The 'Unity of the Nation'; The Trials of Democratic Transition

A renewed reformist effort through the establishment of the 'Unity of the Islamic Nation of Iran' party has provided reformists with a significant party once again. While the activities of the 'Islamic Participation Front' have been declared illegal by the judiciary for over five years, a group of prominent figures and its members have now gathered in a new party. The activities of this party in the crucial six months leading up to the parliamentary and Assembly of Experts elections, as well as the way security and judicial institutions interact with it, will clarify aspects of the current political situation in Iran. Regardless of how much the reformism of the Second of Khordad can still be considered a viable strategy or whether it will succeed, the birth of 'Unity of the Nation' is a testament to the insistence of a spectrum of political forces to act within the constraints and prohibitions of political-security limitations. As Ali Shakouri Rad, the party's secretary-general, stated at its first congress, 'Reforms' are 'nothing but accountability of power institutions, determining the fate of the people by the people themselves, and the rotation of elites through the ballot boxes,' and the reformists associated with this party pursue the grand ideals of the revolution such as independence, freedom, and justice, as well as the aspirations and goals of reforms like civil society, freedom of expression, and defense of the rights of the nation. However, Shakouri Rad and the senior founding members of the party are undoubtedly aware of the existing limitations, constraints, and threats ahead. He and some other members have the experience of being detained after the 2009 elections and are not oblivious to the sensitivities of security and judicial institutions regarding themselves. Nevertheless, they strive — as the party's secretary-general has emphasized — to take a step towards strengthening civil society and defending the rights of the nation within the existing framework and conditions. The establishment and birth of Unity of the Nation by reformists under threat and restriction is somewhat reminiscent of the efforts and resilience of journalists, especially since the Second of Khordad 1997. Despite the notorious mass censorship of spring 2000 and the ongoing repression of non-aligned newspapers, the light of independent and semi-independent journalism has not been extinguished, and alternatives, albeit fainter, have become active. Now, from another angle (organizational action), reformists are trying to create a new opportunity for collective and political action for part of their social base despite the prohibition of the activities of the Islamic Participation Front and the Organization of the Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution. The desire and project of the reformists gathered around the banner of 'Unity of the Nation,' however — as was to be expected — has faced a sharp and negative reaction from authoritarian figures. The uproar of the propaganda arms of the totalitarianists (including the Kayhan newspaper) aside; less than a week after the establishment of the Unity of the Nation party, the head of the judiciary of the Islamic Republic has harshly targeted this reformist group. 'Some individuals who were agitators during the 2009 unrest and some of whom are convicted have now come to change their appearance and create parties to enter the scene.' This reaction from Sadegh Amoli Larijani to the birth of Unity of the Nation was made alongside his sharp criticism of Rouhani — for criticizing the supervisory oversight. The head of the judiciary emphasized that 'elections and their integrity are important issues' and criticized the activities of 'individuals who change their colors,' stating: 'The Guardian Council must be vigilant and firmly stand by the values of the revolution.' Sadegh Larijani, who controls one of the repressive institutions in the regime based on the rule of the jurist, stated that 'we cannot hand the country over to those who do not accept the Islamic Republic of Iran, nor the rule of the jurist, nor the constitution, and only say some things that they do not mean, and when they come to power, they go back on all these statements. Were they not the ones who made statements that did not align with any part of the constitution?' It is clear that the hard power institutions, as they have shown regarding reformist newspapers, will not show any goodwill towards reformist parties. 'Unity of the Nation,' if it continues its political presence in civil society, will be an effective party in the upcoming parliamentary elections (March 2016). The flag of this party carries and symbolizes the social capital of a significant part of Second of Khordad reformism. A noticeable success of the list of candidates supported by this party will not be unexpected, especially in the current political-social climate in Iran (after the 2013 elections and following the initial nuclear agreement with the West). From this perspective, the new efforts of Second of Khordad reformists — some of whom carry the experience of the 2009 elections and the subsequent repression — will increase the chances of changing the composition of the parliament and aligning it with Rouhani's government. If this party continues its activities, reforms step by step (gradually) and increasing democratization, although time-consuming, will be realized and will have inevitable social and political consequences. Regardless of those who agree with this strategy; the birth of 'Unity of the Nation' is also a happy event for those who, after evaluating eight years of reforms and the experience of the 2009 electoral coup, are disappointed with the success of Second of Khordad reformism. Because the essence of increasing political group activities and strengthening social networks, and revitalizing and strengthening civil society means increasing the potential of social movements supporting democratic transition. From this perspective, the activities of the 'Unity of the Nation' party or similar actions provide a platform for the experience of collective work among some young people interested in political activity and also for the cooperation and alignment of a spectrum of the social base seeking change. Can the 'Unity of the Nation' party and reformists confront the supervisory oversight of the Guardian Council? This is an important question that has become particularly prominent following the recent remarks of the head of the judiciary. The answer to this question is not very difficult. Abdullah Ramazanzadeh, a senior member of the Islamic Participation Front, recently stated in a noteworthy comment that 'reformists have no tools to prevent illegal behaviors (such as the supervisory oversight of the Guardian Council in parliamentary elections).' The spokesman for the reformist government recalls the experience of the seventh parliamentary elections; at a time when the sixth parliament was filled with reformists and the Khatami government was in power, the Guardian Council, without any pretense, directed mass disqualifications towards the reformist camp and the candidates of its main parties. Based on such an experience, and in the context of the established political and security realities — which it is unlikely that anyone will deny, especially after the 2009 elections — to what extent can a party like 'Unity of the Nation' influence the illegal behavior of the Guardian Council in elections? Furthermore, how will it respond to the mass disqualifications of its own members? The answer to these questions and similar inquiries is intertwined with the strategies of political forces. It is not in vain that for a spectrum of political forces concerned about the transition to democracy, the paths lead to civil society and the social force emerging from the public sphere. These individuals — of whom the leaders of the Green Movement can be described as prominent figures — have adopted a community-centered political approach based on an assessment of the experience of the reform period and the 2009 electoral coup. A strategy that, while not indifferent to changes in the political structure of power and also to the electoral processes and the contexts arising from it, is concerned with the formation of a social force supporting democratic transition, believes in the revitalization of civil society and the strengthening of the public sphere, and thinks about the real, active, and effective participation of citizens in political processes. An approach that carries the experience of the Green Movement and believes that the prevailing authoritarianism will only take a step back in the face of a defined and manifested social force.