The Use of Chemical Weapons in the Battlefields of Iraq and Syria

The use of chemical weapons in the Middle East and the horrific physical and psychological consequences resulting from it has a history of fifty years. Egypt first employed the toxic gas 'Phosgene' (carbonyl chloride) and 'Mustard' gas against royalist forces and civilians in North Yemen on June 8, 1963. During the Iran-Iraq War, Saddam Hussein's army used various chemical weapons, including mustard gas and nerve gases 'VX' and 'Tabun', killing many Iranian forces and injuring about 100,000 of them. This same army, in another chemical attack on March 16, 1988, during the Anfal operation against the residents of the Kurdish region of Halabja, killed 5,000 people and injured at least 7,000 others. The recent use of these weapons in the battlefields of Syria and Iraq continues. The use of chemical weapons in Syria began nearly three years ago and peaked on August 21, 2013, with a series of chemical attacks by government forces in 'Ghouta' on the outskirts of Damascus. According to estimates by Human Rights Watch, at least 322 Syrians lost their lives as a result of these attacks. The Syrian government initially denied the occurrence of these attacks but later blamed the opposition, despite the fact that these attacks occurred in areas controlled by the Assad regime's opponents. Three weeks after this event, Damascus joined the 'Chemical Weapons Convention' to prevent U.S. airstrikes and military intervention in Syria, leading to the destruction of Syria's chemical weapons arsenal, approved by UN Security Council Resolution 2118 and supervised by inspectors from the 'Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons' (OPCW). In this process, several military personnel of the Syrian army destroyed missiles, bombs equipped with chemical agents, and their production facilities under the supervision of the aforementioned inspectors, and 600 tons of precursor materials for 'Sarin' and 'Mustard' gases were neutralized by transferring them to the U.S. ship 'Cape Ray'. On June 24, 2014, the inspectors of the 'Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons' announced that the last shipment of chemical materials for destruction had been transferred to the mentioned American ship, declaring the end of their work. Nevertheless, according to reports from some media, Syrian government forces carried out attacks using chlorine gas against opposition groups in 2014 and 2015. Chlorine gas, which has extensive industrial applications, is not subject to disarmament treaties, but its use as a chemical weapon, which caused approximately one million injuries and 100,000 deaths during World War I, is prohibited under the 'Chemical Weapons Convention'. These attacks, coupled with the late notification by the Syrian government to the 'Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons' regarding its past facilities and programs for producing the lethal substance 'Ricin', which occurred in late 2014, fueled international doubts about the complete destruction of Syria's chemical arsenal. Furthermore, in May 2015, inspectors from the 'Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons' reported that they had found signs of the nerve gases 'Sarin' and 'VX' in a Syrian military research center, which the Assad regime had refused to disclose. In September 2014, the 'Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons' published its first report on the 'systematic and recurrent' use of chlorine gas in Syria during the early months of that year. Since then, according to regional and international media reports, apart from Syrian government forces, ISIS has also repeatedly used this gas in Syria and Iraq, or signs of this group potentially acquiring chemical weapons have been reported. Examples of these cases and the ways of accessing and using chemical materials are as follows: - On June 19, 2014, ISIS seized the Al-Muthanna complex, located 100 kilometers north of Baghdad, which was one of the main depots and production centers for chemical weapons of Saddam Hussein's regime. According to a contract signed in July 2012 in Baghdad, it was agreed that British experts would train some Iraqi military personnel to eliminate the remaining mustard and Tabun gases, but it is unclear how much of these gases were neutralized or destroyed at the Al-Muthanna complex; in July 2014, several Kurdish fighters were injured from inhaling toxic gas while fighting ISIS 12 kilometers east of Kobani. Some media linked the use of this toxic gas to ISIS's access to Al-Muthanna; on September 15, 2014, ISIS used chemical weapons in the city of Duluiya in Salah al-Din province. According to a statement released by the Iraqi Ministry of Defense, this group used improvised bombs containing chlorine gas cylinders to counter government forces. In this attack, 40 Iraqi soldiers were injured to varying degrees. The same ministry later announced that ISIS obtained chlorine from nearby water treatment plants in Duluiya; on September 20, 2014, Iraqi government forces killed 18 ISIS fighters in a confrontation in Muqdadiyah in Diyala province and destroyed a depot with seven missiles containing chlorine gas; two days after this confrontation, ISIS fighters used chlorine gas canisters in a coordinated attack to seize the center of a military brigade in Saqlawiyah, northeast of Fallujah in Anbar province; six days later, according to the Iraqi Ministry of Defense, ISIS used a gas fog mine (a mine that, upon explosion, projects metal fragments in predetermined directions) containing chlorine, and at the end of September, 15 ISIS fighters who were filling various rockets with chlorine gas were killed; on October 26, 2014, ISIS launched seven projectiles containing chlorine gas at a residential area in western Iraq, and two days later, a Baghdad government official announced that ISIS had stolen chlorine gas tanks from several water and irrigation department warehouses in Anbar province. The same official stated that ISIS specialists aimed to produce new munitions by mixing chlorine with 'TNT' and the plastic explosive 'C4'; in mid-December 2014, ISIS innovatively used live scorpions to create fear and panic among the Iraqi people and soldiers, meaning they launched large shells or metal cans containing live scorpions towards Iraqi civilians and soldiers; on December 24, 2014, ISIS targeted the city of Hit, located northeast of Ramadi in Anbar province, with mortar shells containing chlorine. The U.S. Central Command announced on January 24, 2015, that Saleh Jassim al-Sabawi, known as Abu Malik, a chemical weapons expert during Saddam Hussein's time, was killed in an airstrike near Mosul. Abu Malik was providing training related to chemical weapons to ISIS fighters. On the same day, Kurdish Peshmerga forces targeted an ISIS chlorine depot in Mosul with artillery; on February 5, 2015, ISIS obtained a significant amount of chlorine gas by attacking a large water treatment facility in Nineveh province; the use of chlorine has continued intermittently throughout this year. This group used chemical bombs to prevent Iraqi forces from advancing to retake Tikrit in April 2015. One of the last chemical attacks by ISIS occurred on August 12 of this year in the vicinity of the city of Makhmur, 60 kilometers from Erbil, against Kurdish Peshmerga forces, carried out by launching mortar shells. In this regard, Kurdish Peshmerga forces attacked a mustard gas factory in the industrial area of 'Wadi Akab' in Mosul on August 26, killing dozens of ISIS fighters. The explosion of this factory led to the widespread release of mustard gas into the air, resulting in many being transferred to hospitals in Mosul and hundreds of families living near the factory being forced to leave their homes. ISIS used this factory to produce bombs and explosives; in recent weeks, ISIS has also expanded its chemical attacks in Syria. This group attacked the city of Hasakah using mustard gas on August 16. Five days later, on August 21, ISIS's use of the same gas in the town of Mare' in the northern outskirts of Aleppo resulted in the death of several citizens and injuries to a number of civilians, with ISIS launching over 30 rockets containing mustard gas at the homes of citizens. Preliminary results indicate that although some reports regarding ISIS's access to chemical materials or weapons and the nature of the gases used seem inadequate and superficial, it is certain that ISIS has shown great seriousness in advancing towards new capabilities and weapons, and in some cases has been innovative. Nevertheless, looking at the trend and manner of ISIS's use of chemical weapons, the following conclusions can be drawn: - Most of ISIS's chemical attacks have occurred in Iraq, not in Syria; in most cases, ISIS has used chlorine gas against military and civilian targets; this forms part of ISIS's psychological warfare aimed at weakening the morale of the opposing side and instilling fear and terror among the people and government forces. In Iraq, where its military units have not shown the necessary effectiveness on the battlefield, the use of chemical weapons will further exacerbate the situation and reduce the willingness of soldiers to confront ISIS; it does not appear that ISIS produces chlorine gas itself. This group utilizes existing canisters or cylinders of chlorine gas from water treatment facilities through attacks or seizures; ISIS has obtained some of its consumable chemical materials or weapons from depots in Iraq and Syria, such as the Al-Muthanna complex. The Iraqi government, having lost control over the Al-Muthanna facilities in early June last year, informed the United Nations that ISIS had taken control of the chemical materials in these facilities and that due to the chaotic security situation, the Iraqi government could not fulfill its international obligations to destroy these chemical materials; although ISIS has used cylinders and canisters containing chlorine gas for roadside and improvised bombs, it seems that this group is seeking to create more effective chemical weapons. The use of shells, mortar shells, and gas fog mines containing chlorine supports this effort by ISIS. Therefore, more and more effective attacks by this group in the future are not unexpected; it is highly likely that some chemical weapons specialists and remnants of Ba'athists from Saddam's regime are providing ISIS with technical, military, and tactical assistance; these weapons, with their horrific psychological and physical effects, can alter the battlefield equation, provided that ISIS has enough of these weapons or can produce them with its specialists; to counter these weapons, initially Kurdish forces, Iraqi military personnel, and anti-Assad groups in Syria need training and equipment such as masks and warning systems to protect themselves against ISIS's chemical attacks; condemning ISIS for using chemical weapons or toxic materials by Islamic or non-Islamic scholars will have no effect on this group. This group pursues its goals with the idea of reviving the caliphate and pure Islamic principles, and the approach of 'victory through terror' and will do anything to achieve them. This group considers its opponents as inferior, and therefore the international community, including the 'Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons', must adopt a new and innovative approach to prevent the production and proliferation of chemical weapons and ISIS attacks by exerting greater control over toxic materials in the chemical industry. A Middle East free of chemical weapons? Given the current conditions in the region, the long-standing idea of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction (i.e., nuclear, chemical, and biological) is nothing but a mirage. The 'Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty' or 'NPT' is a treaty that focuses on control and non-proliferation, not disarmament. In contrast, the conventions pertaining to chemical and biological weapons require countries that accept them to destroy their weapons, but the 'NPT' does not impose such a requirement on nuclear-armed countries. This treaty, which distinguishes between nuclear and non-nuclear countries, has a discriminatory nature in this regard. Furthermore, Israel has not accepted the 'NPT'. Regarding chemical and biological weapons, little effort has been made in the Middle East to eliminate these weapons. In the case of the 'Biological Weapons Convention', technical issues, including the lack of an enforcement mechanism, have led to little attention being paid to this convention in the Middle East. However, regarding chemical weapons, the 'Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons', established in 1997, has such a mechanism and can take effective steps towards a Middle East free of chemical weapons, provided that all countries in the region join the 'Chemical Weapons Convention' – a convention that was prepared for signing by willing countries in 1993 and came into force in 1997. Syria joined this convention two years ago, and only two countries in the Middle East, Israel and Egypt, have refused to accept it. Egypt has linked its acceptance of this convention to Israel's nuclear weapons and considers accepting this convention pointless without a Middle East free of nuclear weapons.