Three Internal Trends in the National Democratic Movement

Each significant political event has acted as a historical pivot, leaving its mark on the alignment and arrangement of political forces. This impact has either led to new political blocs or altered the internal alignments of existing blocs. Events such as the revolution, the atmosphere of oppression, the events of the 1980s, the end of the war, the reform process, the Green Movement, and the coming to power of Rouhani's government have all significantly influenced the internal divisions of political currents seeking reform or change. The defenders of the status quo have also been affected by certain events, such as Ahmadinejad's presidency, especially his second term, and the JCPOA agreement, which has profoundly impacted the internal categorizations of this political bloc. Consequently, it can be said that they now have different (and sometimes contradictory) stances regarding Ahmadinejad's record, the JCPOA, Rouhani's government, and so on. Underneath these changes and the formation of new and clear categorizations, transformations and changes have occurred in the foundations or at least the intellectual approaches (for instance, regarding the position of the Supreme Leader) and political strategies, particularly concerning foreign and regional policies, which have led to a kind of semi-visible and semi-hidden schism within the political bloc loyal to the leadership. Discussing the current arrangement of this political bloc is beyond the scope of this article. Moreover, discussing the internal arrangement of other approaches and forces that have radical analyses of the political conditions and government in Iran, as well as the extent of the impact of various events on them, is also outside the scope of this discussion. However, now, after Rouhani's government has taken office (and after the JCPOA and two significant elections in Esfand), it is now possible to clearly identify three internal trends within the political bloc that seeks gradual and peaceful 'reform/change' in the current situation. From another perspective, among the supporters of the Green Movement (especially the diverse younger individuals who fully defined their identity with this movement), the reformist currents previously known as the Second Khordad Movement, the national-religious spectrum, and republicans who have shown interest in and supported such internal, peaceful, and gradual changes since the reform era or at least after the Green Movement, as well as other diverse individuals and forces supporting this strategy, can be observed. Perhaps these three new internal trends can be named: the government/election-oriented conservative trend (conservative in the political science sense), the radical community-oriented trend (or, in a sense, radical green), and the moderate trend with a combined strategy (government-civil society). These designations are merely descriptive and devoid of any positive or negative evaluative judgment, and perhaps later more precise terms can be used in place of them. Indicators for the typology of approaches and forces that can distinguish these three internal trends within the 'national democratic movement' that are 'strategic allies' of each other (and seek a calm and internal movement towards democratic changes in Iran, albeit with somewhat different scopes) include: the manner of evaluation and approach to the institution and events of elections in Iran; how they assess the role and approach to the apex of the political hierarchy; their evaluation and approach to Rouhani's government; their assessment of society and civil institutions; how they evaluate and assign weight to the economic indicators and the relationship between economic and political development; how they assess and assign weight to the issue of freedoms and human rights; the importance of justice and evaluation of the role of low-income groups in future developments; and finally, their evaluation and approach to foreign policy, specifically the regional foreign policy of the Iranian government. Perhaps later some main (or secondary) titles can be added to this list. It should be noted that the description of the views of each of the three mentioned trends regarding these topics is relative and may not precisely apply to some individuals or trends. In other words, while this categorization and descriptions generally have applicability and specificity, in some specific topics, a combination of these definitions and approaches may be observed in some individuals or approaches, or some may be positioned between the first and second trends or between the second and third trends. The government/election-oriented conservative trend Firstly, it should be noted that in this article, we have ignored the motivations of individuals and currents, including in gaining power and benefits, and have focused more on discourses and logics. That area of discussion requires independent analysis. Also, the discussion of excluded forces that are currently, as always, under pressure and thus have no noticeable and effective emergence is also outside the scope of this analysis. Nevertheless, it seems that the first trend or conservative, aside from some intellectual foundations, perhaps due to a lack of hope and trust in the power and role of civil society and its various institutions, as well as the ability of various groups, including large low-income groups, to create change in ongoing processes, or not seeing it as currently feasible, and somewhat being hopeless about it, and on the other hand, with the specific 'short-sightedness' of this trend and emphasizing the necessity of success and tangible achievements, expects and demands quicker results, believes that 'elections' are the core and basis of changes in the political space and processes in Iran. Therefore, it almost believes that under any circumstances, participation in elections is necessary. This trend, for various reasons, including the government-centricity prevailing over this approach or viewing the Iranian government as oil-rich and powerful, describes and analyzes most processes around the government. Just as the 'main game of politics' is seen and explained at the top, mainly among some prominent individuals such as the leader, the head of the Expediency Discernment Council, and the president. This trend also somewhat believes that now it is necessary to move behind Rouhani's government and under the tolerance of Mr. Khamenei. The approach of this trend towards the government is mainly supportive and less critical. It overlooks some shortcomings and sometimes failures of the government in its political and economic behaviors and sees them as a result of the balance of power or considers them unimportant. Sometimes it also justifies these shortcomings. Regarding the relationship between the president and the leader, it believes that the president should avoid challenging the leader and proceed more through interaction. In this trend, if there is any mention of civil society and civil institutions, it is peripheral and almost decorative and ineffective, or in such cases, it evokes a weak duality. Civil society is also seen more as a helper to the government. This trend openly and secretly believes that the main issue of the country and Rouhani's government is the economy. Therefore, if human rights issues are placed in the next priorities or even put in parentheses, they are not of strategic importance, and at least there is no other solution. The casualties of road accidents in Iran exceed cases of human rights violations. Based on this, there should not be much pause on human rights issues, and approaches that prioritize these issues and their instances are criticized. Some more extreme individuals (and in some cases problematic) within this trend engage in destructive criticism of certain well-known (and of course some opportunists!) human rights advocates. This trend believes that economic development and improvement of the country's conditions are possible without political development. Justice should be an issue after welfare, not alongside it. Low-income groups do not have much influence on current political developments and processes. However, they can cause shifts in political power with their votes and sometimes fall for the far-right and populist currents; therefore, the government must address economic problems to maintain its voter base and prevent recruitment by rival currents. There is no unified and clear discourse regarding the country's security doctrine in this trend, but generally, a conservative interpretation and approach to this matter, especially concerning the government's regional policy, is observed. This trend supports the government's clear efforts to de-escalate international relations, especially with global powers, but is hesitant and contradictory in regional policy. Sometimes, there is mention of Iran's regional power, and in this regard, direct and indirect support is given to the government's security doctrine, which emphasizes the military element that is the doctrine of the far-right current in Iran, or this policy is justified. Some extremists of this political trend even engage in exaggerated praise of the proponents of this security doctrine. The radical community-oriented trend (Green) This trend mainly defines itself based on the Green Movement. It sometimes has a linear view of the internal government processes. It is skeptical about the elections after 2009 and sees a thread of overall planning by the power structure aimed at solving the regime's problems. It does not oppose the institution of elections but is skeptical about it and especially about the effectiveness of individuals and institutions arising from it, and it can be said that it is largely hopeless. The participation of Green Movement leaders in recent elections has created some internal conflict in this analysis but has not led to a serious change. The outcome of the elections is positive but with very limited and small achievements. This trend criticizes reformists who have entered elections with exaggerated analyses and sometimes with hasty criticism of the Green Movement's approach and high expectations. Although it considers reading the people's votes indebted to the Green Movement and the resistance of its leaders, it is somewhat suspicious and pessimistic about the mere coming to power of the new government and is very critical of its performance, especially regarding the issue of lifting house arrest and generally the government's internal policies. The government's economic performance and achievements are also seen as limited and unstable. The same analysis exists regarding the government's foreign policy. Although it defends the JCPOA on the grounds that it can benefit the people, it considers the concessions made in it to be excessive. This trend believes that the main obstacle to the reform/change process is at the apex of the political hierarchy and expects the government to stand firm in this area, including regarding the lifting of house arrest, but less specific solutions are provided. This trend explicitly names itself community/social movement-oriented. The evaluation of society/civil institutions is positive, but the view towards them, especially social movements in the medium/long term, may be somewhat wishful. Perhaps because this view has not had much precedent in this approach, this trend lacks a suitable program and language and does not have much connection to activate in this area. Perhaps the horizontal network view (instead of a table-like network) in this approach during the Green Movement also deprived this trend of the necessary organization and connections. This issue was later and, of course, belatedly addressed in critical evaluations of this approach. Also, in the heat of the Green Movement, the enthusiasm of the middle class seemed sufficient, and it was sometimes even said that the poor were also present in the movement. However, later this critical evaluation was raised that a successful social movement requires broader geographical participation and more universal class participation, especially the civil engagement of low-income groups. However, there is sometimes a kind of fear of activating class fault lines in this approach, just as there was previously fear of using the street as a space. Mir Hossein Mousavi's justice-centric approach gives this trend a more justice-seeking hue, but a precise and defined reflection and documentation of this theme in the strategy and tactics of this trend is not observed. It seems that in practice, and not necessarily in theory, some shortcomings and strategic-discursive damages of the reform era have also been transferred to the Green Movement. In this context, theoretical discussions regarding the continuity or discontinuity of the Green Movement (or its goals and ideals) have also been ongoing. Some supporters of the Green Movement have turned purple and are sometimes considered radical purples, shifting towards the first approach, namely the government-oriented conservative trend, and are sometimes strongly committed to moving behind Rouhani's government and are very eager to rebuild damaged relations with the leader of the regime. They believe, openly and covertly - and consciously and unconsciously - that the street should return to the electoral arena. These points require a specific discussion. This radical trend is mainly critical of Rouhani's government and always raises demands higher than the government's performance and expects more. They support the government's international de-escalation but do not have a clear and precise opinion regarding the government's regional policies. Perhaps the remnants of some past leftist elements and the anti-imperialist-anti-reactionary approach in the discursive background of this trend are not without influence in this hesitation and ambiguity. This trend sees a close relationship between economic development and political development and is more persistent than the first trend in raising human rights issues, especially regarding political prisoners and the leaders of the Green Movement under house arrest. Some changes in political and analytical preferences from some adherents of this trend towards the third or moderate trend, which will be discussed next, are also observed. At the end of this section, it should be noted that another radical trend, which mainly fits within the framework of peaceful national democracy, also exists and has fundamentally different intellectual and political roots. The lineage of this trend goes back to before the Green Movement. This trend also has relatively similar analyses of current processes and gives more importance to human rights issues. It fundamentally pays attention to the duality of power (velayat/ republic) in Iran. Unlike the three radical currents that we initially separated from this discussion, it does not oppose reformist processes and does not consider them to increase the longevity of the regime, nor does it disrupt the contradictions and political arrangements of forces and organizes around the axis of velayat authoritarianism and national democracy. This trend does not oppose participating in elections and actively participates in some elections, but also places special value on civil movements (including civil disobedience). The possibility and scope of reforms are discussed.