The U.S. and Europe; An Unprecedented Rift That Is Deepening

With the recent action of the Trump administration to downgrade the legal status of the European Union and the increased pressure to isolate Germany and France regarding the JCPOA, the divergence between the two sides of the Atlantic has taken on new dimensions. This rift may not be repaired even with the departure of the Trump administration, but placing hope in such divisions in Tehran and elsewhere is futile and without perspective. The gap between North America and a unified Europe, formed after the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, is deepening more than ever. This rift and divergence, while not unexpected with the end of the Cold War and the elimination of a common enemy called the Soviet Union and communism, first became evident during the George W. Bush era and the U.S. war against Iraq. However, in the subsequent period, despite the U.S. strategic focus on the Asia-Pacific region and the diminishing importance of Europe in U.S. national security strategy, the Obama administration, which considered itself committed to multilateralism, somewhat repaired relations across the Atlantic, and U.S.-European relations, despite some international disagreements, perhaps experienced their last relatively cohesive and aligned period; although even during this time, the failure of the project to create a free trade area of 800 million people across the Atlantic was not due to support for convergence and alignment. Trump, however, indicated during his election campaign that he had issues with the European Union and believed that U.S. interests could be better served in relations with individual countries rather than with a group of them that are gathered in this or that alliance and possess greater power. His indifference or negative view towards international institutions that resulted from the alliance and convergence of both sides of the Atlantic after World War II (such as the United Nations, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, World Trade Organization, NATO, etc.) and withdrawal from various new collective agreements centered around Europe and previous U.S. administrations can also be evaluated in this context. During the Brexit referendum, Trump did not hide his joy at the majority vote of the island's residents for this exit, describing it as a 'smart move.' Last summer, during his visit to London, he warned Prime Minister Theresa May not to enter into a deal that would maintain extensive economic relations between her country and Brussels during the exit from the Union, as such a deal would make 'a new trade agreement between the U.S. and the U.K. impossible.' The choice of Poland, a selection with multiple objectives, is also indicative. Trump's warm relations with those EU member states whose governments are in the hands of populist right-wing parties (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Italy, Austria, etc.) reflect this. These governments see themselves, like Trump, as revitalizers of national government power and oppose some globalization trends such as immigration and the influx of migrants into Europe. In this context, they have a negative and critical view of the power of EU institutions and decision-making, and although leaving the EU is not their top priority, they strive to reduce the power of Brussels and the core countries of the Union, such as Germany and France. In mid-2017, during a trip to Poland, Trump praised the country's confrontational policies with Brussels, stating, 'Let us all fight and strive like Poland, for family, for our country's independence, and for God. The people and government of Poland must stand and not be intimidated by the European Union.' In line with the exit from the JCPOA, the Trump administration initially attempted to rally European countries that were part of this agreement, an effort that was unsuccessful, and the U.S. exited alone. The disagreement over this exit has effectively deepened the rift between Washington and the other side of the Atlantic, without the European Union having strong mechanisms to counter the revival of U.S. sanctions against Iran or being able to take deterrent action against U.S. pressure on European companies to exit Iran. Even when the European Union requested that the Trump administration exempt the entire Union from oil sanctions against Iran, Washington paid no heed and only included two countries, namely Italy and Greece, which have more or less problems with the European Union, in this exemption. The U.S. efforts to isolate Germany and France, as the two main countries of the European Union that insist on maintaining the JCPOA, are also intensifying. This helps to understand why Washington has chosen Poland as the venue for a conference aimed at creating a stronger global consensus against Iran. Poland is in the heart of Europe and, both geographically and symbolically, the conference scheduled for late February will have a more global aspect and will elevate the issue of Iran beyond a purely regional matter. Furthermore, Poland symbolizes the close political, security, and energy ties of Eastern Europe with the U.S. and this region's opposition in various fields to the institutions of the European Union and the two major powers of this Union, namely Germany and France. Therefore, the conference could further deepen the rift within the Union over Iran and isolate Paris and Berlin, the main defenders of maintaining the JCPOA, especially as countries like Denmark and the Netherlands, which traditionally have close relations with Washington, are increasingly aligning with Eastern Europe and the U.S. Additionally, Poland has close relations with both Israel and Arab countries, which are likely to be key pillars of the aforementioned conference, and it is possible that the U.S. government will announce all or part of the plan related to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at this conference, further paving the way for Arab-Israeli cooperation in exerting pressure on Iran. In Western Europe, the Trump administration has also found more allies. Last October, when the disagreement between the European Union and the populist government of Italy over the borrowing ceiling in the country's budget for the upcoming year escalated, Trump openly supported the Italian government in a tweet. At the same time, praising the new Italian government's strict policies towards refugees, which are contentious within the European Union, he described this policy as aligned with the White House's policies and on the right track. The Italian Prime Minister also positively reacted to Trump's remarks, speaking of the many factors that bind the two countries together and stating, 'We (in terms of positions) are a spirit in two bodies.' Such statements regarding the European Union are not only seen in Trump's rhetoric and positions but also in those of newer members of his administration, such as Mike Pompeo (Secretary of State) and John Bolton (National Security Advisor), who share similar views. In the latest such remarks a month ago, Mike Pompeo, in a fundamental speech at the German Marshall Fund in Brussels, spoke negatively about the European Union, explicitly stating, 'Member countries should ask themselves whether this Union serves the interests of these countries and their peoples or serves a group of bureaucrats in Brussels.' Richard Grenell, the U.S. ambassador to Germany, who is referred to as 'mini-Trump,' has also made it clear that Washington is better aligned with populist governments like that of Austria and is seeking to strengthen such governments throughout Europe. Many circles and experts believe that Steve Bannon's efforts to strengthen right-wing populist parties in Europe are not without the knowledge and coordination of the White House. In the context of the tariff wars and the Trump administration's efforts to reduce the trade deficit between Europe and the U.S., Washington has, instead of focusing on negotiations with EU officials and institutions or countries like Germany and France, effectively been in contact with large companies in these countries based on persuasion and threats. Brussels' criticism of Washington and these companies for bypassing the responsible institutions of the Union has found little receptive audience. Trump's criticisms of the low contributions of European countries to NATO funding or Washington's almost unexpected move to withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), which primarily concerns European security, or Europe's intensified efforts to create military and security structures independent of the U.S. (regardless of how successful these efforts may be) have all significantly exacerbated the rift between the two sides of the Atlantic in recent months. Washington's support for some Eastern European and Baltic governments opposing the current project to create a second gas pipeline from Russia (Nord Stream 2) to Germany through the North Sea and the forced direction of Germany and some other European countries to buy gas from the U.S. have also caused dissatisfaction in Berlin and some other European capitals, especially since the U.S. ambassador in Germany has directly threatened private companies involved in the Nord Stream 2 project with U.S. sanctions through written letters. In such circumstances, the recent action of the U.S. State Department to downgrade the legal status and position of the European Union has sparked more anger and astonishment in Brussels, Berlin, Paris, and some other European capitals, further widening the distances and alienations. With the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, which was approved in 2009 and is considered the constitution of the European Union, countries have recognized the Union as a country in international relations, whereas previously they interacted with it as an international institution. In 2016, the Obama administration also elevated the EU's status in U.S. diplomatic relations, welcoming the Union's ambassador as a country. Although there have been signs for some time indicating a reconsideration by the Trump administration in this regard, the failure to invite the EU ambassador to the memorial ceremony for the late George W. Bush held in Washington in late December left no doubt that the European Union has been downgraded in the U.S. This action was taken without the contact or knowledge of the European Union. Whether the EU's objections to this issue will yield results is doubtful. On the contrary, the trends of the past year or two have shown that 2019 may see more divergence rather than convergence across the Atlantic. The overall international developments and the equations related to the globalizing tug-of-war are not in a direction that the departure of the Trump administration would possibly create a fundamental shift in this divergence. While it is not yet predictable which side will ultimately benefit or suffer more from this divergence, for the time being, Europe may not have many levers to counter the ongoing trend and solidify its position in the increasingly competitive environment that is forming. The strategic link of the Union with China and Russia is also not in sight for fundamental and non-fundamental reasons. Practically, the issue of the JCPOA and Europe's weakness in taking practical action against the U.S. exit and mitigating its sanctions effects against Iran is also quite telling. This indicates that for countries like Iran, any illusion and expectation of the emergence of differences in the international arena and the rise of various poles in a way that would overshadow U.S. dominance for the time being is futile, and thus the necessity of reforming regional and international policies and moving towards interaction on a global scale and maintaining relations with all parties remains unnegotiable.