Those Three Million People and These Two Million People

The propaganda apparatus of the Islamic Republic claims that on December 30, 2009, forty million people took to the streets in defense of the regime. Ali Khamenei states about December 30: "In that unprecedented incident, no one was involved, and the intellectual power that is the main structure of the Islamic regime brought the people to the streets, and that unprecedented incident occurred." (December 28, 2016) The December 30 program was held three days after a severe crackdown on opponents on Ashura, aimed at showcasing this massacre and intimidating dissenters. Was this incident really unprecedented as claimed? Did forty million people participate in this event? What do similar events say? To what extent is the government's social mobilization power? According to the mayor of Tehran, three million people participated in the June 25, 2009 rally protesting election fraud. During the Eid al-Fitr holidays in 2016, about three million travelers went to Mazandaran province. (Fars, July 9, 2017) If we add the travelers from Gilan province to this figure and subtract travelers from other provinces, we again arrive at approximately three million Tehranis who are out of sync with government programs. The volume of travelers to Gilan and Mazandaran provinces from Tehran during short political and religious holidays is such that cars are stuck on the roads and tunnels for hours, with some setting up camp in the middle of the road. The number of vehicles on the roads is so high that tens of thousands are seized for violating regulations on northern routes like Haraz, Qazvin, Firuzkuh, and Chalus. In Iran, this mass travel to the north during the anniversary of Khomeini's death is referred to as "retirement parties," but escaping Tehran is not limited to retirement parties. Any religious or governmental holiday turns into a scene of slow vehicular movement to the north and back on the northern roads throughout the holidays. Despite dissatisfaction with this situation, the government is forced to make the roads one-way and provide some emergency services. These three million people seize every opportunity to escape from government-related propaganda and restrictions. For this reason, they constitute the largest volume of travelers to foreign countries (mainly Turkey, Armenia, the UAE, Thailand, and Malaysia). The audience for music programs abroad is also this demographic. The regime's social base of 2.5 percent. Against the three million out-of-sync residents of the capital, the government has also formed a population of two million (assuming the figure is correct) with all the resources of the IRGC and government ministries across the country, mobilizing them for Arbaeen marches, Khomeini's memorial ceremonies, or Quds Day. Considering the country's population of eighty million, these two million people represent only 2.5 percent of the population, but they are an organized 2.5 percent with armed power and a propaganda apparatus directly connected to oil resources. They are the regime's "professional people" who immediately engage in another pilgrimage (the anniversary of the death of the eighth Imam of Shia) after the end of one pilgrimage (Arbaeen). Interestingly, the announced number of Iranian pilgrims for Arbaeen and the 30th of Safar in Mashhad is about two million. This two million is of particular interest to the government in the distribution of national resources. Khamenei, who does not hesitate to issue statements for the death of a group of these professional pilgrims, quickly issues a statement if tens of thousands die in Iran. The number of participants in the December 30, 2009 rally was around the same two million nationwide, which they exaggerate to forty million. Photos from the December 30, 2009 gathering show about three hundred thousand people on Enghelab Street in Tehran, some of whom were brought by bus from nearby cities. Part of this crowd is also mobilized for Khamenei's Nowruz speech in Mashhad. However, it is unclear how many of this crowd act as the regime's foot soldiers in what topics and under what conditions, but these are the people the government counts on and invests in. The four million student population that the Basij annually takes to war zones is mainly aimed at attracting forces to the regime's social base, but only a small percentage of them register in the Basij. In Iran, there are only two classes: the insiders and the outsiders. The outsiders are supposed to be under economic, social, and cultural pressure, while the insiders enjoy maximum facilities and freedoms, even the freedom to engage in corruption and sexual abuse of children and armed violence in the streets. The Arbaeen march, Khomeini's memorial, the Noor Pilgrimage, Quds Day, and the February 11 ceremonies are not merely religious programs; participants do not attend solely for religious motivations and intentions. The religious government has colored these political programs with a religious hue to attract more participants. In religious programs, both organizers have different tendencies and perspectives, and participants are not all on the same level in terms of diversity. Government ceremonies (the first category) are organized directly with the cooperation of all state institutions, and the government is present and plays a role in all aspects, spending money, while in religious ceremonies (the second type), participants are not necessarily the regime's foot soldiers, although the government wants to claim these programs as its own (for example, by allocating budgets to religious committees by municipalities). For instance, consider the Arbaeen march, a new tradition created in the post-U.S. invasion of Iraq era. There are no services that are not provided to this crowd during their travel to Iraq: from free food and facilities (provided with government budgets) to sleeping arrangements and public transportation. Additionally, incentives like leaving the country for individuals subject to military service and student loans are considered. Due to Khamenei's emphasis on holding these ceremonies magnificently (showing Shia power against the Sunni region), all state apparatuses are mobilized, from the Ministry of Roads and Interior to Foreign Affairs and Telecommunications (free Wi-Fi in some gathering places to cheap mobile services) and from Tehran Municipality (for providing urban services in Karbala and Najaf) to various headquarters operating under the supervision of the office of the Supreme Leader. The composition of these two population groups and their demands. Not all citizens among those three million are secular or non-religious, nor do all citizens among these two million come to the field solely with their religious beliefs. Both groups encompass a diverse population. Previously governmental religious individuals dissatisfied with the state of affairs in the country and Khamenei's regime have joined part of this three million out-of-sync crowd seeking individual and social freedoms. Another group of religious individuals fundamentally does not want their religion to be tainted by politics. The religious individuals in this three million crowd want to decide for themselves whether to wear a hijab or not, and if they choose to wear a hijab, they want to select its type themselves. This crowd wants to decide for themselves whether to fast during Ramadan or eat in public during the month of Ramadan without the threat of being whipped for breaking the fast. Of course, this crowd is not limited to three million, but these three million have a clearer external manifestation in the center of the country. Millions more in towns and villages—mainly educated individuals and low-level employees in the public sector—share intellectual and behavioral affinities with these three million, but outside Tehran—apart from the arrests of significant gatherings in towns—have little external manifestation. Their consumption patterns and media usage can reveal their tendencies. However, this claimed two million is the ceiling of the regime's social base, and despite the claim of mobilizing twenty million, the government cannot mobilize more than that even if all IRGC buses and urban and non-urban transportation companies are mobilized. Basijis and their families, clergy and their families, government officials, and a portion of the poor and unemployed who see a future for themselves in approaching government institutions (like the IRGC and religious bureaucracy) participate in government-supported events like Arbaeen or commemorating Khomeini or February 11. The demand of these two million is for a larger share of the cake of resources and privileges, and they perceive the way to achieve this as aligning with the ruling clergy. The Islamic Republic is one of those regimes that not only organizes its two million base well within military and paramilitary institutions and their affiliated companies, effectively using them to suppress 78 million potential or three million actual people, but also constantly exposes this small class to ideological propaganda and provides them with the necessary financial, status, and job incentives. The policy of engineering the masses. From the beginning, the Islamic Republic has pursued two parallel policies to control and guide citizens whom it views as a shapeless mass: 1) The complete and absolute denial of any organization of those three million people and millions more like them in towns, whether in the form of a bus drivers' union or a writers' association, the board of trustees of a mosque, or members of a missionary church, teachers' unions, or mystical groups. Thousands of parties, organizations, institutions, associations, and unions of this sector have been shut down. The history of the arrest of members, the destruction of gathering places, and the seizure of bank accounts of these groups, associations, and organizations is a lengthy tale; moreover, this population must not have a voice in domestic media. For this reason, this part of society has turned to Persian-language media abroad. Censorship, filtering, and jamming are implemented to suppress the voice of this segment and keep them uninformed. 2) A continuous effort to organize and attract those who have the potential to work within the framework of the Velayat-e Faqih system, through ideological selections to allocate resources and rents to them, registering them in military, security, and paramilitary institutions, and allowing them to join various official institutions of the country. These individuals have been placed in various government institutions, through thousands of scholarships (at higher education levels) and hundreds of thousands of quotas in universities to middle and lower management positions of 150,000, managing state companies and institutions and foundations under the leadership's supervision, to executive headquarters related to implementing Islamic laws, contracting companies that work with the IRGC and municipalities, and the IRGC's and security institutions' smuggling activities amounting to over 20 billion dollars annually. State radio and television programs are produced and broadcast for this segment. The erosion of the middle class. In summary, resources, status, and power in the country are distributed among this two million population (the closer to the Velayat in its communication hierarchy, the larger the share), while that three million, especially and tens of millions more in general, are deprived of these resources. One of the important functions of the Islamic Republic, aside from initiating the process of the dissolution of the modern state, has been the shrinking of the middle class. In Iran, there are only two classes: insiders and outsiders. Outsiders are supposed to be under economic, social, and cultural pressure, while insiders enjoy maximum facilities and freedoms, even the freedom to engage in corruption and sexual abuse of children and armed violence in the streets.