Trump's Second Term; Michael Singh: Today's Options for Iran Are Worse Than Four or Eight Years Ago

Following Donald Trump's victory in the U.S. presidential election, it seemed that everything around the world was waiting for January 20. Will the president, who has already served a four-year term in the White House and is now returning to his former office, pursue the same policies as before or govern with a new approach? Trump's previous presidency was characterized by 'maximum pressure' on the Islamic Republic of Iran. This pressure campaign included increasing economic pressure through hundreds of sanctions, severe criticism of human rights conditions in Iran, and actions such as the assassination of Qassem Soleimani, the former commander of the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guards. The global community in 2025, particularly the Middle East, is experiencing a very different atmosphere from 2016, and for this reason, Michael Singh, the CEO of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, tells Radio Farda that this environment will influence Donald Trump's approaches and decisions. Speculation about what the new Trump administration will do regarding Iran has been two-sided so far. On one hand, there are expectations that the new American administration will reapply maximum pressure on Tehran, with reports emerging about decision-making in this regard. On the other hand, especially with signals coming from Tehran, many are asking whether a path of diplomacy will be pursued. We sat down with Michael Singh to discuss the current conditions, the options available to the new U.S. administration, and the dual path of pressure and diplomacy. Singh believes that Iran's options today are worse than they were four or eight years ago. When asked whether we will see the same approach toward Iran as we did from 2016 to 2020, Singh stated that he thinks Trump's instincts will be very similar to those during his first term. Thus, there will certainly be a tendency to apply severe pressure against Iran, especially economic sanctions, and ultimately a desire to reach some sort of agreement with Iran. Trump has been very clear about his desire for an agreement that specifically addresses the nuclear issue and has expressed optimism that if such an agreement is reached, the U.S. and Iran could have good relations. Singh expects little change in Trump's demands in a second term. He does not believe Trump would want to engage in a military confrontation in the Middle East but also does not want to be the president under whom Iran acquires nuclear weapons or makes significant other advancements. What is very different now is the regional conditions and the global context, as during his first term, the U.S., European countries, and Iran were all part of the 2015 nuclear deal. Trump respected that agreement for about a year before withdrawing from it, which became a focal point of international diplomatic tension. Iran appeared relatively strong and confident in the region at least until the end of Trump's first term. Now, everything has changed. European countries' patience with Iran has run out, and they have taken a tougher stance compared to the Biden administration over the past four years. In the region, Iran has become significantly weakened and is likely in its most vulnerable position since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. This raises the question of whether there are other possibilities for the U.S. or other actors. Trump may start his term and, regardless of his policy, could face a preemptive strike from Israel. As a result, it is truly the context of developments that has changed more than Trump's political inclinations. When discussing Iran's vulnerability in the Middle East, such as proxy forces, the status of Hezbollah, Syria, and also internally, such as the economy and the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic, Singh was asked whether this vulnerable situation is enough for the Trump administration to think that Iran is at a weakness point and that they can negotiate and obtain any concessions they want, or whether they need to apply more pressure to achieve results and bring a completely broken Iran to the negotiating table. Singh believes that a country in a more desperate and pressured situation has fewer alternatives. Therefore, from a classical negotiation standpoint, one might think this presents a better opportunity for reaching a nuclear agreement with Iran, as frankly, Iran's options today seem worse than four or eight years ago. Thus, they may need an agreement and the lifting of sanctions more than ever before. However, he thinks all of this assumes that the regime's leadership acts based on some assessment of advantages and disadvantages, costs and benefits, considering national interests. If the regime truly feels that its survival is at risk, it may view a nuclear agreement with the U.S. as something that further jeopardizes its survival, emboldening internal opponents or other parties. If the regime has such a feeling, this could make negotiations harder. Therefore, the negotiation theory provides one answer, but a closer look at the Iranian regime and how it perceives its situation could yield a different response. Until this proposition is tested, we will not have an accurate answer. One of the discussed topics is Iran's nuclear program, and 2025 is an important year for this issue, as we now have the October deadline in the fall. Europeans are gradually talking about the possibility of a trigger mechanism if negotiations with Iran do not yield results. The question arises whether this does not push Iranians further away from coming to the negotiating table, for instance, exiting the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) instead of negotiating for a deal. Iran finds itself in a position where it may not even be a signatory to the NPT. If the U.S. wants to pursue diplomacy, we have a short window for that, because as you mentioned, we have this convergence of military, diplomatic, and economic pressures on Iran, which could be intensified with a maximum pressure campaign; which I think from the U.S. perspective creates a kind of ideal negotiating condition. This window, in a sense, closes when the possibility of using the snapback or trigger mechanism expires in October, and frankly, one could say September, because in October, Russia will take over the presidency of the UN Security Council and will likely not cooperate with efforts to impose the snapback. Therefore, I think the Trump administration, if it wants to pursue diplomacy, sees this upcoming time as absolutely critical. But this is a limited opportunity, as Iran's nuclear program has advanced significantly. I think there is a serious concern that with further delays from the West, Iran will have time and opportunity to cross the nuclear threshold, and it may have additional motivation to do so because it feels more exposed and vulnerable. Many of its other tools, whether proxy forces or its missile capabilities, have been degraded or destroyed. Thus, I think we are looking at a narrow diplomatic window that could lead to military action or military conflict. I think 2025 looks like this. Iran must make its own decision. Does it want to take advantage of this diplomatic window, or does it want to harden its position? If it hardens its position, I think we may be on a path to conflict. Regarding such a diplomatic path between Iran and the U.S., how do you think Israel, as a U.S. ally, will react? I think Israel will become anxious. The first question is whether Israel will even wait that long. Because there is a discussion in Israel that we have essentially destroyed Hezbollah. We have destroyed Hamas. The Assad regime is gone. The time has come to deal with Iran itself, and given Iran's military vulnerability, there is no better time than now to do this. It is unclear whether the Israeli government believes this or what decision it will make. Therefore, President Trump may find himself involved in Israeli military action and may indeed have to grapple with the consequences of a significant Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear program. Israel and other countries in the region will look at U.S. diplomacy with Iran with some fear, as no one really knows what the outcome will be or how such a deal will address regional issues. Will it be a part that will not be sufficiently consulted? Therefore, part of U.S. policy must be to communicate and reassure those allies, and perhaps even to involve them in the process to some extent. When you were talking about preemptive action, I thought that whatever Israel has done in the past year has always had U.S. support, especially in operational terms. Will Israel be able to take action against Iran without Washington's support? I think U.S. support is critical for Israel's ability to pursue its military objectives in the region. Now whether this is in the form of equipment, which I think will obviously continue under the Trump administration. In fact, people in the Trump administration have talked about reducing the restrictions that the Biden administration had placed on Israel, but also this support takes forms such as increased U.S. military presence in the region, aircraft carriers, fighter jets, missiles as well. You remember, Iran's attacks on Israel or attempts to attack Israel were largely intercepted by U.S. forces and regional forces, not just by Israel. Undoubtedly, there is an open question of whether the Trump administration, despite all its verbal support for Israel, will be willing to make this military commitment. Especially when key figures in the administration like Vice President-elect J.D. Vance and others say that the U.S. needs to distance itself from the Middle East. The U.S. needs to somehow take care of its resources and not get stuck in this region. Well, obviously, an Israeli attack on Iran would have unpredictable consequences and could lead to some form of unlimited commitment from the U.S. And I think right now, no one in the region really knows how the Trump administration will view this kind of scenario. This brings me to my last question, which is that as we await the start of the Trump administration, there are many questions about who makes these decisions and who is going to advise Mr. Trump on an issue like Iran. Who is important here? Is it the State Department? The National Security Advisor? I think that person is President Trump. We know two things about President Trump and how he makes these big decisions. First, he likes to consult widely. He will talk to his Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense in the way that presidents do. But President Trump, uniquely, will talk to a wider range of people. People who dine with him at Mar-a-Lago. He asks them what they think. People in business, those who happen to be in his office in the White House. He clearly likes to consult widely, to talk broadly about the big decisions he has to make. But ultimately, it will be President Trump who makes that decision. President Trump's style is top-down, much more than other U.S. presidents. A model that, frankly, is very familiar to our friends in the Middle East, where decisions really start from the top and trickle down for implementation rather than being built from the bottom up. So I think this decision will be President Trump's, but he will talk to many people before making a decision.