The Virtue of Separation of Government from Religion

Once, the great Russian writer Dostoevsky wrote in his work 'The Brothers Karamazov' through one of his characters, 'If God does not exist, everything is permitted.' If Dostoevsky were to rewrite his novel today, reflecting on the current state of the Middle East, would he still present the same proposition? In a Middle East where religion has a pervasive presence in the public sphere and the name of God is heard everywhere, everything has become permissible in the name of God, and individuals with divine motivations sometimes commit acts and crimes that are rarely found elsewhere in the world. The name of Allah is inscribed on the flags of ISIS, Hezbollah, Saudi Arabia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Taliban, and many other Islamist groups, all of whom carry out their policies and actions in His name. The discussion is not about equating these countries and groups, but the common feature among them is a maximalist and identity-driven interpretation of religion and speaking in the name of God while simultaneously being hostile to one another. Religion has never before entangled the Middle East in such devastating political-religious wars and conflicts. For over three decades, the people of significant parts of this region have turned against one another instead of progressing and building, and no one knows when this tangled mess of the 'war of seventy-two nations' will end, or when nations and religious and ethnic groups will see peace and tranquility. Undoubtedly, religion is not the only explanatory factor for the current crisis. Geopolitical and economic motivations, as well as foreign interventions, also play their part in these crises. However, in today's tense and crisis-ridden Middle East, religion and its involvement in governance, along with the activities of radical religious groups and their aspirations to seize power, have become one of the most significant factors of tension in the political arena: Sunnis and Shiites are at odds with each other, various trends within each religion threaten one another, religious minorities and large segments of the population are under pressure from fundamentalists, jihadists, and other religious extremists, and life for minorities becomes increasingly dangerous and difficult. In such an environment, the crisis in Iran's relations with Saudi Arabia and Turkey has become a symbol of tension between Sunnis and Shiites. This tension has gone far beyond a mere political dispute between neighboring countries and has cast a shadow of uncertainty over the future of major crisis areas in the Middle East, such as Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain. The geopolitical meaning of these tensions is the formation of regional alliances and enmities and the impossibility of peace and peaceful coexistence among the peoples and countries in this war-torn region. ISIS, the Taliban, Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia, and other extremist religious interpretations find audiences in such a crisis-ridden environment and add to the complexity of the tangled crisis in the region. Even governments like Assad's in Syria, which came to power with a secular foundation, are now defined within the framework of the religious conflict between Sunnis and Shiites. The internal situation of many crisis-ridden countries is also a function of this complex equation. In Yemen, Shiites, who make up 45% of the population, have rebelled against the Sunni government. In Bahrain, the Sunni minority governs the Shiite majority, and in Saudi Arabia, a very rigid and fundamentalist Sunni interpretation puts severe pressure on the Shiite minority, exemplified by the execution of Sheikh Nimr. In Iraq, there exists a kind of terrifying balance among Shiites, Sunni Arabs, and Kurds, and the expansion of ISIS threatens the territorial integrity of the country. The political deadlocks in Lebanon are also a result of the tense relationship among religions. In Iran's power struggle, religious hardliners eliminate their co-religionists under the pretext of 'non-commitment to Islam' or 'non-commitment to the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist,' and for over three decades, the type of religiosity (and not belief in religion) and the interpretation of religion's involvement in governance and politics have become a subject of biased interpretation and endless conflicts at the top of the Islamic Republic's government. Social peace based on the separation of religion and government In the Middle East, like many other regions of the world, political and religious-ethnic boundaries do not align. Religions and their numerous branches are not confined within the national borders of a country, and no country has a single religion. To this complex and sensitive political-religious geography, one must add the sociological reality of today's world, where citizens are gradually freeing themselves from the unquestionable influence of powerful religious institutions and establishing individual relationships with religion and religiosity or losing their belief in religion and the sacred. The diversity of citizenship identity and forms of religiosity or disbelief in religion is one of the main characteristics of contemporary societies. In such an environment, the existence of governments that present themselves in the rigid framework of a religion or an interpretation of a religion, or seek to impose a set of principles and rules of a religion in an authoritarian manner from above onto the public sphere, is inherently reductive and undemocratic. Theocratic systems, with their biased policies, inevitably confront sections of the populace that view religion and religiosity differently, have a different religion, or have little relationship with religion. This way, a religious government inevitably institutionalizes discrimination based on the type of religiosity and relationship with religion, and citizens never enjoy equal rights. The religious diversity of Middle Eastern countries is not unique to this region. Many countries in Europe, Africa, and America also live with various religions and forms of religiosity. Widespread migrations around the world have also added to the complexity and diversity of the geographical borders of religions. Social and political peace in these countries has been made possible, among other things, by accepting the important principle of the separation of government and religion and not imposing a specific religion on the public sphere. A government does not represent any religion; nothing sacred is imposed from above on all people, and various religions enjoy the necessary freedom to participate and operate in society and organize their followers and religious ceremonies. This mechanism and historical choice are the result of rethinking and global experiences over the past two to three centuries around the world. The separation of religion from government does not mean hostility toward the sacred or this or that religion, nor does it oppose the participation of forces affiliated with this or that religion in political life. In Europe, political forces with religious backgrounds in various countries, despite relying on their Christian identity, have engaged in democratic political play and set aside the project of religious intervention in the public sphere. The oath of government officials to the holy book in some countries does not mean that official institutions and laws follow the principles and teachings of religion. Even in countries with very religious public opinion, the relationship between religion and government is minimal, and laws and governmental mechanisms are secular and civil, and the public sphere is not a place for the dominance of one religion or an interpretation of religion. Bitter experiences of the Middle East The countries in the Middle East have had fewer opportunities to experience democratic forms of governance without religious interference. The experiences of secular governments in this region, from Iran after the Constitutional Revolution to Atatürk's Turkey, Tunisia, or Egypt, have mostly been undemocratic and authoritarian. Authoritarian, non-participatory, and top-down secularization is one of the reasons for the lack of growth in democratic culture and civil society, deep public disillusionment with the processes of societal and governmental modernization, and the rise of political Islam in the region. To this unfortunate experience, one must add the historical weakness of political thought and critique in these countries, which has lagged behind in creating a democratic culture and a better understanding of today's world and a critical approach to religion and tradition and their place. In such an environment, political Islam claims to have an alternative governance model and asserts a project for managing society based on religious principles and teachings. Over decades, Islamist forces and intellectuals and elites affiliated with them have fostered a kind of mythological belief that the principles and rules of Islam provide suitable answers to the needs of contemporary society and economy. This mythological belief has taken root in the psychology and imaginary representation of large segments of the population from Morocco to Central Asia and is reconstructed and repeated by various Islamist groups. The record of religious government What have governments that define themselves in the name of a religion or an interpretation of Islam done beyond what non-religious governments have accomplished, and what special positive achievements have these religious governments brought to the people? What record does ISIS have in Iraq and Syria over the past three years, or what specific results did the Taliban's years of rule in Afghanistan yield for the people? The main discussion here is what special advantage do religious governments and governance in the name of the sacred have over other governments for the people, and can religious decrees and principles serve as the foundation for laws and governance in today's world? This question can also be posed regarding the Islamic Republic and its consequences in Iran. Islamist forces in the years leading up to the revolution attributed the poor economic situation, poverty, and many other social ills and negative phenomena to the absence of religion or the secular and Western nature of the government, claiming that religious teachings, dynamic jurisprudence, and ijtihad could provide a roadmap for society to establish a terrestrial paradise. Today, after 37 years, one can objectively evaluate the effectiveness of religious governance in various economic and social domains. To what extent has the religious government in Iran been able to fulfill its ideals and promises and transform Iran into the 'mother of all cities' in the Islamic world? What record has a government that came to power in the name of religion and spirituality left in the realm of moral values and spirituality? Has the Islamic nature of the government brought about more moral virtues and less corruption for society? Has the Islamic nature of the government led to the promotion of a superior and different political morality, free from deceit and lies? What is the state of the economy and the environment in Iran? Has what was called Islamic economics brought about prosperity, progress, and a desirable standard of living for the people? Has religious governance contributed to reducing natural problems such as drought? Is the Islamic judiciary more effective and just than other judicial systems? Is theft, fraud, and bribery in Iranian society less than in other countries or in Iran before the revolution? Has the Islamic nature of the government improved Iran's relations with other Muslim countries? Have religious minorities and other groups of people enjoyed religious and cultural rights and freedoms under the Islamic government? What is the state of freedom of expression, political transparency, party activity, elections, and democratic power rotation? Have Iran's prisons been emptied of political and ideological prisoners since 1979? Does religious governance respect human dignity and individual and citizen freedoms? The answers to many of these questions are not particularly difficult. In some areas, national and international official statistics clearly illustrate Iran's current status compared to the past and other countries. Few people in Iran, even among government officials, believe that today's Iranian society, the daily lives of many people, the environment, the job market, or the economy are in a favorable state. The religious government has a severely negative record in the realm of public morality and the fight against corruption, and the moral crisis in society and various social harms have never been as deep and concerning in contemporary times. The experience of the Islamic Republic, like other theocratic governments, has shown that the religious nature of governance does not lead to any special miracles in the economy, society, and environment. The maximum presence of religion in society, Friday prayers, rain prayers, religious mourning, and hijab have not been able to prevent earthquakes, water shortages, drought, and the catastrophic destruction of wetlands, rivers, and underground water tables. A significant portion of the major economic, environmental, and social problems stems from the inefficiency of officials and the policies that arise from them. Political rent-seeking and prioritizing 'ideological commitment' over expertise and efficiency have led to brain drain, the increasing impoverishment of human resources, and catastrophic managerial disarray. The involvement of religion in governance has proven to be very unsuccessful even in areas like public ethics and the relationship with spirituality, which pertains to the symbolic function of religious institutions in society. Corruption, which has infiltrated the highest governmental echelons and official institutions and involves astronomical figures, is the most significant symbol of the failure of religious governance in Iran. With such a record, it can be said that the challenges and problems of Iranian society with religious governance are, if not greater than those of other countries, certainly not less. Political horizon for the future If we return to Dostoevsky's words, it may be said that he proposed a kind of moral horizon related to the function of religion for society. The experiences of Iran and other countries show that this horizon can only be effective and desirable when religion returns to its rightful place and abandons the aspiration for governance in the name of the sacred and comprehensive intervention in the public sphere. Those who, in the name of God, are messengers of violence, discrimination, intolerance, and repression of both insiders and outsiders have, in practice, made every disaster possible. Contrary to expectations, religious ethics and governmental spirituality have not only failed to prevent repression, corruption, and looting, deceit, and fraud, but many negative phenomena have occurred or are justified in the name of the sacred, accelerating the moral collapse of society. When everything becomes possible in the name of God, the relationship with spiritual and ethical values becomes hypocritical and devoid of meaning, masking the true inner world of individuals with a facade.