 1397 has increased by 18 percent compared to the same month last year (from July 96 to July 97).' With this calculation, the inflation index becomes more tangible for the people. Inflation is no longer 10.2 percent but rather 18 percent. However, the 18 percent increase in prices pertains to a basket that includes 386 items of goods and services. To realistically illustrate the impact of price increases on people's lives, we should focus on the goods and services that are of the utmost importance to a large segment of the population. In the table presented by the Central Bank, we see that the point-to-point inflation (July of this year compared to July of last year) for food and beverages is 25 percent, for tobacco is 72 percent, and for transportation is 23 percent. More importantly, in the figures published by the Central Bank, we see that point-to-point inflation has increased from below 8 percent in Farvardin of this year to 13.7 percent in Khordad and 18 percent in Tir. Here, the increasing trend of the inflation rate in Iran, based on the statistics provided by the Central Bank, becomes more apparent. Such an increase in point-to-point inflation is very concerning.
3) Concern increases further when we look at the third method of announcing the inflation rate by the Central Bank. This refers to 'month-to-month inflation,' which indicates the inflation rate in each month compared to the previous month. The Central Bank states in its announcement on July 25 that the index in July increased by 3.4 percent compared to June. However, it is noted in the Central Bank's statistics that 'month-to-month inflation' in July compared to June decreased (4.3 percent), but if we look beyond one month and consider several past months, we will see that this monthly index has jumped from 0.8 percent in Farvardin of this year to 4.3 percent in Khordad and 3.4 percent in Tir. Last year, based on the implicit norm set by the government’s expert team under Hassan Rouhani, it was decided that 'month-to-month inflation' would not exceed 0.8 percent, which was essentially a red line for controlling inflation at a single-digit level. Currently, we see that this red line has been broken, and the month-to-month inflation rate fluctuates around three to four percent. With such a monthly inflation rate, a rapid advance towards point-to-point inflation at levels above 40 or 50 percent annually is entirely possible. Thus, in the current situation, the possibility that the inflation rate could return to the final months of Ahmadinejad's second term is very high.
The Risk of Becoming Like Venezuela? However, the concern in Tehran's economic circles goes beyond the prospect of inflation rates of 40 or 50 percent, and the possibility of slipping into 'hyperinflation' or even 'Venezuelanization' of Iran's economy is being discussed. The most serious economic media in Tehran raise this fear based on what is happening in Iran's macroeconomic environment. The weekly 'Tejarat-e-Farda,' which has many readers in Iran's business, academic, and expert circles, dedicated a file in its July 16 issue to this issue and posed the question on its cover: 'Can the wave of floating liquidity, which has been accompanied by the pressure of foreign sanctions, stimulate inflationary expectations in such a way that we end up like Venezuela?' Today’s Venezuela, like yesterday’s Zimbabwe, is a full-fledged symbol of national currency collapse. The International Monetary Fund announced on Tuesday, July 24, that Venezuela's inflation rate will reach one million percent this year. Thus, a country that relies on the world's most significant oil reserves and was one of the wealthiest countries in Latin America a few years ago has now become the beggar of this continent due to the policies of Hugo Chavez and his successor Maduro, leaving its people with no choice but to flee across borders and seek refuge with neighbors to escape hunger. Fortunately, Iran has not yet reached this level of misery. However, given the chaos prevailing in the country's 'economic governance,' the widening internal gaps, and the increasing tensions in foreign relations, the risk of economic collapse cannot be considered an unachievable scenario.
Currently, attention is primarily focused on the successive jumps in the exchange rate in relation to the impending return of sanctions. Economic circles in Tehran also point to another danger, which is a direct consequence of the failure of economic reform programs under Hassan Rouhani's government. This refers to the continuation of liquidity explosion, which has created the groundwork for severe inflationary tensions in the near future. Liquidity, in very simple terms, encompasses the cash in people's hands and also bank deposits that can be quickly and easily converted into cash. In a balanced economy, liquidity increases in line with the growth of available goods and services. In contrast, in an economy with abnormal structures and performance, such as Iran's economy, the growth rate of liquidity outpaces the growth rate of goods and services production, and this event fuels inflation. To better understand what is happening in Iran's economy, we refer to the latest issue of the Central Bank's economic indicators (Issue 91), which covers the last quarter of the year 1396. We see that in the last quarter of last year, the liquidity volume grew by 22 percent to 1529 trillion tomans, while the total GDP volume last year was 1480 trillion tomans. In other words, liquidity exceeds Iran's GDP. The 22 percent growth in liquidity, in a country where the average annual GDP growth is around three percent at best, takes inflation control out of hand. A few days ago, Masoud Khansari, the head of the Tehran Chamber of Commerce, warned that every day one trillion tomans is added to the liquidity volume in the country. The consequence of this relentless liquidity surge is to fuel inflation and simultaneously shift waves of floating money from one market to another.
However, the eruption of liquidity without alignment with the realities of the national economy has various reasons, the most important of which is the existence of a bloated, costly government that is permanently trapped in a budget deficit. In Iran, to fill its budget deficit, the government, instead of resorting to reforms (reducing expenses and increasing tax revenues) or borrowing from private domestic and foreign sources, turns to the Central Bank, which is at its command, and asks it to print money. This is the primary source of increased liquidity and inflationary tensions. In the coming months, as the waves of sanctions begin to take effect, Iran's oil revenues will significantly decline, and at the same time, tax revenues will also decline due to the expanding recession in the country's economy. To compensate for this decrease in revenues, in what areas can the Islamic Republic government cut costs: eliminating cash subsidies, realigning energy carrier prices, refraining from paying the principal and interest on its debts to banks, further reducing construction costs to zero, cutting support for struggling economic enterprises, reducing costs related to Iran's military and political presence in the Middle East, or...? The most likely scenario in the current conditions will be a surge in the budget deficit and the necessity of resorting even more to 'borrowing from the Central Bank.' This is a very polite term for printing money to meet the government's needs. Iran is concerned about the further surge in liquidity, which is the natural consequence of runaway inflation.