Theism or Atheism; Which is Rational?

You have contacted the Taboo program numerous times and asked us to address the topic of God. Previously, we have tackled the crucial question of 'Does God exist?' However, you are right that the existence or non-existence of God has such a radical effect on our being and life that it can still be debated and more questions can be answered. In this week's program, we host two philosophy researchers; one defends the rational arguments for theism, while the other presents arguments for atheism. Zuhair Bagheri Noeparast, a philosophy researcher and editor of the philosophical journal 42, defends atheism by emphasizing the necessity of living wisely, while Yaser Mirdamadi, a researcher in religion and philosophy, discusses the limitations of reason and believes that rational arguments can be made in favor of theism. Mr. Mirdamadi, can you explain rationally from what angle theism can be defended and why? Yaser Mirdamadi: Before answering your important question, I would like to make two key points. First, I am defending the 'rationality' of theism here, not the so-called 'proof' of theism. The difference between proof and rationality, in brief, is that proof involves certainty and is beyond doubt, while rationality does not involve certainty or absolute assurance. This means that in a technical sense, we do not have a 'proof' for the existence of God, but we may have reasons, that is, non-certain arguments for the existence of God. The second point is that when I speak of the rationality of theism, I do not mean that I defend all the well-known non-certain arguments that have been raised in favor of the rationality of theism. However, some of the famous reasons that have been raised in favor of the rationality of theism seem to me to have defensible versions or could potentially have them. These reasons are (five reasons): the 'cosmological argument,' the 'religious experience argument,' the 'consciousness argument,' the 'moral argument,' and the 'cumulative argument,' which we can discuss later if time permits. Very well. Mr. Noeparast, Mr. Mirdamadi spoke about several categories of rational arguments in defense of theism. Can rational arguments be made in defense of atheism? Zuhair Bagheri Noeparast: We need to see what evidence theists provide for the existence of the God they claim and what definition they have of that God; then we must examine whether this definition is coherent, defensible, whether there is evidence for it, or whether it aligns with our best scientific theories. The common definition of God in philosophical discussions usually attributes at least these three characteristics to God: omniscience, omnipotence, and absolute goodness. One of the things atheists do is critique this definition of God and try to show that belief in such a God lacks sufficient evidence. One of the most famous arguments from atheists is the 'problem of evil' argument. By evil, I mean all the evils, sufferings, and pains that humans experience in their lives, which include natural evils like earthquakes, tsunamis, various diseases, etc., and moral evils that include a series of actions that humans perform against each other, which can range from small acts like lying and betrayal to large-scale acts like genocide. If God is omniscient, omnipotent, and absolutely good, then according to the definition, if evil is to occur, He is aware of it and, being omnipotent, can prevent it, and since He is absolutely good, He should not allow this evil to occur and should prevent it; yet we see various types of evil in our world. Here, it seems that a contradiction arises in the definition of God. We either have to conclude that this God does not exist at all or if He does exist, He lacks one of those three characteristics. Mirdamadi: It can be easily shown that there is no contradiction between a God with these attributes and the existence of evil in the world. Why? For the simple reason that God may have reasons for creating evil, even if we do not know those reasons; just being able to show the logical possibility is sufficient to say that there is no contradiction between the existence of evil and a God with these—specifically—three attributes. We see that even parents sometimes have to do things for their children that from the children's perspective may seem evil (or even truly evil, not just from their perspective), but introducing this evil from the parents' perspective has a reason. However, they may be able to show reasons that, even from our human perspective, indicate that a kind person should not do this. One example that one of the atheist philosophers gives is that in a forest that catches fire, a beautiful innocent deer burns alive in the fire; what reason does this kind God have to let this beautiful deer burn? Here, some philosophers have pointed out that certain evils, especially moral evils like murder and war, are unavoidable. Specifically regarding moral evils, it can be said that God has given humans free will, and the necessity of free will is that people can commit wrongful acts. The existence of free will among people, despite all the evils it may create, may, from a cosmic perspective and from God's viewpoint, who is observing the entire history, have its good outweigh the evil, so to speak. One cannot give someone free will and not give them the ability to create evil. Based on this, God can still remain omnipotent, purely benevolent, and all-knowing. Mr. Mirdamadi, I want to ask you here whether that part of your argument that 'there may be reasons at play that we do not have access to' cannot approach that simplistic wisdom that is common among people, which suggests that it is God's wisdom and we do not know and do not have access to it? I want to say that it cannot actually be very rational, which engages the mind. This way of thinking does not seem to be very rational, as we are discussing rational arguments and need to be able to comprehend it with human reason. Mirdamadi: In fact, one of the wonders of reason is that it recognizes its own limits. We realize the limitations of reason through reason itself. That is, believers cannot tell us that reason is limited; only philosophers—those who have entered the arena of rationality—can point out the limitations of reason. Based on this, philosophical theists can also point out the limitations of reason without stepping out of the arena of rationality and without undermining the sanctity of rationality. To avoid sounding too strange, when you are dealing with a teacher or a kind parent as a child, you may not understand all the details of what they do, or when you are in class, you may not grasp all the strictness and issues that the teacher raises with you, and some of them may even seem unreasonable to you. However, we naturally trust them. This trust is not absolute, but it exists nonetheless. A similar trust is what theists have towards God. Mr. Noeparast, you may want to specifically respond to the arguments that Mr. Mirdamadi raised in response to the problem of evil or this discussion of 'there may be hidden games at play' that we may not be aware of, and then I will have another question for you. Bagheri Noeparast: First of all, logically, there is no objection to the existence of evil. That is, a logical contradiction does not occur. Therefore, if someone says that there is a reason for the existence of evil, they must specify that reason. Mr. Mirdamadi referred to free will, which is a strong argument against the problem of moral evil. But another issue that exists is that it could be argued that if God exists, He could have created humans in such a way that they do not commit moral evil. For example, if we want to use the same examples they used, suppose that parents can raise their child in such a way that they do not lie. Another version of this argument could be that there is no need for us to commit atrocities like the Holocaust; just telling a small lie or doing a small wrongful act is sufficient. And since Mr. Noeparast's discussion with Mr. Mirdamadi also touched on the 'hidden secret' that we may not be aware of, I want to quote Simon Blackburn, a former Cambridge University professor, who says that he prefers the term 'non-believer' to 'atheist.' I want to delve into the discussion of faith as well, and you can explain to our listeners what the difference is. Bagheri Noeparast: We have a word called 'belief.' I currently believe that I am speaking. This belief of mine is correct because there is a reality that I am speaking right now, but I do not use the word 'faith' to describe my speaking. Faith refers to a belief that a person is very passionately committed to. A person may say, well, the evidence is not sufficient; I make a faith-based decision. However, there is another approach that we can have, which is to say that the question of 'Does God exist or not?' is a meaningless question and will have a therapeutic approach to the issue. It tells us that this is a meaningless question; your mind is preoccupied with it, and there is no answer. Therefore, it is better to forget and set this question aside. Non-belief can mean this. In my opinion, no one can be non-believing in the sense of knowing that God exists or believing that He exists while simultaneously not believing. Mr. Mirdamadi, now that religions have come up, you yourself mentioned religious experience at the beginning of the program. Some people also argue against religions to defend atheism, while the opposing group can argue that the existence of religions and heavenly sacred texts can lead to the conclusion that theism can be defended. If you want to talk about rational arguments in defense of theism, will religion and sacred texts come into play? Mirdamadi: Before answering your important question, I would like to briefly respond to one or two points that dear Zuhair mentioned. Mr. Zuhair said that God could have created humans in such a way that they do not commit evil. This can be interpreted in two ways. If the implication is that God could have created humans in such a way—structurally—to do this, meaning giving will and free will but in such a way that they only do good, it seems that we face a paradox here. Because free will means that a person can do bad, but if there is a free will that cannot do bad, it seems that it is not free will. This is the first point. But as for the suggestion that they should not do very strange bad things, like the Holocaust or wars, the response that can be given is that if God wants to bring unlimited good to humanity, it seems that He must give them unimaginable and vast free will for evil as well. But let’s get to Simon Blackburn's discussion and non-belief; Blackburn's point is that for him, God is not an issue that he wants to deny to become an atheist. This is like someone saying, 'Are you denying the three-headed giant?' The person responds, 'I am not denying the three-headed giant; in fact, the three-headed giant is not an issue for me.' Of course, note that such a person implicitly denies the three-headed giant but simultaneously adds something more important, which is that this is not an important issue. Now I can add to Blackburn's discussion that this view has recently found a term in English called Apatheism, which, of course, we should ask Dariush Ashouri to suggest a Persian equivalent for this term, but my suggestion for now is 'indifference to God.' Note that indifference to God fundamentally does not contradict atheism. Indifference to God essentially assumes atheism but goes beyond it and considers the issue of God fundamentally unimportant. Now, regarding your question about whether rejecting religions can lead to rejecting theism, we have two types of theism; theism independent of religion, which is called Deism, and a religious or revealed theism, which is called Theism. If someone rejects religions, yes, they have rejected revealed theism. On the other hand, if someone rejects theism, they do not necessarily reject all religions, as not all religions are solely based on theism, and some religions, like Buddhism, are not based on theism at all. Mr. Noeparast, now there is certainly a short opportunity if you want to respond to Mr. Mirdamadi, but at one point he raised a point about indifference to God, which can be an independent and interesting discussion. I want to ask you whether indifference to God is not a certainty of atheism. If it is ever determined that theism is the correct belief, how would the defenders of atheism respond?