The Ups and Downs of Hamas Relations with the Islamic Republic

In the literature of the Islamic Republic, the term "Axis of Resistance" holds significant importance, and even after becoming embroiled in the Syrian crisis and standing against the people of that country, receiving the label of supporting sectarianism in the region and confronting the Sunni world, this term is still widely used by Iranian media and its supporters in the region. The "Axis of Resistance" refers to three entities: Hezbollah of Lebanon, Hamas, and the Islamic Jihad of Palestine, which are committed to fighting Israel and rejecting the Middle East peace process. Hezbollah has lost its previous standing in the Sunni world due to its Shiite-oriented ideology, strict adherence to the policies of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in the region, and involvement in the Syrian war. The Islamic Jihad attempts to maintain its relations with Iran, but it does not accept the Islamic Republic's demands outside the issue of fighting Israel. In recent months, "Iran-Khamenei" has made two significant requests of the Islamic Jihad: first, to join the forces of Bashar al-Assad and Ahmad Jibril in the Yarmouk camp against the opponents of the Damascus regime, and second, to issue a statement condemning the Arab coalition led by Saudi Arabia's attack on the Houthis in Yemen. The Islamic Jihad rejected both requests, stating that it would not interfere in any other matters besides the issue of Israel. The Islamic Republic's response was to cut financial and military aid to the Islamic Jihad and to strengthen a new splinter group within this Palestinian faction called the "Saberin Movement," led by an individual named "Hesham Salim," who was previously considered a member of the Islamic Jihad. The emblem of this group closely resembles that of Hezbollah and follows the regional policies of the Islamic Republic. Iran-Khamenei invited the leader of this group to Tehran, and the Islamic Jihad accuses the Iranian officials of providing the requested aid to this group. Abdullah Shalah, the Secretary-General of the Islamic Jihad, discussed this issue with Iranian leaders during his last visit to Tehran and requested guarantees from the Islamic Republic that it would not continue its aid to the Saberins, but he did not receive any results. However, the Hamas movement holds a special position in the Islamic Republic's "Axis of Resistance." On one hand, this entity is part of the Muslim Brotherhood, which has influential supporters among a wide range of regional Islamists and some governments, and on the other hand, it is the largest Sunni Palestinian group associated with the Islamic Republic, which Iran could use to dispel accusations of sectarianism. However, with the severance of relations with Hamas, the Islamic Republic becomes defenseless against accusations of Shiism and sectarianism in the Sunni world. Another problem for the Islamic Republic with Hamas is that this movement is so large and diverse that the Iranian government cannot easily create a parallel group for it, and all efforts in this direction have so far failed. The history of relations between Iran and Hamas began three years after the formation of this Palestinian group when the first conference to support the Palestinian Intifada was held in Tehran in 1990. At this conference, the Islamic Republic invited "Khalil Qouqa," one of the leaders of Hamas. The following year, at a conference of the same name, Hamas members had a significant presence in Tehran and requested Iran to establish a permanent representative office for them in Tehran. This office was immediately established, and "Imad Alami" began his activities as the ambassador of Hamas in the Iranian capital alongside the Palestinian ambassador. This event coincided with Yasser Arafat's acceptance of the Madrid and Oslo peace processes, against which the Islamic Republic had launched extensive attacks, labeling it as the "line of compromise." Thus, the Islamic Republic found its lost ally among the Palestinians and began to develop its relations with Hamas to confront Yasser Arafat directly. Undoubtedly, Hamas could not have reached its current extent without financial and military assistance from Iran. In 1992, Israel exiled 400 Hamas and Islamic Jihad activists to an area in southern Lebanon called "Marj al-Zuhur," which opened the door to relations between Hamas and Hezbollah and subsequently the Islamic Republic more than ever before. During this period, Hezbollah's military experience, supported by Iran, was transferred to Palestinian groups, with Hamas benefiting more than others. They learned from Hezbollah how to use small and medium weapons and how to employ explosives for their political objectives. In 1998, Ahmad Yasin, the spiritual leader of Hamas, traveled to Iran after being released from prison, where Iranian officials warmly welcomed him. During this period, relations between Hamas and the Islamic Republic entered into major plans with no turning back, and the Hamas representative in Tehran, without an embassy, was one of the most active foreign figures in Iran, with some regional diplomats turning to him to test their closeness to the Iranian government. In 2006, a significant political transformation occurred in the Palestinian Authority when Hamas participated in local elections and subsequently won. The Hamas movement secured 60% of the seats in the Palestinian parliament, and Ali Khamenei, the leader of Iran, was happier than the Hamas members themselves. Ismail Haniyeh, the elected Prime Minister, was invited to Tehran, and it was decided that a billion dollars in financial aid from the Islamic Republic would be provided to the Palestinian government in two phases. A few months later, the Hamas government fell due to the separation of Gaza from the West Bank, but the Islamic Republic still considered it the legitimate government of Palestine and increased its aid to the Gaza Strip more than before. Ali Khamenei repeatedly praised Hamas and its self-proclaimed government in Gaza in his speeches, stating that the Islamic Republic's duty was to assist Gaza in all aspects. At this stage, Israel accused the Islamic Republic of sending missiles to Hamas via the sea and the Sinai desert, and in the three subsequent wars, Hamas demonstrated a significantly higher defensive capability compared to the past, a superiority achieved thanks to the Islamic Republic, a fact that Hamas leaders later acknowledged and thanked Iranian leaders for. With the onset of the Arab Spring revolutions and their arrival in Syria, the golden era of relations between Hamas and Iran came to an end, as Hamas, contrary to the expectations and desires of Iranian leaders, defended the Syrian people's right to free themselves from tyranny, and Khaled Mashal, the head of Hamas's political bureau, left Damascus. From early 2011 until the summer of 2014, when Israel attacked Gaza once again, relations between Hamas and Iran reached their lowest point. However, after the summer 2014 war with Israel, several Hamas leaders were once again invited to Tehran, and in March 2015, Ali Larijani, the Speaker of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, met with Khaled Mashal in Doha. During this time, Hassan Nasrallah, the Secretary-General of Hezbollah, Mohammad Ali Jafari, the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and Amir Abdollahian, the Deputy Foreign Minister, praised Hamas's resistance in its recent war with Israel. However, with Hamas's support for the Arab coalition led by Saudi Arabia in its attack on the Houthis and the subsequent visit of Hamas leaders to Riyadh, relations between Hamas and Iran once again cooled. The events in the Yarmouk camp Before the protests and then the uprisings in Syria in 2011, the Yarmouk camp in southern Damascus had a population of over half a million, but now that number has decreased to 20,000. Currently, there are 12 armed Palestinian groups in this camp, divided between pro and anti-Bashar al-Assad factions. In the events of April 2015, this camp, in which ISIS played a key role, saw one Palestinian group called "Aknaf Beit al-Maqdis" come to the forefront of regional news. Hamas is accused of having close ties with this jihadist group and assisting it. The killing of one of Hamas's leaders named "Yahya Hourani" in this area, on one hand, and the leadership of Aknaf Beit al-Maqdis by former Hamas members such as Muhammad Zaghmout, Khaled Mashal's personal bodyguard, and Nidal Abul-Ala, known as Abu Hamam, the personal bodyguard of Mousa Abu Marzouk, the deputy of Khaled Mashal, on the other hand, has further fueled these accusations. However, Hamas, which has adopted a policy of neutrality in the Syrian war, vehemently denies these accusations, although such allegations could anger Bashar al-Assad and, subsequently, the leaders of the Islamic Republic. Hamas claims that these two individuals have long been separated from their organization and were pursued by the Syrian government at the beginning of the Syrian revolution. Additionally, the name of Tarek Hamoud, Khaled Mashal's son-in-law, has emerged, with the Syrian government accusing him of assisting the opposition at the beginning of the country’s crisis, a claim that Hamas has strongly denied. Furthermore, Nayef Hawatmeh, the Secretary-General of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, stated that Aknaf Beit al-Maqdis shares the same ideological roots as the Muslim Brotherhood, a matter that could once again place the Hamas movement under suspicion for aiding this group. The future of Iran-Hamas relations The government of Hassan Rouhani may welcome a new opening with Western countries following the nuclear agreement and financial resource shortages, particularly at a time when some Western governments consider distancing from "terrorist" groups as a condition for developing relations with Iran. However, the structure of governance in Iran is such that it does not allow the current president to assert his views in this regard. The leadership apparatus, the Revolutionary Guards, and hardline clerics in Iran have tied their fate and that of Hezbollah to support for Hamas. The distancing of Iran-Khamenei from Hamas, based on the current regional conditions, will be temporary and transient unless the Supreme Leader and the Revolutionary Guards decide to make fundamental changes and completely distance themselves from what they call the "Axis of Resistance." Such a possibility is currently very unlikely, as the hardliners' insistence in Iran on adhering to the Axis of Resistance reflects more concern for their own future. In recent developments after the nuclear agreement, the Revolutionary Guards and their commanders remain on the sanctions list and evaluate the situation in such a way that Iran's new opening towards the West will come at the cost of sidelining them. Therefore, they will continue to emphasize the Axis of Resistance in the region as a pressure tool against Western governments and will not easily abandon their relationship with Hamas. On the other hand, the Hamas movement is also in dire need of Iranian assistance, and experience has shown them that no country, like the Islamic Republic, provides them with such generous support. However, their positioning indicates that they will not accept Iran's conditions for restoring relations. Especially since Bashar al-Assad's government is now on the brink of collapse, and the power of the Houthis in Yemen has also declined. Most importantly, the Hamas movement seeks its strategic depth in the Sunni world and does not want to be seen alongside a country that has been accused of sectarianism and its specific Shiism more than ever. Hamas expects that in the not-too-distant future, the Islamic Republic will abandon its conditions and, without granting any concessions, the Supreme Leader will once again pour his assistance towards them.