The U.S., Europe, and the Half-Full and Half-Empty Perspectives on the Nuclear Agreement with Iran

The publication of a six-month report on Iran's implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2231 and the commitments outlined in the nuclear agreement of July 15, 2015, known in Iran as the JCPOA, has elicited varied reactions among the permanent members of the Security Council: while the U.S. highlighted the empty half of the agreement, Europe seemed pleased with the full half. The U.S. government apparently has not yet completed its comprehensive assessments to decide whether to maintain or abandon the nuclear agreement with Iran, and in this regard, Nikki Haley, the U.S. Ambassador to the UN, stated that Washington temporarily respects this agreement solely to prevent Iran from moving towards a bomb. Washington identifies Iran as a repeated violator of UN Security Council Resolution 2231 and cites ballistic missile tests in Iran as evidence of this claim. The Islamic Republic claimed early on Sunday, June 18, that it had launched six ballistic missiles, 'Zolfaqar' and 'Qiam,' to punish ISIS members near Deir ez-Zor, close to the Iraq-Syria border. Beyond the expressed doubts about the technical efficacy of these missiles, whether all of them reached their designated targets, and the actual extent of the destruction caused, the use of missiles in Syria, as predicted (in last week's article by the author), was cited in the UN as a violation of the Security Council resolution. Nikki Haley, representing a country that is a party to the original nuclear agreement with Iran, also criticized the Security Council for its indifference to violations of the JCPOA by Iran, including 'efforts to purchase technical equipment for missile production and proven cases of arms smuggling.' Other criticisms from the U.S. towards the Islamic Republic include 'Iran's destabilizing role in the region and Tehran's arming and supporting of terrorist groups in the area.' Contrary to Ms. Haley, whose perspective aligns with the current U.S. government's focus on the destructive role of the Islamic Republic, Jeffrey Feltman, the senior political advisor to the UN Secretary-General, who is also American, along with Jao Valdi, the EU Ambassador to the UN, and the ambassadors of China and Russia, focused on the positive half of the glass and cited seven positive reports from the International Atomic Energy Agency regarding Iran's cooperation as evidence of satisfaction. Mr. Feltman, whose statements align more with the foreign policy of the Obama administration than that of Trump, claimed that the UN Secretary-General is 'deeply satisfied with the cooperation of all parties to the nuclear agreement with Iran and the fulfillment of their commitments' at a time when world peace faces other nuclear threats. The EU representative, speaking on behalf of Ms. Mogherini, assured that Iran's nuclear program (with military dimensions) has been pushed back several years and that the JCPOA is the best means to exercise control and oversight over it. Amid these two critical and encouraging perspectives, the clear reality is that since the signing of the nuclear agreement and the implementation of its provisions, Iran's presence in the region has become more pronounced compared to the time before the nuclear agreement. The lifting of sanctions and the resumption of oil exports, along with the reduction of many banking and trade transaction barriers, have provided the Islamic Republic with billions of dollars in liquid assets that it was previously deprived of. Without foreign currency revenues, the government and the ruling establishment would not have been able to finance the arming of thousands of men for conducting military operations abroad and maintaining Assad's government against the threat of collapse. If the nuclear agreement had not come to fruition due to pressure from the IRGC and hardliners, as Ahmadinejad previously attempted and failed, and even had his hand curtailed from intervening in nuclear affairs, the potential nuclear capacity, even if secured, would not have been able to be converted into another value and would have become a coin in the hands of a hungry man without the right to spend it or the possibility of converting its hypothetical value. The government and the military of the Islamic regime in Tehran are well aware of this point. They know that returning to square one is not only very costly and difficult but also a futile and fruitless endeavor. Reviving Iran's neutralized military nuclear capacity, by bypassing the JCPOA, will not improve 'Iran's presence in the region,' which the Tehran government refers to as 'influence in the region.' For this reason and several other stronger reasons, including the intensification of economic recession and the employment crisis and the unpredictable reaction of internal discontent, among others, alongside the Islamic regime's increasing regional isolation, targeted missile launches can only serve to fuel policies that deem the Islamic Republic irreparable and target it in its current entirety and essence.