Trump, Rouhani, and 'Politicking'

Recent orientations from the White House and the harsh words of the President of the United States against the Islamic Republic have predictably reflected a convergence within the political governance of Iran. In two significant instances over the past days, Hassan Rouhani and Mohammad Javad Zarif have praised and honored the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Rouhani described the IRGC as 'beloved by the nation' and 'in the hearts of the Iranian people,' while Zarif referred to the IRGC as 'dear and an honor for the Iranian people.' In a report on the positions of the main factions within the political power structure, Rouhani emphasized, 'There is no disagreement among the factions of the country in confronting the plots of the enemies.' These statements were significantly confirmed by recent remarks from Mohammad Khatami. The former President of Iran, who has recently been rumored to face new restrictions against him, stated in a meeting with a group of students that 'there may be differences of opinion in Iran, but there is no disagreement in upholding the dignity of Iran, the essence of the revolution, and the main national interests, and standing against external threats. Can someone come and insult the IRGC with their nonsense? The IRGC is born from the revolution and is one of the pillars of our national security.' Recent threats from Washington and the announcement of potential restrictions and sanctions against the IRGC have effectively sidelined previous criticisms from Rouhani's government and reformists towards the IRGC. In the new situation, it is unlikely that Rouhani will criticize the 'government with guns' or say that 'if information, guns, money, newspapers, news agencies, and other manifestations of power are concentrated in one institution, even if it is Abu Dharr and Salman, it will become corrupt.' Although Rouhani's increasing alignment with the central power (including the security forces governing the IRGC and Quds Force) has been noticeable since the recent presidential election, the severe and intense orientations from the White House have maximized the proximity of the official positions of the government and the IRGC. This situation will not be without its challenges for Rouhani's government; the moderate president will find it increasingly difficult to complain about threats or disruptions affecting his promises for political, cultural, and even economic development. Rouhani is even compelled to remain silent about differences of opinion regarding foreign diplomacy. All of this signifies an increase in the despair and frustration of the social base supporting the moderate government regarding the realization of his electoral slogans and statements, leading to a significant drop in support for Rouhani and even reformists. This situation will weaken Rouhani's hand for potential negotiations within the political power structure. Independently of this, it seems that Rouhani has turned more towards alignment with the apex of the political system and the security forces governing the IRGC and traditional references sympathetic to the government rather than relying on supporting social forces; an approach that is not indifferent to the future absence of the second leader of the Islamic Republic and the upcoming challenges of the system. In such a situation (whether due to the threat from the United States and the extension of the post-JCPOA crisis and the suspension and instability of foreign investment, or due to Rouhani's post-election orientations and the increasing dominance of the core power), achieving good governance (issues such as participation, rule of law, transparency, justice, efficiency, and accountability) by the technocrats established in the executive branch will face more questions and ambiguities. Where is the problem? Policy-making and policymaking. Saeed Hajarian, in a recently published analysis, while conceptually distinguishing between the two concepts of 'policy-making and policymaking,' gives an example: 'If a person has disturbances in the upper limbs such as the arm, elbow, forearm, and wrist, one cannot expect him to solve a knot with the fingertips of wisdom.' From this perspective, he believes that a group that replaces policymaking with policy-making is going astray. Hajarian points out that when the status and potential of upstream oil industries (such as drilling, extraction, processing, and transportation) are unclear, it is impossible to plan in downstream industries (such as refining, chemical, and petrochemical products). From this perspective, he explains that as long as a government does not have a vision, discussing a mission is inappropriate. He points to significant problems that have plagued politics in Iran, such as: 'dual power'; the incorrect design of the organic principles of the constitution that deal with the distribution and redistribution of power, leading to dual power. 'Principles of foreign relations'; the unclear view of the Islamic Republic towards the world, and the lack of determination of Iran's position in international relations and the ambiguity of the country's strategic friends and enemies. 'Planning'; neglecting long-term horizons in planning and design. 'National security'; the ambiguity of the components of national security in Iran. 'We do not know what the preservation of this land depends on; sometimes we talk about exporting the revolution, sometimes we speak of preserving the system at any cost, sometimes we seek continuous revolution, and sometimes we believe that development leads to survival.' And concepts such as 'legitimacy' and 'development' and 'justice.' Based on this assessment and explanations, Hajarian emphasizes: 'With all these problems existing at the upper levels and while the political foundations are still undefined, now some are bound to the role of the iwan (the hall). These domestic policymakers who present their activities as scientific are completely evasive of fundamental discussions.' Thus, he emphasizes the importance of 'politicking' and 'policy-making' and states: 'The way for Rouhani's success is to prioritize policymaking; his government will remain suspended between heaven and earth merely with the presence of policymakers. Rouhani cannot take a step without relying on a group of technocrats... First, solid work, then fine work. Rouhani's choice and preference. Given the current conditions and based on existing evidence, it seems unlikely that Rouhani will abandon 'policymakers' and turn towards 'policy-makers.' He and his companions (including Mohammad Javad Zarif) are bound to the role of the iwan while showing indifference or reluctance to address the aforementioned fundamental issues (including components of national security or dual power in the power structure) or undervaluing their capacity to address them. In such a situation, they rise to fully defend the IRGC and provide complete support for it while overlooking the authoritarianism of the IRGC's intelligence organization or security projects and its interaction with the Guardian Council or the complex and extensive role of the IRGC in the economy and foreign relations. They also turn a blind eye to the threats against journalists, political activists, and civil and professional activists or the continued house arrest of the leaders of the Green Movement, and the negative impact of this on ensuring national solidarity and authority. This confrontation will have no consequence other than strengthening the positions and increasing the negative and anti-national impact of the 'far-right' both inside and outside Iran. If Rouhani and Zarif cannot defend the components that underpin and affirm national security (especially at the soft level and civil society and issues such as increasing and deepening social participation, achieving the sovereignty of the nation, ensuring the fundamental rights of all citizens, and the rule of law and justice and fairness) within the upper echelons of power and the core of the system or explain their vital importance in ensuring sustainable national security, they will leave behind an indefensible record and may well go astray.