The Thinker Behind Obama's Foreign Policy and the Nuclear Deal with Iran

Some experts and researchers on national security believe that power depends on a simple metric: the physical distance a national security advisor sits from the President during advisory and official meetings. In other words, the power of any national security advisor is determined by how close they sit to the President. However, the special role of a national security advisor revolves around trust, impartiality, partisanship, or a combination of both. Legally, a security advisor serves the needs of the President. Last week, the publication of a thirty-page article in the New York Times by David Samuels caused a stir, prompting even the White House spokesperson to explain the claims made in the article to reporters. The article titled "The Eager Novelist Who Became Obama's Foreign Policy Teacher" was based on information originating from Ben Rhodes, the Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications and the speechwriter for the President. The article states that Ben Rhodes is the primary author of the President's speeches and manages the President's travel schedule and strategic communications at the White House. The idea that a new reality has emerged in Iran was politically significant for the Obama administration as it supported his policy of rapprochement with Iran. Moreover, according to David Samuels, the U.S. government and Obama's national security advisor exploited maximum support from cyberspace and information technology, using a circle of journalists covering the White House to present reality in a way that directed 21st-century thoughts in the direction they desired. The author of the article believes that after the President, Ben Rhodes is the only influential voice in U.S. foreign policy. Furthermore, after painting a picture of Ben Rhodes, the author claims that President Obama misrepresented the Iranian government under Hassan Rouhani as moderate to persuade the public and Congress to accept the nuclear deal, effectively lying to the people. In fact, the author spends a significant portion of the article's introduction legitimizing Ben Rhodes. By presenting facts such as Obama and Rhodes being in contact multiple times a day and Rhodes organizing the U.S. relations with Cuba, he elevates Rhodes to the status of the most influential figure in the President's national security circle. Although David Samuels's article relies heavily on one individual, it is necessary to explain that since the National Security Act was passed under President Truman in 1947, there have been fundamental changes in the composition of the National Security Council, with different security advisors serving the President in almost every instance. Each year, depending on new issues and topics that arise, the number of advisors and their deputies increases. During Truman's time, this number did not exceed a handful, but today it is numerous and limitless. Therefore, Samuels's emphasis on Ben Rhodes is not particularly credible, and certainly, Barack Obama relied on numerous other advisors to formulate his national security strategy, even if the final drafting was done by Ben Rhodes. David Samuels is the type of writer who constructs an image of his subject using their own words and writings, so what the author ultimately wants to convey is documented as being said by the subject. Samuels quotes Ben Rhodes stating that on January 12, hours before the last "State of the Union" speech (which Presidents typically deliver to Congress to report on the state of the country along with current and future plans), he had lunch with the President and reviewed his notes prepared for that day's speech. For five weeks prior, Ben Rhodes had been shaping the President's thoughts for this final address to Congress. However, that day, suddenly a news report appeared on television indicating the detention of two small boats and ten American sailors in the Persian Gulf. Ben Rhodes was quickly informed about the incident but tried to keep it out of the headlines to ensure the President's speech proceeded as planned. At the same time, he knew that important secrets could not be kept hidden for more than two hours. The author's narrative of the President's report and his closest national security advisor, Ben Rhodes, ultimately accuses Barack Obama of crafting the "story" of the nuclear deal with Iran in such a way that negotiations with Iran began in 2013, the year Hassan Rouhani, the moderate President of Iran, took office, while the reality indicates that negotiations started in mid-2012 when hardliners still held power in Iran. This idea that a new reality has emerged in Iran was politically significant for the Obama administration as it supported his policy of rapprochement with Iran. Furthermore, according to David Samuels, the U.S. government and Obama's national security advisor exploited maximum support from cyberspace and information technology, using a circle of journalists covering the White House to present reality in a way that directed 21st-century thoughts in the direction they desired. The author then describes the trip of Jake Sullivan, a close aide to Hillary Clinton, who traveled to Muscat, the capital of Oman, in 2012 to convey the White House's message to the Iranians. The summary of the message was: "We are ready to establish a direct channel for a nuclear agreement, if you are prepared to obtain permission at the highest levels and commit to a new dialogue on these issues at the highest levels." This idea that a new reality has emerged in Iran was politically significant for the Obama administration as it supported his policy of rapprochement with Iran. Furthermore, according to David Samuels, the U.S. government and Obama's national security advisor exploited maximum support from cyberspace and information technology, using a circle of journalists covering the White House to present reality in a way that directed 21st-century thoughts in the direction they desired. Representatives from the State Department, including Wendy Sherman and Secretary of State John Kerry, engaged in formal negotiations with the Iranians to reach an agreement on the details of a framework. According to Samuels, the scenario for negotiations was written in Ben Rhodes's war room and disseminated by the White House's team of journalists and press representatives. As Rhodes himself claims, "They were echoing the words we delivered to them." Last spring, a legion of arms control experts appeared in think tanks and social media, becoming news sources and quotes for hundreds of journalists who were unaware of the facts. According to Ben Rhodes, an "echo chamber" was created that reflected the words we were telling them. In parts of Samuels's writing, the impression is created that Rhodes wanted to demonstrate that Obama's strategy to persuade domestic opponents of the nuclear agreement was thoroughly calculated, and he was personally very satisfied with the approach taken. He describes the opponents of the deal as having been "driven mad." Another point emphasized by Ben Rhodes is the issue of U.S. foreign policy and the President's efforts to reshape it. Rhodes states that U.S. foreign policy is the result of groupthink. However, David Samuels uses the term "Blob" to describe a thick, water-like bubble. He believes that Hillary Clinton, Robert Gates, and other supporters of the Iraq War from both parties belong to this "Blob" that now regularly laments the disintegration of the U.S. security system in Europe and the Middle East, while Obama is not a standard Democrat and is unhappy that foreign policy is the result of groupthink. In Obama's foreign policy behavior and rhetoric, there is a clarity that indicates he does not follow the groupthink approach. Samuels also quotes other individuals such as Leon Panetta, who once headed the CIA during Obama's presidency. The author asks Panetta whether the agency's assessment regarding Iran confirms the existence of both hardline and moderate factions. Panetta's answer is "no." He does not directly respond to the question but implicitly expresses doubt about the role of moderates. "There is no doubt that the Quds Force and the country's leadership operate with the power of arms." The author also asks Panetta whether he has ever seen the letters that Obama claims to have sent to Khamenei in 2007 and 2009 while he was head of the CIA or the Department of Defense. Panetta's answer is again negative. In the continuation of the conversation, Panetta confirms that one of his toughest tasks while serving as Secretary of Defense was to prevent Netanyahu and his Defense Minister Ehud Barak from unilaterally bombing Iran's nuclear facilities. According to Samuels, Obama's team used figures like Leon Panetta, Robert Gates, and Hillary Clinton as cover to end the Iraq War. The situation with Iran is similar to Obama's approach in Iraq. Panetta states that Obama's mindset was, "I am someone who wants to end these wars, and the last thing I need is another war." Heightened sanctions against Iran could trigger another war. Opposition to Iranian interests in Syria could also spark another war. In another part of the article, the influential institutions in the United States are referenced, with Ben Rhodes stating that Obama does not believe in the thinking of influential institutions and underestimates them. "The absence of government in vast areas of the Middle East" is the result of America's influential institutions. Samuels's article presents an image of Ben Rhodes, who is the speechwriter for the President and considered one of Obama's most influential aides, that aligns with the image of his boss, Barack Obama, and is precisely a messaging machine aimed at garnering support for the President. This is done through processing narratives that are not based on reality. Rhodes kept the news of the detention of American sailors hidden on the day Obama delivered his speech in Congress. The article, quoting Ben Rhodes and his colleagues, shows how social media, journalists, and aligned interest groups were employed to disseminate a narrative of the nuclear deal with Iran that the White House desired. The publication of this article has generated significant positive and negative reactions across various levels of American society, and on Monday, the White House sought to neutralize the damage caused by Ben Rhodes, one of the President's closest aides. The author of the article, David Samuels, 49, is known for writing long-form journalistic reports. He grew up in Brooklyn (New York) and holds a master's degree from Princeton University. He works with prominent publications in American society such as The Atlantic, The New Yorker, and The New York Times. One of his most famous writings is an article about Yasser Arafat published in September 2005 in The Atlantic, which placed him on the finalist list for the National Journalism Award, and many critics wrote reviews about it. In the opinion of this analyst, the impact of Samuels's recent article, in addition to exposing the practical policy process and how media resources are utilized in politics, could serve as an important reference for future American policymakers for a long time. What is unclear is the author's objective in publishing this article. It seems the author was pursuing several simultaneous goals: First, that the political system of Iran, whether during Hassan Rouhani's presidency or before, is a system that cannot be precisely defined by the attributes of hardliners and moderates, as the country is governed by the leadership and the IRGC, and Rouhani and Zarif have only had specific missions for a short period. Second, that the nuclear deal with Iran has been agreed upon and signed at the highest levels, but the President of the United States had to package it in a way that would be acceptable to democracy to justify the deal with a hardline Islamic regime. Naturally, Barack Obama, the President of the United States, had a strong justification based on national interests for this deal, but considering the rivalry between the two competing parties at that specific moment, he maximally exploited various advertising, technological, and scientific arguments. Third, that any future U.S. government, regardless of party affiliation, can refer to the arguments presented in this article and the extensive discussions that have recently begun around it to shape U.S. policy around the national interests of the time without any specific commitment to the nuclear agreement. Fourth, that the hardliner-moderate divide regarding Iran may not be accurate, as there are also efforts within Iran to deny the existence of a moderate line; however, at the same time, the Iranian nation and the international community witnessed an undeniable reality during the process of reaching the nuclear agreement: the Islamic Republic can sit at the same tables as other prominent members of the international community, argue, oppose, rule, threaten, become angry, and show leniency.