Transformation of Civil Institutions in Iran Over the Past Decade

According to Mohammad Reza Rostami, Deputy for Youth Affairs at the Ministry of Sports and Youth under Rouhani's government, "In 2005, over four thousand NGOs were active in the country... This number drastically decreased from 2005 to 2013, reaching 54 NGOs... In the two years of the new government, the number of NGOs has reached 550." (Fararu, October 10, 2015) According to various reports, the number of registered non-profit and civil institutions during Khatami's presidency ranged from 8,300 to 25,000. How and why did this significant growth until the end of Khatami's presidency decline so sharply during Ahmadinejad's era? Is there hope that society will achieve similar growth in NGOs during Rouhani's term? The strengthening and expansion of civil institutions were part of both the reform movement's agenda in the 1990s and Khatami's government. The concept of "civil society" was primarily introduced to Iranian society during this period. As a result of cooperation between the government and reformist political and social activists, civil institutions experienced significant growth in scientific, artistic, sports, charitable, cultural, and professional fields during this period. This growth included not only quantity but also allowed weakened institutions from the previous era and new institutions to expand their areas of work. This expansion continued to the point where one year, the book fair was handed over to publishers, and cinema and press associations played a significant role in organizing the Fajr Festival and the Press Festival. Khatami's government was serious about transferring some state activities to civil institutions, as it did not see them as competitors. However, the Supreme Leader and government opponents were dissatisfied with this trend and feared that the empowerment of civil institutions would lead to a loss of their totalitarian control over society. Consequently, both the judiciary and security and military institutions became active in opposing these institutions. The period of stagnation began due to these destructive activities, along with the suspension of permits for new institutions, the cessation of collaborations and transfers by the government, and a tsunami of arrests and house arrests of political activists. Civil and non-profit institutions rapidly headed towards closure after 2005. Additionally, two other factors contributed to the unprecedented stagnation of these institutions. First, there was a flood of migration of social and political activists abroad, especially after the Green Movement in 2009. Second, Ahmadinejad's government made unprecedented efforts to create fake civil institutions that received their budgets from state and quasi-state entities, with their programs and personnel completely under the supervision of state institutions. Ahmadinejad's government viewed mosques and religious councils as its social base and provided them with financial and logistical support. Ahmadinejad's government opposed independent intermediary institutions (administratively, organizationally, and financially) between the people and the government, both in the realm of parties and social civil institutions. This government effectively summarized popular institutions within religious councils and mosques. The leadership apparatus has always aligned with Ahmadinejad's views in this regard, and support for Ahmadinejad's rise to the presidency was due to these alignments. After the Green Movement, Ahmadinejad's government and the institutions under the leader's supervision (security, military, law enforcement, and judiciary) set out to completely eliminate civil institutions. Their assumption was that these institutions would side with the people in any social movement rather than the government, and thus their absence would benefit the government more than their presence. The record of the leadership apparatus and Ahmadinejad's government until 2013 has been very successful in this regard. The blow inflicted on civil institutions from 2009 to 2013 was so severe that in the two years of Rouhani's government, despite some positive inclinations towards these institutions at lower levels of government, they have been unable to rise again. Rouhani's government prioritized de-escalation in foreign relations and lifting sanctions over domestic policy and social issues, which have generally not been on the government's radar. If officials have spoken about issues such as women's rights in some areas, they have quickly retreated at the slightest opposition from clerics to avoid increasing pressure on the government. The very slight increase in the number of NGOs (reaching about 15% of Khatami's era) is not due to Rouhani's special attention, but rather first due to the change in government and improved morale among some social activists, and second, a somewhat unrealistic perception among some government officials that change was possible with Ahmadinejad's departure. For example, members of the Press Syndicate have attempted several times since 2013 to hold meetings and form a new board, but ultimately could not overcome the barrier posed by the Ministry of Intelligence, which had more authority in this area than the Ministry of Culture or the Ministry of Labor. In the case of the House of Cinema, the only change was the removal of pressure from Ahmadinejad's officials for the dissolution of this guild, rather than any special investment by the government for the inclusion and greater power of this guild or transferring cinema management to this institution. Beyond which government and what policies hold the executive power in Iran, the Supreme Leader's policy has been to weaken and eliminate independent civil institutions and to create fake institutions dependent on and close to the government, managed by loyal elements. Both Khomeini and Khamenei have had a harsh and sometimes violent approach to civil institutions. Both have viewed society in a mass-oriented way and have feared the organization of individuals in various institutions and their identification with organizations. Members of military, law enforcement, and paramilitary institutions have been cherished in their eyes, while members of civil institutions have been treated with disdain. Consider the government's (coercive power institutions) approach to the Writers' Association as one of the independent institutions over the past 37 years. The goal has been to eliminate this association by any means possible: from the constant arrest of some members to the assassination and murder of some (Mohammad Mokhtari and Mohammad Jafar Pouyandeh), and from the non-issuance of permits for gatherings to severe censorship of the works of members of this association. Alongside these measures, efforts have been made to establish seemingly independent associations such as the Iran Pen Association (with a name that evokes independent writers' associations worldwide) and the Islamic Artists' Association by loyal writers to marginalize the association. In contrast to the House of Cinema, the Sacred Defense Cinematic Association was also formed.