Trump's Strategy Against the Islamic Republic: Regime Change or Containment?

With the change of the U.S. president, the question arises as to what Trump's strategy against the Islamic Republic is: regime change or containment? Obama left no doubt from the beginning that he did not have a regime change strategy in mind for Iran. On various occasions, including his Nowruz messages, he used the full title 'Islamic Republic of Iran.' His secret messages to Ayatollah Khamenei all indicated that he was thinking of a path other than regime change, which was referred to as the smart power doctrine. According to this doctrine, the U.S. utilized a combination of its soft and hard power against the Islamic Republic, with the aim not only of ensuring the cessation of Tehran's military nuclear program but also, as explicitly stated by Obama, 'changing the regime's behavior' rather than changing the regime itself. With the fundamental change in U.S. leadership, does Trump think of regime change? Or will Trump adopt the smart power doctrine to change the regime's behavior? Aside from these two options, the third option is the implementation of the Iran containment doctrine. Hossein Mousavian, a senior diplomat of the Islamic Republic, believes that due to the Republican majority in Congress and the composition of Trump's cabinet, the current model of confrontation with the Islamic Republic is the first option, namely regime change. Such a foreign policy framework requires at least three global collaborations: cooperation with Moscow, alignment with the European Union, and alignment with the Arab world. Among these, the Arab world, led by Saudi Arabia, has placed its spearhead against Tehran. Adel al-Jubeir, the Saudi foreign minister, described Tehran as a 'threat' in a conversation with the new UN Secretary-General. This position is not merely Riyadh's. Riyadh, using its tools in the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Arab League, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, has all three organizations behind it. The EU's alignment with Trump largely corresponds to the behavior of the U.S. government towards the EU. It is unlikely that Trump can form a coalition similar to that witnessed during Obama's time, especially if the U.S. policy of rapprochement with Moscow alienates the EU. However, Moscow's alignment with the U.S. may be the most important parameter; if Trump succeeds in establishing a solid bridge with Putin, he could prepare a structured plan for regime change in Iran. Trump's government's confrontation plan with the Islamic Republic can be either a maximalist or a minimalist program. The maximalist program aims to achieve regime change, which faces serious obstacles. Since Trump does not believe in the smart power doctrine and has not relied on the regime's behavior change option, his next option is to implement the 'Iran containment doctrine,' which was previously the cornerstone of Bill Clinton's foreign policy in confronting Iran and Iraq during Saddam's time. This doctrine, known as dual containment, was designed by Martin Indyk with the aim of ensuring Israel's security and supporting Arab countries, and it was implemented during the Clinton administration. Among the various parameters of this doctrine, at least three main headings will now also be employed in Trump's administration. These three are: • The arrangement of forces in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East in favor of the U.S. • Preventing Iran from establishing normal trade and political relations with other countries. • The disbelief that moderates can be used against hardliners in Iran. Among these three parameters, it can be imagined that the first will be welcomed by the Gulf Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia, to the extent that the Arab coalition that Saudi Arabia has organized against the Houthis will be entirely utilized in line with this idea. Regarding the second, it is highly likely that the policy of intensifying sanctions against Iran to target Iran's weak economy will be prioritized by the Trump administration. This round of sanctions could be justified by Iran's missile program, human rights violations, or support for terrorism. Regarding the ease of the last point (support for terrorism), it is sufficient to note that the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, in its latest summit, specifically labeled Hezbollah as a terrorist organization and the Islamic Republic as a supporter of terrorism. Such groundwork, especially from the most credible organization in the Islamic world, paves the way for the U.S. to impose sanctions on Iran. The policy of containing Iran ultimately aims to intensify international isolation to return Iran to the pre-JCPOA status. In the early weeks of Trump's entry into the White House, he has come to terms with the reality that tearing up the JCPOA (as he had campaigned) is not in his best interest, but this does not mean he cannot, with measures similar to those employed by Obama, return Iran to the conditions of pre-JCPOA isolation. It is strongly believed that in Netanyahu's meeting with Trump, strategies aimed at intensifying Iran's isolation will be discussed. In this strategy, military action is not the first option. The first option is to implement all measures that would intensify Iran's isolation. The Middle East that Obama left behind, from Trump's, Israel's, and Saudi Arabia's perspective, is one that has become a playground for Iran. Saudi Arabia always emphasizes the Iranian officials' statement that Iran now has a significant presence in four Arab capitals (Sanaa, Baghdad, Damascus, and Beirut). Such a Middle East is neither desirable for Saudi Arabia nor for Israel and the U.S. If Trump's strategy is to contain Iran, it must have measures in mind that can reduce Iran's influence in each of these capitals, as Tehran views each of these countries as its 'strategic depth.' It is no coincidence that in a phone call between the Iraqi Prime Minister and Trump, Haider al-Abadi announced the outcome of his negotiations with Trump as Baghdad choosing 'neutrality' in the Tehran-Washington conflict. Although the contents of the phone conversation between Abadi and Trump were not disclosed, it can be imagined that Trump's main request from Abadi was to counter Iran's influence in Iraq. Trump will have the same request from Michel Aoun as well.