The Unripe Fruit of Rouhani's Domestic Politics and the Paradox of Political Opening

Hassan Rouhani's press conference during Government Week provides a suitable opportunity to evaluate the performance of the moderate government at its halfway point. In response to questions, Rouhani attempted to present a positive and successful image of the government and keep hopes alive for the realization of promises. Rouhani's performance, which bears the burden of responding to criticisms almost entirely on his shoulders, is acceptable in the areas of foreign policy and economics given the conditions and severity of the damage left by the previous administration. However, the weak point of the moderate government's record is domestic policy. The cultural space has improved to some extent, but there has not been a significant change compared to the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Rouhani claimed that the moderate government has sought to create a reconciliatory, peaceful, and brotherly relationship among factions, parties, groups, ethnicities, religions, and sects in the country and has repaired social rifts. Observing the realities of the country reveals the promotional and exaggerated nature of this claim. The intensity of the police atmosphere in the political arena has somewhat decreased, but its shadow still looms large. Groups that were targeted after 2009 and classic critics and opponents of the Islamic Republic continue to struggle with various limitations. The confrontational atmosphere between the two factions has not significantly diminished either. The moderation of the conflictual atmosphere is due to the absence of electoral competitions, and it is predicted that confrontations in the upcoming elections for the 10th Parliament and the 5th Assembly of Experts will reignite competition and lead to tension-filled conflicts. Some military and security forces are already warning that events similar to those of 2009 may recur in the upcoming elections. Rouhani claimed that the government's efforts have been aimed at creating stability and calm in the country. However, stability has not been achieved in the past two years; rather, the relative calm is more a product of the stagnation of critical political and social activities, especially in the field. Pressure on political and civil organizations has lessened, and reformist political groups have found more room for activity, but they have not yet reached the level of activity seen during Ahmadinejad's first presidential term in 2009. In universities, Rouhani's government started relatively well, but after the impeachment of Faraji Dana and the appointment of Mohammad Farhadi as Minister of Science, the situation has gradually reversed. Therefore, Rouhani, aware of this reality, claimed that the government has currently laid the groundwork for political and social matters and deferred the realization of promises to the future. His response to a question from the newspaper 'Mardomsalari' regarding actions taken to lift the house arrest indicates that Rouhani does not have a short-term plan for resolving major political issues and is trying to embed his desired policy of patience and tolerance through diplomatic responses. However, the problem is that Rouhani's strategy does not provide an effective capacity for solving fundamental political problems and is more akin to a temporary remedy or limited openings based on pragmatism, the sustainability of which is seriously questionable. In justifying the failure to resolve the house arrest of Mousavi, Karroubi, and Rahnavard in the middle of the eleventh government’s term, Rouhani emphasized the efforts to prepare the groundwork and called for tolerance alongside engagement. His response suggested that there are more important issues than house arrest in the country. For a solution, patience is required to resolve the problem through behind-the-scenes negotiations. Although he hinted at the hardline conservatives who have turned the issue into a prolonged problem with slogans, he also emphasized the role of the judiciary in addressing violations. His response is characteristic of his usual approach, attempting to stand in the middle of both sides' positions. However, this method lacks the capability to resolve the issue of house arrest and fundamental political issues in Iran. Mousavi, Karroubi, and Rahnavard believe in the legitimacy of their actions, while on the other hand, the leadership and its affiliated institutions and supporting forces absolutely condemn their actions. Therefore, finding mutually acceptable solutions that would conclude the Green Movement and the protests of 2009 solely with the physical freedom of Mousavi, Karroubi, and Rahnavard is very difficult, if not impossible. So far, due to the sensitivity of nuclear negotiations, expectations from Rouhani regarding political and social openings have not been high. However, after the implementation of the JCPOA, the situation will change, and his preferred policy of patience and waiting will face challenges. If this situation continues for another two years, then the unfulfilled promises will become an obstacle to the continuation of his presidency. Rouhani maneuvers on the rule of law, but the main problem lies in the differing interpretations of the law within the political system, where the philosophy of law has historically been based on 'the ruler’s decree' and ideological interpretation rather than 'public interest.' In the formal structure of the government, the executive branch has no role in interpreting the constitution and ordinary laws. The parliamentary elections and the activities of reformist parties and opposition forces will be a serious test for Rouhani's government in the political arena. Although he has already clarified that in his vision of moderation, only those forces that distanced themselves from Mousavi and Karroubi after the leadership's stance in 2009 and particularly did not participate in the protests aligned with the Arab Spring are allowed to engage in formal political activities. The Ministry of Intelligence's actions against the National Front and preventing their meetings even in private homes are revealing in this regard. From one perspective, Rouhani's close circle is not inclined to allow the political arena of the system to enter a new arrangement, and the previous polarizations to be redefined with a new definition of reformism and the transformation of moderation into a discourse of change. From their viewpoint, even depoliticization has value so that with minimal demands and a shift in focus to economic, cultural areas, and the Chinese model of modernization, the retreats and sterility of the moderate government in the political sphere are not seriously challenged. Rouhani's special attention to forming a coalition consisting of Ali Larijani, centrist reformists, and moderates is noteworthy. In this environment, it seems unlikely that Rouhani will be keen on revoking the dissolution of parties like the Participation Front and the Mojahedin of the Revolution, and he will probably defer resolving these issues to an uncertain future. From another perspective, the limitations faced by reformists, the symbolic leaders of the Green Movement, and non-affiliated individuals serve as an advantage for Rouhani's circle to present themselves as the only viable option to the forces opposed to the current situation. It is not incorrect to say that there is a paradoxical relationship between Rouhani's public position and political opening. If a significant political opening occurs, then options with greater social acceptance will attract the attention of reformist and change-seeking forces, and there will no longer be a reason to accept the model of preferring the lesser evil. If nothing happens, Rouhani's social base will face erosion, and the survival of the moderate government will be threatened. The conservative rivals are also waiting for the decline of Rouhani's government in the post-nuclear agreement era, although in this regard, the top of the power hierarchy must decide, considering the level of cohesion among conservatives, whether political expediency still dictates that the small window opened in the political arena remains or whether the space should be closed again. Of course, in the path of political opening, unlike nuclear negotiations, Rouhani does not align with the dominant power and leadership, and the conflict of policies engages the government's capacity. However, the obstruction and resistance of appointed institutions, while a threat to Rouhani, also represent an opportunity. If he can neutralize the threats in such a way that they do not jeopardize the survival of the moderate government, then he can navigate the boulders of authoritarian resistance for the continuation of guided political opening and benefit gradually, justifying to the social base that patience and tolerance are needed to overcome the resistances. Also, in the absence of a rival in the political change arena, he can maintain his exclusive position. However, achieving this process requires that the current stagnant atmosphere and the hegemony of government-centered approaches be preserved. Changes in the public sphere and social space and the renewed mobilization of community-centered approaches have the potential to disrupt the equations. Developments within the power bloc and the confrontation between hardliners and moderates are also other determining factors. The uncertain and fragile state of politics in Iran and the turbulent regional situation make predictions difficult. However, it is unlikely that the relative calm that prevailed during the first two years of the moderate government's term will continue in the second half, and Rouhani's expected patience will be implemented without a specific and acceptable timeframe in the social sphere. The unripe fruit of domestic politics needs to ripen in a not-too-distant time. Otherwise, it may fall from the tree in the endless maze of slogans, unfulfilled promises, and unproductive rhetoric.