Tikrit Operation: A Model for Liberating Mosul?

The Tikrit operation, which began on February 28, 2015, with the participation of military units and popular mobilization forces (militias), ultimately succeeded on April 1, 2015, and the city of Tikrit was reclaimed from the Islamic State (ISIS). Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, upon entering Tikrit and referring to the Iraqi flag being raised over the Salah al-Din governorate building, stated without mentioning the role of the Revolutionary Guards or U.S. air support, that "this operation was achieved by the efforts of the Iraqis themselves... and the government is determined to liberate the entire country." Currently, the city of Mosul and half of Anbar province, including the city of Fallujah and a significant part of Ramadi, remain under ISIS control. However, two days after the liberation of Tikrit, in an interview with the German newspaper Spiegel, Haider al-Abadi acknowledged the assistance of the Islamic Republic in the fight against ISIS, responding to a journalist's question about what "political cost" he would pay for this assistance by stating, "Iraq owes nothing to Iran... They [Iranians] are working for their own national security." Officials in Iraq, including Khaled al-Obeidi, the Minister of Defense, have described the Tikrit operation and the cleansing of ISIS from this city as a turning point in the fight against this group, asserting that this operation could pave the way for the liberation of Mosul. However, the manner in which the Tikrit operation was executed and the performance of the participating Iraqi forces not only contradict this but also contain serious warnings and lessons for the military, militias, and political officials in Iraq that must be considered in the Mosul operation, including the lack of cohesion and coordination between military units and popular mobilization forces, and their differing approaches to confronting ISIS. One significant warning is the retaliatory behavior of Shiite militias in Tikrit, who engaged in looting and burning buildings after the liberation operation. According to Reuters, in one instance, they beheaded two ISIS members with knives and dragged several ISIS corpses on the ground. Following this behavior, which provoked strong protests from Sunni representatives in the Iraqi parliament and the head of the Salah al-Din provincial council, the militias were ordered by Haider al-Abadi to leave Tikrit, and security forces and Sunni Arab tribes took control of the city. The geographical position of Mosul poses logistical challenges. Most residents of Tikrit had left the city before the operation began, while ISIS deliberately prevented the residents of Mosul from leaving. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that the residents of this city, over 65% of whom are Sunni, will welcome the Shiite popular mobilization forces or Iraqi military personnel. These forces may face stiff resistance from the residents of Mosul. From a military perspective, the Tikrit operation demonstrated that Shiite popular mobilization forces, in cooperation with military units, can play an effective role in future operations in Iraq, provided that the shortcomings revealed in the Tikrit operation are addressed. Although the experiences gained in this operation could enhance the effectiveness of military and militia units in urban warfare, these experiences cannot predict the outcomes of the Mosul operation. Tikrit is located 130 kilometers north of Baghdad, while Mosul is 350 kilometers from Baghdad, and the nearest Iraqi army base to Mosul, the Baiji base, is located 150 kilometers south of the city. Considering these distances, the deployment of military and militia forces in the Mosul operation and maintaining supply lines will be more challenging and dangerous. Mosul fell to ISIS in June of the previous year, nine months ago, and undoubtedly this group has made necessary defensive preparations. Tikrit covers an area of 150 square kilometers, while Mosul spans 400 square kilometers. Most residents of Tikrit had left the city before the operation began, while ISIS deliberately prevented the residents of Mosul from leaving, and currently, over 750,000 people reside in this city. Additionally, there is no guarantee that the residents of this city, over 65% of whom are Sunni, will welcome the Shiite popular mobilization forces or Iraqi military personnel. These forces may face stiff resistance from the residents of Mosul. Meanwhile, the behavior exhibited by the militias after the liberation of Tikrit has exacerbated the situation. The U.S. plan raises questions about which forces will participate in the Mosul operation, when they will do so, and what the composition and nature of these forces will be. U.S. media and officials have been inconsistent regarding the timing of the Mosul liberation operation. On one hand, a U.S. military official announced that spring would be the time to begin the operation, while on the other hand, U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter ruled out an early start. Some media outlets have reported that the operation will begin before the end of the current year. Nevertheless, a Central Command (CENTCOM) official on February 19 provided unprecedented information about the U.S. operational plan for liberating Mosul, stating that the assault on Mosul would involve five Iraqi brigades with support from three brigades of Peshmerga forces and that nearly 25,000 soldiers would participate in this operation. According to Pentagon estimates, between 1,000 and 2,000 ISIS members are present in Mosul. This CENTCOM official stated that the reorganization, training, and preparation of Iraqi army units by U.S. advisors for the recapture of Mosul has long been underway and that this operation is likely to be executed in early summer of this year. Fundamental weaknesses in the army and widespread corruption cast doubt on the feasibility of such a plan within the announced timeframe, especially since the fundamental weaknesses of the Iraqi army have not been addressed, weaknesses that are essentially political in nature. Current U.S. assistance to the Iraqi army is one of the key structures in revitalizing this army, but aside from weapons, equipment, and training, the Iraqi army, like any effective fighting force, requires motivation, faith, and charismatic leadership from its officers. Evidence suggests that no significant changes have occurred in the sectarian nature of the Iraqi army, which continues to suffer from weak and ineffective leadership, a lack of unit cohesion and spirit of unity, low morale, and corruption. Evidence indicates that no significant changes have been made in the sectarian nature of the Iraqi army, which continues to suffer from weak and ineffective leadership, a lack of unit cohesion and spirit of unity, low morale, and corruption. Haider al-Abadi revealed in a meeting on November 30 of last year that there are 50,000 fake names in the Iraqi army receiving salaries from four divisions of Iraq, some of whom do not even exist. Regarding widespread corruption in the Iraqi army and police forces, The New York Times reported on November 23, 2014, citing several Iraqi officers, lawmakers, and U.S. officials, that one Iraqi general is known as "General Chicken" due to his reputation for selling soldiers' chicken rations, while another general is referred to as "General Alcohol" because of his habit of drinking during working hours, and finally, another general is known as "General Office" due to his eagerness to receive 10,000 dinar bills in exchange for granting jobs to officers. The configuration and capabilities of the army The current Iraqi army is merely a shadow of the modern army established by the U.S. after 2003. In that year, following the dissolution of the Ba'athist Iraqi army, the U.S. and its allies spent $25 billion to establish, organize, and equip this modern army - an army with a capacity of 250,000 personnel, 400 tanks, 2,500 armored combat vehicles, and 278 helicopters. However, despite this significant manpower and equipment, this army lacked sufficient combat readiness and was struggling to recruit new personnel and maintain training at the unit level to preserve its effectiveness. In such circumstances, as the security situation in Iraq deteriorated, then-Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki stationed experienced units of the army in Baghdad and its surroundings, neglecting to pay adequate attention to political and military events in western Iraq, particularly in Fallujah and Ramadi, and the disintegration of four divisions of the Iraqi army in Mosul, with a capacity of 30,000 personnel, showcased the fundamental weaknesses of this army. The collapse and surrender of Iraqi divisions in June of last year to ISIS severely damaged the army's reputation, and the Tikrit operation, in which militias played the main role, did little to restore the tarnished image of this army. The continuation of this situation threatens to undermine the status and dignity of the army as the most important military institution in the country. Currently, the nominal and apparent strength of the Iraqi army is reduced to 40 weak and ineffective brigades. Nearly six months ago, General Martin Dempsey, the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated that half of the Iraqi army is incapable of fighting the Islamic State, and the other half needs to be rebuilt with the help of U.S. advisors and military equipment. According to this senior officer, assessments by U.S. military experts of the Iraqi army indicate that 26 brigades of this army, with competent commanders and a sense of nationalism, not sectarianism, can fight the Islamic State, while the remaining brigades, most of whose personnel are Shiite, are not considered reliable units for combating ISIS. Military experts' assessments indicate that the capabilities of the Iraqi Ministry of Interior have similarly declined. This ministry has 24 small brigades and a personnel count of 36,000. In addition to the army and the Ministry of Interior, Iraq also has two other security-military forces. One of them is the popular mobilization force, with a capacity of 100,000 personnel, of which only 20,000 have received adequate training and possess combat capability. The other force being organized by the Baghdad government is the National Guard, which will be under the control of provincial councils. Alongside these forces, the Kurdistan Regional Government is also organizing and equipping Peshmerga forces, which number 54 brigades and have a personnel count of 113,000. A quantitative comparison of these forces indicates that the Iraqi army is becoming the smallest force in the country. The military units in Tikrit did not play a decisive role, and the performance of this army in future operations will be crucial for this institution and will shape its future - a future that is closely linked to the political support of Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds, as well as the role of this army in liberating Mosul, although the Kurds of Iraq are historically concerned about the strengthening of the army. Challenges in liberating Mosul Given the significant weaknesses of the Iraqi army, the Baghdad government had no choice but to rely on militias to liberate Tikrit. The U.S. plan for Mosul does not include militias, and in fact, the U.S. does not have a direct relationship with the popular mobilization force, and its operational coordination is limited to the army and the Iraqi Ministry of Defense. Considering the course of the Tikrit operation and the military lessons learned, and the fact that no fundamental changes have been evident in the capabilities and performance of the army, the use of popular mobilization forces in the Mosul operation, as well as U.S. air support, will be inevitable, especially since the Kurdish Peshmerga do not consider the liberation of Mosul a priority in their operational agenda. Sunni residents of Mosul have the ability to determine the fate of this city. Between 1,000 and 2,000 ISIS members are stationed in Mosul, ruling over this city, but this city has over 100,000 eligible individuals for combat and arming who have remained neutral thus far and may rise against ISIS if concessions are made by the Baghdad government. The Peshmerga, in January of this year, during an operation, recaptured several villages surrounding Mosul from ISIS and disrupted the supply lines between Mosul and Tal Afar and Syria, but officials of the Kurdistan Regional Government have explicitly stated that the Peshmerga will not go beyond Kurdish areas and that the liberation of Mosul is the responsibility of the Iraqi army, not the Kurds. In addition to the importance of the composition of the forces participating in the liberation of Mosul, this city serves as the capital of Iraq's Sunnis and has not only a poor relationship with the Shiites but also does not welcome the presence of Kurds. Despite this, Khaled al-Obeidi, the Iraqi Minister of Defense, stated on February 25, 2015, that 80% of the residents of this city are with the government and army, saying, "They are waiting for the liberation of the city from the terrorists of ISIS and... the operation to liberate the country will be completed this year." This prediction will only come true if ISIS is in a weak position in Mosul and its resistance breaks in the short term. On the surface, 25,000 attacking forces, considering 12 attackers for every defender, may seem rational, but the reality is that the capability of these forces will diminish given the extensive tasks they will undertake. In the city of Mosul, with its current population of 700,000, personnel of these forces will have to grapple with explosive traps and clear buildings while maintaining security.