Tirman: Resolving Implementation Issues of the JCPOA May Take About a Year

John Tirman believes that it is still too early to consider the JCPOA a turning point, although beyond disarmament, the fact that the JCPOA created a new opportunity for dialogue between Iran and the U.S. is likely the most significant achievement of the agreement. In an interview with Radio Farda, he mentioned that potential changes in political actors in Iran and the U.S. could impact the implementation of the JCPOA. John Tirman is a political science professor and executive director of the Center for International Studies at MIT, where he also directs the Iran-U.S. relations project. He has authored several books on international affairs. It has been a year since Iran and the P5+1 reached the nuclear agreement. Do you consider this agreement a turning point in international politics? The claim that this agreement can actually be a turning point is still a big assertion, as we do not know what the situation will be in one, ten, or fifteen years. There are issues in the implementation of the agreement that may take about a year to resolve. Questions remain, but from a positive perspective, this agreement was a significant action, not only in the realm of disarmament but also in creating an opening in Iran-U.S. relations, which had not communicated for over three decades. We are talking about two countries that are important in global politics. The situation of the U.S. is clear, but Iran is also a large country with oil reserves and a strategic position, where revolutionary and Islamic ideology is also very significant. Therefore, this new discourse, or new phase that created an opportunity for dialogue, is likely the most important achievement of this agreement. However, do you agree that this is just the beginning of a long path with no guarantee of reaching a destination? There are many problems for the relationship, and the negotiations that led to the agreement did not address other issues. The experience with the Soviet Union and other countries has shown that negotiations around nuclear issues almost never address topics outside this realm. This applies to Iran as well, where the six countries focused on Iran's fuel cycle and technology, which could potentially pose a threat if militarized. These negotiations did not address other issues, including terrorism, Syria, human rights, Yemen, and other regional matters, because reaching an agreement on nuclear issues, with all its technical and political aspects, is inherently very difficult. Therefore, I think it was a rational decision to focus on the nuclear issue, which the U.S. pursued, and with expert researchers in this field, they were able to reach a conclusion. Other issues, whose situations have worsened, remain. These issues are more related to the U.S. relations with Saudi Arabia and Israel, which are Iran's main enemies, or related to the Syrian war, where Iran has spent thousands of troops and significant amounts of money to support Assad, or Yemen and some other areas. As a result, there are multiple controversies in the region, some of which are extremely violent, which this agreement did not address, and the opportunity for direct contact between the U.S. and Iran has created a chance for a useful diplomatic discourse that might, for example, find a solution to the chaos in Syria. You mentioned that the issue was only nuclear and that other crises were not addressed. What is your opinion on this criticism of the JCPOA, where critics say that this agreement somehow gave the upper hand to Iran and legitimized Iran's position in the international community? I think this analysis is correct. The relationship between the foreign ministers of Iran and the U.S., Mohammad Javad Zarif and John Kerry, who claim to be in constant contact, somewhat grants Iran the legitimacy and respect it has sought in international forums for years. However, I think a negative aspect of this is that the U.S. compensates for this by providing new weapons to Israel and supporting Saudi Arabia's attack on Yemen, which is the cost of the agreement; this is another complex issue. Nevertheless, reaching an agreement with six world powers has given Iran a kind of power that it has not had in the last ten to fifteen years. But what this means for the region is still unclear. Because the problem is not just the so-called Syrian quagmire and the violence in which Iran also plays a role, but the refugee crisis in Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey, and the situation in Iraq with the rise of ISIS and other jihadist groups has made the situation very complicated. This situation requires innovative diplomacy, especially from Iran, which we have not yet witnessed. Countries need to act responsibly, not only regarding Syria but also in the Saudi war in Yemen, which I believe is a clear distortion of human rights. Another issue I should mention is that while sanctions are being lifted, the human rights situation in Iran, and not just in Iran, but Iran's support for Hezbollah and other groups that the U.S. considers terrorist; this issue was also not included in the agreement, but it has overshadowed the status of sanctions, and all U.S. sanctions have not been lifted for this reason. Many sanctions remain due to support for terrorism and the human rights situation in Iran, even in large states like California, where their sanctions remain in place, and companies from these states cannot invest in Iran, and these sanctions hinder the full implementation of the nuclear agreement and relate to non-nuclear issues. In your statements, you referred to the foreign ministers of Iran and the U.S. What do you think will happen if we remove these two from the picture, for example, with the upcoming elections in November in the U.S. and next year's elections in Iran? This is a good question because I have always believed that the election of Rouhani and the appointment of Zarif was a point in the effort for dialogue and finding a solution to the nuclear issue. Zarif, whom I have seen a few times and I find him an attractive personality, spent a large part of his life in the U.S. and studied here during the Shah's time. After the revolution, he returned to Iran. His familiarity with the U.S. and many political figures here, during his time at the United Nations, created a fundamental difference in Iran's leadership group for a proper understanding of U.S. policies and political culture that could hinder negotiations, such as what Congress did or what certain media said. Zarif understood these matters better than any foreign minister in Iran. I think the same can be said for John Kerry, although he has not been to Iran, but he was open to negotiation and spent a lot of time on this issue in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Of course, I should say that Hillary Clinton, as Secretary of State, was also moving in a similar direction, and there were even efforts during the Bush administration from 2005-2006 to negotiate in good faith. Therefore, there was a long path of diplomacy that was significantly developed with the arrival of Zarif and Kerry. This is how politics works in the U.S., and it seems that in the next administration, someone else will replace Kerry. But Zarif's situation relates to Rouhani's re-election, which is again related to the process of lifting sanctions, but I think Zarif will be considered a serious political force for a while, and this is a good thing. I want to ask you about a slightly different topic. What is your assessment of Iran's position between Russia and the U.S.? Russia, at one time, joined other powers in negotiating with Iran when it had serious problems with the U.S. and the EU regarding Ukraine. This is a very good question, and I think you have pointed to an issue that has not been discussed much. I am not a Russia expert, but I try to follow developments in that country, and I think it is very significant that Russia pursued the P5+1 negotiations with Iran in such a way that when France, Britain, and the U.S. challenged Moscow, it did not abandon the nuclear negotiations. This could have led to the collapse of negotiations and failure to reach an agreement, as they had the power to do so as a Security Council member. I believe one of the important issues for Russia is the economic benefit it has in Iran; they want to sell nuclear technology to Iran and many other things. Russia has a long-standing relationship with Iran and can gain many benefits. But the geopolitical question is whether Iran can have a place in the new Cold War between the U.S. and Russia? I think the discourse about this Cold War is somewhat exaggerated. Of course, there is a serious problem regarding Ukraine and its eastern territories and Crimea. However, most countries involved in this issue are trying to reduce tensions and want to solve this issue through backdoor dialogues, which I do not know where it will lead. I think after Russia's annexation of Crimea, there was severe tension that has somewhat subsided, which is good. And it should be resolved through diplomatic efforts, which I do not think Iran has a place in this balance. But do you think the agreement and the space that was created helped to ease the crisis? It certainly helped. If the Russians had cut off negotiations, it would have posed a serious challenge for the U.S. and Europe. Therefore, one can assess the non-interference in the negotiation process as a positive action. My other question is about the European Union. How do you evaluate the renewed relationship of the European Union with Iran and the beginning of 'high-level' dialogues? Does this union think only of economic interests, or is it genuinely considering that Iran could be an ally for this union? I think it is a combination of both issues. And of course, it varies from country to country. I think the economic issue is somewhat the icing on the cake. France, Britain, and Germany, as negotiators, clearly wanted to resolve the tension that was fundamentally between the U.S. and Iran. This tension was sometimes close to turning into a military attack that could suddenly be carried out by Israel. And if Israel did this, the U.S. would inevitably have to get involved. As a result, it was a dangerous situation. At the same time, the rest of the region, especially the rise of ISIS in Syria and Iraq, is very concerning for Europe, both in terms of the potential for the region to spiral out of control at such an important cost in human terms, and in terms of the refugee crisis, which has created a difficult situation for Europeans, especially Germany. Therefore, it was very important for them to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue to help find a solution to the ISIS crisis in Iraq and Syria and Syria itself, and for Iran to be a positive partner in solving problems, and its military force to fight ISIS is important for all Europeans. And of course, Iran is a large country with oil wealth, an educated population, and a country with high consumer demand, making it attractive for the global market, and Europeans want to take advantage of this opportunity.