Trump's Return: From Major Changes in America to Khamenei's 'Failed' Policy in Tehran

The day Joe Biden stepped into the White House, he stated that he wanted to bridge the significant divide that had emerged in society and reduce polarization, hatred, and enmity to the point of violence. Four years later, however, the results of the November 15 elections in the U.S. showed that Biden had not succeeded in this endeavor, and Trump, by riding on and deepening these divides, regained the keys to the White House. He often set aside the less aggressive speeches written for him by his advisors and returned to his familiar habit of attacking enemies and opponents, stoking the flames of division. This approach frustrated his advisors but primarily excited his audience. Now, as a result of a relatively decisive vote in a free election, he will once again be the occupant of the White House for the next four years, with Congress also falling into Republican hands. The polarization and divide that American society continues to face has various aspects: whether in terms of economic wealth and poverty, the urban-rural divide, or the gap between the educated and those without higher education; between the beneficiaries of globalization and those harmed by it; between supporters of U.S. intervention in the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East and those opposed; between the COVID-19 approaches of Trump and Biden and their opponents; between men worried about the rise of women and women demanding more rights; between the deindustrializing center of America and its coasts; between supporters of LGBTQ rights and their opponents; between environmental advocates concerned about climate change and those who deny the impact of human activities on these changes, etc. Given Trump's approach and stance, it is unlikely that by 2029 the divides in American society will not have deepened further and that liberal democracy in America and the world will not have fallen into a more difficult state, especially with the '2025 Project' aimed at transforming the structure of the American political system and considering the presence of figures like Elon Musk, Robert Kennedy, and Jeff Clark who are expected to hold key positions in the government, as well as the power Trump has gained by relying on a Republican majority in Congress and the Supreme Court. Trump's re-election, with a wealth of experience and support, is significant. Statistics show that Harris's votes in many states were two to three percent lower than Biden's. The Biden administration proudly claimed to have improved the economic situation in America, and the relatively high recent inflation and weakness in the job market were not expected to change voters' positive opinions. However, two days before the election, a joint poll by ABC and Ipsos revealed that 74 percent of respondents said the country was not on the right track, indicating that the Biden administration's perception of public satisfaction did not necessarily align with reality. This negative perception and concern about the economic situation provided a solid basis for Trump to maneuver and question the economic record of the Biden administration and his vice president, Harris. Biden's late withdrawal and Harris's limited time in the election campaigns also contributed to the Democratic candidate's defeat. Harris's special investment and focus on attracting women's votes were not mistakes, but in the face of the appeal of Trump's sometimes gender-biased behavior and slogans for men, and the fears they had about women's empowerment, she lacked a specific idea; polls had already predicted a majority of men's votes would go to Trump, and on election day, a portion of Black, Latino, and Muslim men also cast their votes in favor of Trump. The fact that one would have to search with a magnifying glass for women's names in Trump's potential cabinet is also significant. Nevertheless, the decrease in women's votes for Harris compared to Biden in 2020 is also noteworthy. In response to Trump's intense anti-immigrant propaganda and his emphasis on closing borders, Harris was in a defensive position, and Trump's slogans created more appeal, as had been the case in the previous two elections. Harris's focus on sexual and gender minorities was not a mistake, but perhaps it became so overwhelming that other areas were neglected, giving the opposing candidate a basis to construct a case against Harris in the conservative segment of American society. The New York Times calculated that in the month leading up to the elections, Trump and the Republicans spent a total of $65 million on advertising and maneuvering around Harris's focus on transgender issues; an expense that apparently paid off. Trump did not surpass Biden, but he did overcome both Hillary Clinton and Harris. This indicates that the racial identity of Kamala Harris was not necessarily an issue for the American people, just as it had not been for Obama; however, a significant portion of them still have a problem with the presidency of a woman and consider a man like Trump superior and more powerful in solving problems and facing them and making decisions. Despite all the legitimate concerns about Trump's approaches and policies at the level of America and the world, including regarding Iran, what leaves uncertainty is the unpredictability of some of his behaviors and approaches, as well as the composition of the cabinet he will introduce. In his first term, Trump did not immediately withdraw from the JCPOA, did not immediately kill Qassem Soleimani, and did not promptly implement concessions in favor of Israel (such as moving the embassy to Jerusalem). He hesitated for about 18 months before exiting the JCPOA; 18 months during which Pompeo and Bolton had not yet appeared around him, and Khamenei and his partners missed the chance to take advantage of this opportunity. A clip of the meeting between Shinzo Abe, the then Prime Minister of Japan (containing Trump's message), and Khamenei in 1398 is a telling account of this squandered opportunity. Khamenei told Abe that he did not consider Trump worthy of exchanging messages, and on the same day, two Japanese ships were targeted in waters near Iran. Rand Paul's efforts to bring Mohammad Javad Zarif to meet Donald Trump, or the unsuccessful attempts to reach an agreement during Hassan Rouhani's visit to New York, or Zarif's unsuccessful trip to Beatrice, France during the G7 summit also occurred during Trump's presidency, and in all these events, what negatively affected was the lack of necessary flexibility and authority of Iranian government representatives due to Khamenei's strictness and policy of refusal to negotiate with the U.S. In this round, Europe is also no longer in the relatively softer position it held toward Tehran in the past. The extent to which figures like Richard Grenell or Tom Cotton as Secretary of State or National Security Advisor to Trump, or Benjamin Netanyahu can push him into confrontation with the Islamic Republic is a likely matter, even if this confrontation does not lead to a hot war, which Trump continues to avoid worldwide. However, it is also not out of the question that, conversely, he may pursue a policy based on opening negotiations with Tehran due to his unpredictable behavior and personal desire to record this or that major action, as well as his dealings with figures like Putin and Erdogan. This possibility, if it has a chance of success, depends on changing the behavior and approach of Ali Khamenei and the hard core of power in the Islamic Republic toward the U.S., abandoning the failed policy of 'no war and no negotiation,' and making a fundamental shift in approaches based on the experience of Trump's first term. Is it an impossible expectation from Khamenei and his entourage?