Transformation of Sunni Islam and the Politics of the Islamic Republic

The closure of the Sunni prayer hall in Tehran by the municipality last week, along with the silence of government officials, indicates that the policy of imposing restrictions on Sunnis remains a public policy of the Iranian government, while social developments have granted a new and active position to Sunnis in Iranian society. Meanwhile, this new position, which has increased the international and regional importance of Sunni leaders in Iran, has compelled the Iranian government to politically exploit these leaders. The meeting of Molavi Abdulhamid, the most significant political and religious figure among Sunnis, with Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the leader of the Islamic Republic, reflects a change in some of the Islamic Republic's policies towards Sunnis. This meeting occurred within the framework of a gathering of participants at the Islamic Unity Conference with the Supreme Leader, but the manner of reporting and the images released convey a specific media significance. The release of these images following the cold atmosphere of this year's Unity Week and the protests of Sunnis against the continuation of discriminatory policies against them is a sign of an attempt to appease Sunnis. After this meeting, Mohammad Taghi Rahbar, the Friday prayer leader of Isfahan, called for a change in the approach of hardliners who, according to the leader, 'create discord.' Mr. Rahbar stated, 'After this meeting, hardliners who consider themselves followers of Ayatollah Khamenei and claim to be loyal to the leadership should adhere to the Supreme Leader's policies instead of insulting Molavi Abdulhamid, this Sunni scholar.' The roots of the dual policy During the past week, two other events also drew media attention back to the issue of Sunnis. One was the release of a news report by the Rasa news agency (close to the Qom seminary) showing a photo of two congregational prayers held in a hall, one attended by Shia government officials and the other by Sunni scholars. Some on social media interpreted this photo as a sign of the superficial and baseless nature of the Iranian government's claims to pursue Shia-Sunni unity. In response to this photo, a university student in Zahedan wrote on his Facebook page that some university and provincial officials prevent him and his Shia friends from attending the Sunni congregational prayer at this university, while according to these students, Mr. Khamenei has deemed the presence of these youths at the Sunni congregational prayer permissible. Mr. Khamenei's inclination to show friendship with Sunnis is not new. He once lived among Sunnis in Iranshahr in exile and has always maintained a friendly relationship with Sunni scholars. However, in recent years, he has not reacted to the protests of Sunnis and even in the case of Molavi Abdulhamid's mediation for the release of captured soldiers, factions close to Mr. Khamenei intensified their verbal attacks on Molavi Abdulhamid. Another event last week was the prevention of a congregational prayer led by Molavi Abdulhamid in a prayer hall in the Pounak area in northwestern Tehran. This prayer hall has been used by Sunnis residing in Tehran for years to hold prayers due to the prevention of mosque construction by Sunnis in Tehran. In such circumstances, Mr. Khamenei's appeasement of Molavi Abdulhamid could provoke speculation about the reason for this appeasement and its timing. The newspaper Qanoon, in an interview with Mr. Rahbar, raised the question of whether this meeting could be related to the position of Sunni leaders to act as mediators between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Mr. Rahbar's response is diplomatic but contains an undeniable context for Iran's desire to use Sunni leaders to end the cold atmosphere between Iran and Saudi Arabia following the Iran-U.S. agreement on Iran's nuclear program and Saudi Arabia's role in reducing oil prices: 'I do not want to comment on their relationship with Saudi Arabia and other countries. In any case, we do not express an opinion on this matter. However, we will have sympathy with Saudi Arabia as an Islamic country, if they also align with Iran's unity policies and do not seek discord with Islamic Iran by provoking the Americans.' Just six months ago, in Tir, when Molavi Abdulhamid intended to attend the international conference 'Attention of Islamic Scholars to Institutionalize Peace, Moderation, and Sound Reason' in Turkey as a special guest, security officials declared him banned from leaving the country. According to reports from Sunni sources, Mr. Abdulhamid's contact with Ali Younesi, the advisor to the president on minority affairs, could not resolve the issue. The travel ban on Mr. Abdulhamid occurred a month after he responded to concerns expressed by some influential figures among hardline Shia in Qom regarding the increasing Sunni population, calling it 'baseless and provocative.' Mr. Abdulhamid's remarks were in response to Ayatollah Nasser Makarem Shirazi's comments, who is considered a reference close to Mr. Khamenei and hardline factions. These disagreements reflect the roots of the duality in the Islamic Republic's policy towards Sunnis. On one hand, the leaders of the Islamic Republic want to exploit the display of friendly relations with Sunni leaders as a symbol of the Islamic Republic's proximity to the majority of Muslims worldwide. On the other hand, the government continues to impose constitutional violations against Sunnis to satisfy influential Shia figures who repeatedly express their concerns about social developments among Sunnis. These figures lead hardliners in increasing propaganda against Sunnis at the national level, especially in Qom and Sunni-populated areas. Transformation in the Sunni community The Sunni community in Iran has witnessed significant transformations over the past twenty years. Most of the Sunni population resides in areas (such as Kurdistan, West Azerbaijan, Khorasan, Fars, Hormozgan, Golestan, Gilan, and Tehran) that have experienced higher-than-average population growth in the past twenty years compared to previous years. This characteristic explains the change in demographic ratios. According to reports from the Ministry of Interior in the first half of the 1980s, Sunnis constituted about 9% of Iran's population. Molavi Abdulhamid stated in an interview with the 'Sunni Online' website: 'There is no reason to express concern about the Sunni population. Sunnis have been in this country in the past and had this population; they have not recently increased their birth rate. The Sunni community and many sources have repeatedly stated that the Sunni population in this country is about 25%, and according to research we conducted with the Ministry of Interior, we received confidential information from official sources that the Sunni population is about 20%. Previously, when we said this, no one accepted this reality. Now that the authorities want to examine the Sunni population, they will see that the Sunni population is somewhat higher than their expectations. It is not the case that this population has recently increased through birth rates. This is a complete misunderstanding that the Sunni population has increased.' Thus, while government-affiliated sources estimate the Sunni population to be less than eight million, Sunni sources claim the Sunni population is at least 15 million. Official statistics do not confirm the Sunnis' claims, but the phenomenon of undercounting or ignoring the Sunni population has always existed in Iran's censuses and official statistics. The disagreement in understanding the reality of the Sunni community does not limit itself to population counting. While the government still tries to portray a picture of scattered rural demographic groups or residents of underdeveloped cities and often uneducated clergy unfamiliar with today's society, the reality is that the sharp increase in urbanization, literacy, and educated groups has changed the quality of the Sunni population and even its clergy. In such a transformation, merely appeasing Sunnis through official unity displays is no longer feasible. Today, Sunnis and even their religious leaders speak of the necessity of equality in citizenship rights. From their perspective, the concept of unity without equality in citizenship rights is nothing but a deception. Researchers studying the Sunni community say that the level of urbanization and social connections in the Sunni community has increased, leading to a departure from a sense of isolation that previously dominated the Sunni community. Not only has the new generation of Sunni youth increased their social activity both domestically and abroad, but Sunni clerics have also distanced themselves from their traditional values based on separation from political and social activities. According to researchers like Abdul Wahab Shahlibar, a Sunni researcher, these transformations have even affected the institution of religion in areas like Balochistan: 'The institution of religion in Balochistan today, despite its fundamentalist roots, has taken a strongly pragmatic direction and is trying to align itself with the political and social atmosphere of the Balochi community and the country. In fact, although with the entry of 'Deobandism' into the Balochistan region, religion transitioned from a primitive, minimal, and unorganized state to a direction of organizing social and individual life based on its teachings, the pressures of political and social realities of the past two decades have directed it towards non-fundamentalist paths. To put it more specifically, in the early entry of the Deobandi interpretation of Sunni Islam into Balochistan and its institutionalization efforts, emerging clerics, by criticizing the public atmosphere of society and also labeling old clerics as unfamiliar with religious teachings and lacking serious education, sought to shape a specific social and cultural order in the region and, so to speak, invited the Baloch people to renew their faith in true Islam, as stated in primary and fundamental religious texts. However, as they defined political and social roles for themselves, their critical perspective on the personal and social lives of the people gradually diminished, and they adjusted themselves to the pulse of society instead of wanting to create a fundamentalist community.' Sunnis and the Central Civil Society According to Sunni researchers, recent social transformations are not only ignored by the government but are also deemed insignificant by central civil society figures and political groups. The result of this neglect has been the diminished official status of Sunnis in the country's centralized political and social space. In recent years, for the first time in the discourse of political and administrative officials, Sunnis have been referred to as a minority, while according to the constitutional law of the Islamic Republic, even local regulations must be based on the religion of one of the Sunni sects that has a majority. Thus, the legal status of Sunnis is officially different from that of other religious minorities, but the government's actions in recent years and its alignment with hardline Shia figures have intensified the policy of limiting Sunnis and viewing them outside the official religion of the country, a policy that does not favor the emergence of the Sunni community from the isolation it has experienced since the 1979 revolution.