Transition from 'Insider-Outsider' to 'Revolutionary-Non-Revolutionary'

For years, the name of the Islamic Republic has been intertwined with the dichotomy of 'revolutionary and non-revolutionary', but recently, revolutionary ideology has been redefined in a new style and definition within Iran's political landscape. In recent years, 'being revolutionary', 'thinking revolutionarily', and 'remaining revolutionary' have become public in all political stances and movements of those close to Ayatollah Khamenei, and as the date of the twelfth presidential election approaches, the delineation of figures and political groups inside and outside this categorization becomes more apparent. This delineation coincides with the changing political fabric of power in favor of reformists and moderates, aiming to establish a new definition of political composition and identity in Iran. Efforts are underway to negate the dichotomy of principlists and reformists, which is perceived as a purification of political forces. Most notably, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, in 2012 during a meeting with Air Force personnel, positioned the term revolutionary against being diplomatic in negotiations with the U.S., stating: 'I am not a diplomat; I am a revolutionary.' Since that position, Ayatollah Khamenei has repeatedly used terms such as revolutionary Islam, revolutionary thought, revolutionary stances, revolutionary foreign policy, revolutionary art, revolutionary economy, revolutionary clerics, revolutionary experts, revolutionary spirit and will, revolutionary presence, revolutionary identity, and revolutionary young believers, emphasizing the promotion of revolutionary views and beliefs. He has repeatedly stressed that the 'spirit of revolutionary thought' must be maintained among officials and politicians. Moreover, he warned that 'we must stand against the current within the system that does not accept revolutionary thought.' He has explicitly questioned the discourse of reformism and principlism, stating: 'I have repeatedly said that for me, these divisions of principlist and reformist and modern and traditional reformists, and the like, do not matter; I do not pay attention to these names at all; I care about the contents.' However, his most explicit speech and position declaration came in June 2016, on the anniversary of Ayatollah Khomeini's death, where he outlined the characteristics of revolutionary thought and warned: 'The mindset that equates revolutionary thought with extremism and divides people into hardliners and moderates is one of the mistakes. Such dichotomies, which are the gifts of foreigners and the words of enemies, should not enter the political culture of the country.' Following these remarks by Ayatollah Khamenei, figures and groups close to him quickly began to clarify the instances of revolutionary thought and promote a dichotomy that encompasses a very limited range of political groups. If at one point in the history of the Islamic Republic, many political activists were excluded from the power circle in the insider-outsider division, now the new polarization of revolutionary-non-revolutionary seeks to filter the same insiders and impose more restrictions. This issue is so pronounced that some principlists close to the top of the regime emphasize that individuals and groups whose thoughts are in opposition to the Islamic government will not be allowed to hold responsibilities within the Islamic Republic. Who are the revolutionaries? But who are these non-revolutionaries that must be sidelined from the power circle? What is the reason for the multiple warnings that have intensified in the past year? This is after nearly four decades since the Islamic Revolution, during which, according to common international definitions, Iran is not in a revolutionary condition following the establishment of new governments. Ayatollah Khamenei, who is referred to as the 'Leader of the Revolution', himself outlined the indicators of revolutionary thought during the anniversary of Ayatollah Khomeini's death, declaring five pillars: 'Adherence to the fundamental principles and values of the revolution', 'Aiming for the ideals of the revolution and a high ambition to achieve them', 'Commitment to the comprehensive independence of the country', 'Not obeying the enemy and engaging in the great jihad', and 'Religious and political piety'. With his speech, figures and media close to him began to further elaborate on the aspects of revolutionary thought, which according to their definition, the majority of political forces become a minority, leaving no room for compromise or understanding. Among them, the newspaper Resalat wrote in a detailed editorial that 'the revolutionary current emphasizes a heartfelt and unconditional belief in the absolute guardianship of the jurist, aligning the revolutionary outlook in all aspects of society and people's lives with the culture of Ali, Fatima, Hussein, and Mahdi.' In contrast, the non-revolutionaries were introduced as a current that, while accepting the system and conditional guardianship, considers itself committed to Western economic principles, believes in Western technocratism and pragmatism, and follows the approach of Ayatollah Montazeri in the realm of the guardianship of the jurist. These two groups are separate from those labeled as anti-revolutionary. The division of 'with us or against us' has been reiterated with intensity in all statements of the groups close to the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic. They believe that Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the current close to him, and Hassan Rouhani's government are seeking relations with the U.S. and an open economy, exhibiting a tendency towards elitism and compromise, and for these reasons, they lack a revolutionary spirit. With this analysis, they argue that 'a jihadist and revolutionary president' should replace Rouhani. Saeed Jalili, representative of Ayatollah Khamenei in the Supreme National Security Council, compared revolutionaries and non-revolutionaries in Qom, stating: 'The non-revolutionary wants to make a nation regret the revolution; and against the revolutionary thought that thinks of a nation's independence, they seek despotism and aim to distort Islam and promote counterfeit Islams. They are looking for doubt and incitement.' With such a definition of revolutionaries, major groups of reformist, critical, and dissenting political parties, and even principlists in Iran are excluded from the circle of revolutionaries approved by the regime. This categorization seems to be a way for the regime to determine its stance with political currents that, if they think and act outside these characteristics and domains, will be labeled non-revolutionary and even anti-revolutionary, having no place in power relations. The advancement of this policy occurs at a time when, in the past 30 years, all figures close to Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic, have been sidelined from power; also, from the seventh parliament in 2003 to today, many reformist and critical figures have been removed from the power circle in various ways, from widespread disqualifications by the Guardian Council and the formation of judicial cases and long prison sentences to house arrest, exclusion, closure, and cancellation of party activity permits. In contrast, groups close to the top of the regime have enjoyed material and moral support throughout these years. To the extent that Ayatollah Khamenei recently condemned the attack by a group of Hezbollah members on the Saudi embassy, he harshly stated: 'Some constantly repeat the word extremists, meaning the faithful and Hezbollah current'; 'We should not accuse revolutionary and Hezbollah youth of extremism, as these youths are wholeheartedly present in the field, and whenever defense of borders and national identity is necessary, they are in the middle of the field.' Such explicit positions and direct and indirect references indicate that the policies and actions of Hassan Rouhani and his government are not approved. Additionally, in the tenth parliament, some figures who passed the Guardian Council filter and succeeded in entering parliament have challenged the policies and actions of the regime. Such conditions also prevail in the Assembly of Experts and the seminaries. The current labeled as non-revolutionary believes that such an idea suppresses revolutionary forces, and accepting this proposition is in itself a form of 'anti-revolution.' Hassan Rouhani, in March 2016, in critical remarks, stated that the Iranian revolution was for national unity and not for figures to emphasize their revolutionary nature in words, 'Otherwise, what benefit is there if I say I am revolutionary?' These positions have become sharper and clearer as the twelfth presidential election approaches, and the use of the revolutionary and non-revolutionary polarization has become more widespread. On one hand, Hassan Rouhani's government is under pressure from its opponents in the economic and JCPOA domains, and on the other hand, the faction defined within the revolutionary circle is seeking to introduce a candidate to replace Rouhani in the twelfth presidential term. Abdul Reza Davari, a close associate of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, told the Arman newspaper: 'Rouhani's government does not have revolutionary orientations, and these non-revolutionary approaches in 2016 will severely polarize the country.' The polarization that some principlists, such as members of the Stability Front, evaluate one side as Hashemi Rafsanjani and his supporters and the other side as groups close to and aligned with the guardianship of the jurist. What has become public is the dichotomy of revolutionary and non-revolutionary, but the ambiguous point is finding a figure who, while possessing the characteristics desired by the revolutionary discourse and being approved, also has social acceptance and a base. An effort that has not yet reached fruition.