Three Key Cases on the Government's Table

The confrontation and competition between the executive branch and the coercive powers is not a new topic in Iran's political landscape. The institutions under the supervision of the Supreme Leader have been in constant challenge with four governments over the past three decades. This challenge is not exclusive to the Khamenei era; during Khomeini's time, it led to the dismissal of one president (Banisadr) and the sidelining of another (Ali Khamenei). With the parliament becoming less effective, the judiciary, the IRGC, Friday prayer leaders, and councils appointed by Khamenei have been at the forefront of attacks on the executive branch (the part that is not completely tamed). From this confrontation, specific titles like 'insightless elites', 'leaders of sedition', 'deviant current', and 'paving the way for the West' have emerged. Today, during the twelfth presidential term, we are witnessing another chapter of this high-stakes game that has led to the arrest and even assassination (of Saeed Hajarian) of hundreds of state officials. Three cases during the twelfth presidential term will hold special significance in the struggle between the presidents of the last four terms and the institutions under the supervision of the Supreme Leader: the financial misconduct of Hossein Fereydoun, brother of Hassan Rouhani (the Rouhani-Khamenei confrontation), the case of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, which has particularly come to light after the display of his opposition and his allies (the Ahmadinejad-Khamenei confrontation), and the case of the house arrest of the leaders of the Green Movement, which Khatami has called for resolution in his statements to the Supreme Leader (continuation of the Khatami-Khamenei confrontation). The cases related to the Rafsanjani-Khamenei confrontation have faded into the background after his death and no longer hold much political significance. Fereydoun's case: Ishratabad versus Pasteur There are many unanswered questions regarding Hossein Fereydoun's case. First, the charges have not been clearly announced. What were the specific reasons for the arrest? What charges have the prosecutor or judge mentioned in the case? Simply stating 'financial issues' is not a charge. There are specific legal titles for financial charges such as unauthorized appropriation, embezzlement, fraud, bribery, collusion in government transactions, smuggling, money laundering, and illegal appropriation of public and state property. Why is the exact charge not announced? Is it intended that the charges will be fabricated during interrogations like many other political cases? Keeping the charges ambiguous is sometimes a way to open the path for political exchanges between the two sides. Another point is that the initial arrest was made by the IRGC intelligence and the Ishratabad residents after Rouhani mentioned 'the government with a gun'. What was the security aspect that led the IRGC intelligence to intervene? In the explanation of the case by judicial officials, a two-year coordinated operation by some members of parliament, the IRGC, and the judiciary prior to the arrest has been referenced. If this is a normal case in the judiciary, what do those preparations mean? This arrest is supposed to be a display of the fight against corruption, but the abuse of power is an inseparable part of governance in Iran, and the display of fighting it is part of the drama of the power struggle among power centers. Corruption costs the Iranian economy about $35 billion annually (according to Ahmad Tavakoli), which is about half of the country's oil revenue. The arrest of Fereydoun and the possibility of keeping the arrest over him is a kind of attack on Rouhani's weak point to control him. Of course, cases are made against all officials (it is very easy), but only some of them are pursued: the same approach has been taken with Khatami and Ahmadinejad's associates: this is a recipe. Fereydoun's arrest has two clear meanings: the continuation of the struggle between the government and the IRGC, and the use of the judiciary for political settlements. The timing of the arrest indicates this point. This struggle regarding widespread, structural corruption will have no effect because corruption, alongside governmental privileges, is one of the channels left open for buying loyalty and distributing rent. The aim of this arrest is to tame Rouhani after the elections, especially on the eve of ministerial appointments. Rouhani's silence up to this point indicates that he has no trump card in this game. The house arrest case: The smiling Seyed versus the vengeful Seyed Despite the reformists' efforts to get closer to Khamenei and the IRGC (their complete silence regarding military intervention in Syria, full obedience to the Guardian Council, and increasing the IRGC's share of the country's economic pie), and the clear request from the head of the Baran Foundation (Mohammad Khatami), the issue of house arrest remains an obstacle to normalizing relations between the social base of reformists and the appointed power institutions. Khamenei and the military-security institutions completely ignore the requests for lifting the house arrest because the opposing side has no tools to exert pressure, and even placing the names of authoritarian figures on the 'hope' list of the office and the IRGC has not convinced them of the reality of the reformists' repentance. Today, Karroubi is 80 years old, Mir Hossein Mousavi is 76, and Zahra Rahnavard is 72. Karroubi and Mousavi are not in good health, and news of their death could emerge any day. Members of the office and the IRGC will certainly not be saddened by the death of these individuals, but the death of Khomeini's prime minister and Khamenei's speaker of parliament under house arrest would be a stain of disgrace for the religious regime, similar to the deaths of Kazem Shari'atmadari and Hassan Qomi under house arrest. Political brokers have certainly been looking for a solution to this issue, but so far they have not reached an acceptable plan for both sides. For this reason, this case will remain suspended over the political space. The Spring Government case: Jamkaran versus Qom The Spring Government group has shown great enthusiasm and eagerness to gain the presidency. Three key figures of this current, namely Mashaei, Baghaei, and Ahmadinejad, have been disqualified so far, and there is no possibility of their approval. However, they will not withdraw from this game and will bring another candidate to the next elections. Their political activities will continue in the form of a website, trips to cities, and occasional announcements. In this context, the only weapon of the office is the judiciary and case-making and summons because due to the collapse of the field forces, the IRGC cannot act against Ahmadinejad's team. It is unclear how long this mutual battle will continue, but what is clear is that it will lead to further exhaustion of Ahmadinejad's team. What Ahmadinejad and his friends have in their arsenal is that the Wilayatists have not been able to gain the presidency without them. At the same time, there is no sign of a breakthrough for unity between these two groups. Even the distance between them has increased after the 2017 elections. The messianic current has a suppressed ideological and institutional capacity that the Shia clergy and the IRGC ignore. Relying on this capacity makes Ahmadinejad's group a potential threat to the current or future Supreme Leader. Belief in a savior in difficult economic and security conditions acts much more successfully in mobilizing social support than belief in Sharia and reliance on the ineffective or powerless deputy of this savior. As you can see, these three cases are the product of two presidential terms and one presidential election term. If we bring up the cases of Fa'ezeh and Mehdi Hashemi, there remains a case for each president like a knife in the flesh for the government. The twelfth season of the Game of Thrones has just begun in Iran. This series can be much more attractive for Iran watchers than the series of the same name broadcast on HBO.